1.0 Introduction
The Islamic Republic of Iran was formed in 1979, after overthrowing the last monarch. Therefore, it is regarded as a revolutionary theocratic State. The State is made up of mainly Shiite Muslims and it is has long opposed secular rule. The state has a constitution, though Sharia law is popularly used in all matters (Axworthy, 2013). The republic recognizes borders and it is a member of the United Nations. Additionally, the economy of Iran is heavily reliant on energy and international trade. Officially, the president who is elected by the people is the one in-charge of the government. However, the Supreme Leader has the last say on all matters and is the commander-in-chief thereby limiting the powers of the president. The ruling regime utilizes a religious philosophy that has established a council of experts that help govern the country, through the interpretation of the Quran (NATO Review, 2016). According to Axworthy (2013), the council of experts is tasked with electing and dismissing the Supreme leader in case of death or the leaders loses popularity with the people. The Supreme Leader exerts his policies and political ideologies, has the power to declare war and appoints or dismisses members of the Judiciary and state radio and television networks. The constitution provides for a parliament whose activities are supervised by the council of experts (Mabon, 2012, p.89). Therefore, in the Shia democracy, the Supreme Leader is at the top of the power structure.
According to Lippman, Vatanka, and Mattair (2011), the relations between Iran and most of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have been strained because Iran had tried to exert Islamic revolution to most of the GCC member states during the 1980’s. The GCC was formed as a security pact between the member countries against a perceived threat from Iran. Some of the actions that have led to the strain include the coup attempt in Bahrain by Iran in 1981, inciting of the Saudi Arabian Shi’ite minority during the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. The atmosphere of mutual distrust and hostility was as a result of Iran’s interference in the domestic affairs of the other countries (Mabon, 2012, p.93). At first, the interference was ideologically motivated, but then it turned into a strategic-motivated affair. The countries that would later unite to form the GCC, felt threatened by the militant attitude exhibited by Iran. The countries responded by implementing three policies, they finally formed the GCC in 1981, they strengthened their security and military alliance with the US, and they offered Iraq support during the Iran-Iraq war (Copper, 2013).
1.1 Statement of the Problem
One of the main reaons the GCC was created was a result of perceived threat from Iran. The members of the Council wanted a security pact that would counter the radical activities of Iran in the area. The republic plays a destructive role of diplomatic quarrels and stalling of economic negotiations. The constant interference into the affairs of the member countries of the GCC and threats caused the formation of the council. Therefore, there is a mutual animosity between the states of the GCC and Iran that has been characterized by a cold war and political uncertainty (Hooglund, 1987, p.15).
The rationale for conducting this research is to establish the role that Iran has played in the Gulf area; to establish the Republic of Iran as either a threat or a friend to the GCC. The republic has apparently exploited the numerous wars experienced in the area and it has exploited every opportunity to emerge as a very strong regional influence politically, socially, and economically. It is important to recognize that the Iranian influence and rise to becoming a regional power is as a result of its revolutionary ideology. The Iranians believe that Islamic Resistance is the answer to fighting against the western imperialism and religious extremism. The country has often provided the much needed military and political support during regional crisis. For example, during the fall of Mosul in Iraq, Iran offered Baghdad the military and logistical support needed. Furthermore, due to the financial stability emanating from its oil reserves, Iran has endured various sanctions throughout the decades and still emerged stronger and more influential than any other state in the region (Habibi, 2010, p.45).
1.2 Aim
The principal aim of the proposal research is to evaluate the role played by Iran in the Gulf Cooperation Council’s security by establishing the country as either a threat or a friend to the GCC. To achieve this aim the following objectives will be pursued;
1.2.1. Objectives
- To evaluate the threat that Iran poses, as a political power, to the different GCC member states.
- To investigate the effect of the republic of Iran on the stability, integration, and security of the GCC states.
- To investigate the Iranian Foreign Policy and its position from various issues related to the GCC.
- To establish the nature of the relationship between Iran and the different GCC members.
It is also important to note that Iran holds much sway on the politics of the Middle East region. The country also has close ties with Syria and its foreign policies and financial muscles seem to work best for it. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate how Iran influences regional politics and security in the area. With regards to this, there have been quite a number of various warring groups sponsored by Iran and Saudi Arabia in particular for the purpose of expanding their areas of power in the Middle East. This hegemonic brawl places these two countries in a contest of military and political supremacy in the Gulf region. With the focus of this dissertation being on the role of Iran on the stability of the GCC, Alghunaim (2014) asserts that Iran purports to be the Shi’a protector while Saudi Arabia purports to be Sunnis leader. As such, there exists an increasing Iranian influence in the region since Saudi Arabia tends to rely much on the US military umbrella of which there’s no absolute certainty as to whether Washington may provide full-protection against Iran in case of a conflict. For several years Iran has felt encircled politically and militarily by the United States and its allies including Saudi Arabia. Iran has always believed that such an encirclement is basically a prelude to attempting a change of regime (Alghunaim, 2014).
In a bid to earn back its trust, Iran has made several economic deals with different members of the GCC as a strategic move of healing its strained economy after all the sanctions. Therefore, the choice of this topic was informed by the need to investigate the role that Iran plays in the Middle East and in GCC security. Additionally, the influence that the Republic has so far gained over countries such as Syriaand is also vital in understanding how Iran’s political powers have increased in the Gulf region.
1.3 Plan of Chapters
Chapter 1
Introduction – The first chapter introduces the theocratic state of Iran and the relationship between the republic and other GCC members prior to the formation of its formation in 1981. Comprises of study objectives, research questions, background among others. It also entails the research methodology which are the methods used to collect data and information used during the study (Kothari, 2005). The thesis has utilized secondary resources such as journal articles, newspapers, books and other materials. The use of primary sources is not practical in the research because of the various challenges and constraints such as time, travel cost, and security. Therefore, a comprehensive investigation into the secondary sources will suffice in satisfying the research objectives.
This dissertation will conduct thorough research on the questions research question with regards to the problem stated in the fore pages of the dissertation. The methodology outlines the necessary steps taken while conducting the research. The introduction explains the thesis of the paper and keeps the reader hooked (Moore & Cassel, 2011). Moreover, the methodology is useful in researching and explaining the questions posed in the research question section. As such, the research methodology helps in providing comprehensive answers to the subject matter. The research design for the thesis will be qualitative and the use of secondary research methods will be employed in gathering the relevant data. The dissertation will utilize the use of in-depth qualitative data. The data will be obtained from materials such as interview extracts, newspaper articles, scholarly articles and books. To thoroughly interpret and explain the data, the proposal will use a realistic approach.
Secondary data is that which is collected and recorded by another person other than the user. The data is collected over a long time and it is readily available for the users. Additionally, it is cheap to obtain and very comprehensive (Vartanian, 2011). Secondary sources of information include reading materials such as journals, newspapers, books and other relevant materials. Presently, most of the secondary sources are found online in different websites and online sources (Church, 2002, p. 39). The use of these secondary sources will be essential in the realization of the study objectives. The use of secondary data involves selecting and discussing descriptive and theoretical materials in context. Therefore, the proposal will have a detailed comparison of the different theories and research from different authors in terms of the applicability. However, if we use primary research we will have more originated work and the depth we can go into would be better because of the limition of study time period.
The research is helpful in understanding the role played by Iran in the Middle East and the security threat posed by the spread of its ideologies to the member states of the GCC and worldwide. It is important to understand how the conflict between Iran and the GCC came to be and why the country is perceived as a threat to the integration. The dissertation will use the theory of realism to evaluate the role played by Iran in the security of the GCC. The GCC countries have downgraded their relations with Iran due to the various reasons explained in the proposal.
Therefore, the aim of this dissertation is to investigate the role that the Islamic Republic of Iran plays in GCC security. In a bid to comprehend this theme, the study will concentrate on the factors that led to the formation of the GCC and the relationship between Iran and the GCC.
Chapter 2
Literature Review of the dissertation is the second chapter which involves interpreting different information from different authors with dissimilar point of views and presenting the relevant arguments.
Chapter 3
The third chapter will discuss the first two objectives as they are related to the forign policy and relations between Iran and GCC.
Chapter 4
The fourth chapter will discuss the later two objectives, as a matter of security, stability and effect on GCC internal affairs. Thereafter the dissertation ultimately concludes on the role of Iran in the stability of the GCC, a conclusion which will finalize the research question of the dissertation.
2.0 Literature Review
The main objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the role that Iran plays in the Gulf Cooperation Council’s security. Hence, given the objectives and the research questions of the thesis, the appropriate theoretical framework for the research would be the international theory of realism. This school of thought is significant to the study because it helps explain the different elements of the actions of Iran as explained in this section.
2.1 Literature review
According to Baldwin (1997) security has taken many dimensions in the modern-era. The appropriate interpretation of Security in the context of this thesis defines security as a political value is not autonomous, but rather depends on the different societal values and systems. Security is achieved through the elimination of perceived dangers, threats, and vulnerabilities. The perceptions are different depending on individuals. Thus, the definition of security is based on the perception of lawmakers.
After the 1979 revolution, Iran sought to export its ideologies in the Gulf region as well as globally (Kurzman, 1996, p. 162). Thereby, Tehran offered the needed assistance to Lebanon to act as an alternate army against Israel. However, the Iranian reach was limited by its war with Iraq and the USA dual containment policy in the 1980’s and 1990’s respectively. According to Barzegar (2008, p. 53), Iran cannot compete with the hegemony of the USA in the Gulf. However, in the 2000’s Iran got a chance to play an influential role in Iraq during the US invasion in Iraq. Iran has been seen as a constant threat because of different actions in the country has taken since the Islamic revolution of 1979. The Republic has declared itself the defender of Shia causes in the world (Alghunaim, 2014). As a result, the state is constantly meddling in Bahrain, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. The Republic supported political reforms in Bahrain where the majority population is Shia and the monarchy Sunni. The state has also openly criticized the mistreatment of Shia minorities in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province. Furthermore, in 2016, there was a diplomatic crisis between Tehran and Riyadh after a Saudi Shia cleric was executed. Finally, in Yemen, the Iranians have shown support for the Shia-oriented Houthi movement (NATO Review, 2016).
According to Alghunaim (2014), Iran has been perceived as a security threat in the Gulf region for a long time. However, the Republic does not necessarily view all the members of the GCC as its enemy. Saudi Arabia is the biggest threat to Iran due to its size and oil reserves, which are substantially bigger than Iran’s. Saudi Arabia has had a very constrained relationship with Tehran due to the constant interference into the Saudi Arabia’s politics, the intensification of the nuclear program in Iran and the 2005 arrival of Ahmadinejad. The GCC has, thereby being afraid of the objectives of the Iranian regional policies. After the USA invasion of Iraq, a power vacuum was left and Iran was fast to jump on it. Thus, Iran gained more influence on Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria in the mid-2000. Gause (2014, p.14) article agrees with the assertions of Alghunaim and further claims that during the time Saudi Arabia decided to take a leading role in the limiting and rolling back the power and influence that Iran had in the Gulf. However, due to a weak military, the efforts were futile.
According to Tsoran (2007), Iran poses a serious military threat in the Gulf region due to its nuclear program. Various GCC states have reported sighting military exercises by the Iranians in and around the Gulf area. Further, Saudi Arabia reported that the Iran has occupied and militarized the areas of the Tunbs and Abu Musa. The three Emirati islands have been a bone of contention between the two states because they lie in a strategic position. Despite, the occupation and militarization of the islands, Saudi Arabia has the support of the other GCC members over their claim to the islands that are in a shipping lane to the west of the Strait of Hormuz. Further Gasiorowsky (2007, p.129) furthers the assertions and claims that the suspicions of a speculated and ambiguous foreign policy and enhanced nuclear program by the Iranians have raised tension among the GCC. The reason for the security threat is the uncertainty on whether the program is part of an actual military aspect, as Khan (2009) puts it.
Furthermore, Iran has been a major supporter of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, the Republic has vested interest in the territory of Syria that would be diminished if Assad fell from power. As a result, Iran has provided assistance to the Syrian government through sending supplies and training missions. The Republic has conducted training to the various Syrian law enforcement forces with the use of its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Further, the IRGC has also been deployed to Syria to help Assad’s hold onto power. According to a report by the American Enterprise Institute, Iran’s deployment of the military to Syria means the Republic is able and willing to cross the border for its vested interests. Goodarzi (2015) further asserts that Iran has been supporting the pro-government Shabiha militias in Syria. The Iraq Shiites have also publicly joined the Syrian in the fight after numerous calls by the Iranians for the Shia community to help Assad fight against the ISIS that is dominated by Sunni’s. The support of the Shia’smilitants in Syria is a disquieting indicator of the development of the sectarian conflict in the Gulf. The The Shi’a crescent clashed with the Sunni crescent in Syria. The results of the clash are the Iran’s extensive support to the Syrian regime. Seznec (2013), claims that Saudi Arabia has been low-key supporting the extremist in Syria because they perceive some kind of betrayal from the Syrian government. The Saudi’s have assumed that the civil war in Syria is a strategic action by Iran to take over control over the region and the entire Islamic world.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
The two main theories of international relations are liberalism and realism (Treviño, 2013, p.382). The use of realism as the theoretical framework of this study is clearly presented. Realism asserts that all nations work only for their self-interest, and to increase their power relative to the other states. The key facets of a realist theory include: military power is required in this harsh and dangerous world, every country’s goal is to self-preserve, and international laws are only as powerful as states accept them (Burchill et al., 2001). In this dissertation, realism is the best suited theory to base my research on because of its above-mentioned assumptions. According to Donnelly (2000), the theory claims that human nature is very egotistical and as a result, there arises conflicts because every leader wants to have the greatest military and economic powers, and thus the most influence in the international relations. Thus, international theory of realism can be used to further understand the role that Iran plays in the security of the GCC. Further, the GCC states can avoid further conflicts by aligning their interests with those of Iran.
2.3 The Choice of Theoretical and/or Analytical Perspectives
Realism is regarded as the most appropriate theoretical framework because it thoroughly analyzes the conflicts involved in the international relations. The theory analyzes the roles played by both state actors and non-state actors in a conflict. Realism assumes that countries enter into agreements with other nations just to further their interests as well as to self-preserve. Any agreement or pact made must be for the benefit of all the parties involved equally (Khoshandam, 2015). The central theme of realism that is the state’s being the most vital in international relations explain why it is necessary to study and research more on the role that Iran plays in the security of the GCC.
Realism as well attempts to explain and prescribe political relations. In this case, it is best suited to explain the political relations between Iran and the rest of the GCC. It has an underlying assumption that influence ought to be the ultimate end of any political action irrespective of whether the action is in the international or domestic arena. In the international arena, realism shows how nations strive to maximize their influenc and power just like what the research question is focusing on concerning Iran on the GCC. Nations basically in pursuit of power for their interests; a typical example of Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East.
Political realism asserts that anarchy is what basically characterizes the international community since there exists no superseding world government responsible for the enforcement of a common code of conduct to be observed by all countries (Donnelly, 2000). This relates well with the case of Iran in thye Middle East since there is no world government regulating its advances in the Middle East comprising the GCC countries. Realism supposes the idea that relation between self-interested political entities is basically amoral. Realism further asserts that there exists neither justice nor morality without a presiding body responsible for legislation of codes of ethics. In connection to this , it postulates that without a common power or a power great enough for security of all, then every man or country stands to lawfully rely on his self-strength and art for restraint against the other men or countries (Pham, 2010, p. 69). As such, this dissertation is basically purposed to establish the role played by Iran in the stability of GCC using realism.
Realism is quite evident in the Middle East among the GCC countries. In absence of a supreme tribunal or international power , nations perceive one another with fear, mistrust and hostility, and threats or conflicts (Macleod, 1998, p. 193). A typical example is that which exists between Saudi Arabia and Arabia. It is important to note that Iran is the second largest in population after Suadi Arabia in the Middle East. Precisely, realism best suits this dissertation as it can be seen openly that the ideals of realism are the very ideals being used in the Middle East by the GCC countries with Iran being one of the major users of this philosophy.
3.0 Chapter 3
3.1 The Threat that Iran Poses, as a Political Power, to GCC Member States
The increased threat posed by Iran facilitated the formation of the GCC organization in the attempt of increasing its military power. With this prime role, therefore, it becomes apparent that Iran poses a security threat to the prosperity of the GCC. This is evident from the various strategies taken by this nation to enhance its security and military capabilities against the GCC. Gawdat and Barracks (2007, p. 5) argue that Iran is forming a nuclear power, which is in its finalization process. This is a major threat posed by this nation to the progress of the GCC, as it causes the power imbalance in the region (Cordesman, & Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012, p. 86; Ward, 2012). Kishk (2014) adds that the urge of building this military power was after the invasion of Iraq that caused imbalance and instability in the region. Consequentially, Iran developed its military power using offensive means such as cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and asymmetric warfare, which are all used as a defensive measure (Malek, 2013; Adib-Moghaddam, 2008, p. 24). Besides, the security threat posed by this nation over the GCC organization was intensified from the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the U.S. on the nuclear deal (Gawdat & Barracks, 2007, p. 5; Alazdi, 2015; Pollack, 2003, p. 3; Hussain & Abdullah, 2015, p. 475). The speculations that the U.S. is willing to strike a deal with Iran indicate the way the U.S. is taking side with Iran. This is a threat or a point of concern to the GCC members who have earlier been assured of the U.S. support in the attempt of stabilizing the region. Moreover, the GCC nations are scared of the fact that once the nuclear deal has been signed, Iran will emerge as a dominant nation in the region, which is unacceptable to the GCC (Malek, 2013).
The existence of such fear has been seen as a key source of political instability in the region. According to Malek (2013), this is because the success of this deal will possibly stimulate the development of the nuclear power by the GCC nations as a way of countering the capabilities of Iran. For instance, Saudi Arabia has thought of the possible alternatives to disrupt this deal by collaborating with France and Russia who have the capability of reducing the damage of the nuclear agreement (Malek, 2013; Legrenzi, 2008, p. 107). The move made by the Saudi is an indicator of the Saudi’s interest of protecting its citizens as well as maintaining regional stability. This possibility has threatened the American officials who are afraid that the Saudi leadership might obtain the nuclear weapons once the terms of the agreement have been reached (Malek, 2013; Hussain & Abdullah, 2015, p. 475). The probability of these actions taking place destroys the attempts made by the GCC members to re-unite with the Iranians.
The security threat facing the Gulf States has forced the Oman nation to implement a foreign policy that facilitates the participation of foreign powers in stabilizing the regional conflict. Therefore, Oman establishes exceptional relationships with international nations that have substantial roles in the region such as Britain and the United Nations (Fulton & Farrar-Wellman, 2011). The establishment of these relationships has enabled the Oman to achieve diplomacy neutrality even after the critical moments in the region such as Iraq-Iran War (Legrenzi, 2008, p. 111). However, Iran plays a substantial role in reinforcing the security mechanisms of the Oman. This is because of the Omani-Iranian reunion that has always remained strong and solid in fighting the penetration of the Saudi Wahhabist (Fulton & Farrar-Wellman, 2011; Mattair, 2007, p. 133). The presence of the Wahhabist Islam reinforced the bilateral relations between these two countries since they were in need of each other in the fight of this Islamist group (Bowen & Moran, 2015, p. 694). Therefore, the desire to fight this group has enabled the establishment of a good mutual relationship between Iran and Oman, which has promoted the security power of Oman as a Gulf State.
Even in the peak of Iran-Iraq War, Kamrava (2011, p. 56) records that the Oman supported Iran despite the rest of the Gulf regimes offering military support to the Iraqi army. This was clearly demonstrated when Oman was requested to prohibit Iran and instead separated them economically and diplomatically in 1987 (Kamrava, 2011, p. 76; Kamrava, 2012, p. 101; Sayigh, 1991, p. 487). Further, after the war, the Oman mediated between the renewal of the relations between the Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as between the UAE and Iran (Al-Bolushi, 2016, p. 384). Such moves strengthened the relationship between the Oman and Iran, which has promoted the political power of the Oman in the face of Iran, unlike other GCC nations. Therefore, it is apparent that Iran is an ally to the Oman from their close relations that have reinforced their political and military power in the face of their enemies.
Moreover, there is the likelihood that the GCC nations will be splatted by the ongoing nuclear deal negotiations between Iran and the US. This is because of different perspectives that each of the GCC nations has towards these negotiations with some being more resistant such as the Saudi Arabia and others being comfortable with either of the results such as Oman (Chubin, 2009, p.176; Chubin & Tripp, 2014). The nuclear deal majorly shows the reunion of the United States with Iran, which will increase the Iranian military power (Alcaro & Dessì, 2013, p. 16; Khalilzad, 1995, p. 95). This is contrary to the will of the strongest members of the GCC that seek to have the dominant position in the regional. As such, Ulrichsen (2015, p. 60) claims that the GCC states such as the Saudi and UAE are likely to stimulate the Islamic Republic into actions as a way of disrupting the integration of Iran in the regional order by the US.
Iran has had negative influences to the Bahrain. Initially, Iran attempted a coup in Bahrain in 1981 together with incitement of the Saudi’s Shiite minority during the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca (Chubin & Tripp, 2014). These actions revealed the potential harm that Iran can have as a superior nation in this region (Gause, 2015; Kechichian, 2016, p. 87). The rising effect of the Shiite in Bahrain in 2011 has been associated with the influence of Iran. Therefore, it has been alleged that Iran has been the key cause of the internal unrest in Bahrain, as it has been supporting the protestant groups in this region. Consequentially, the GCC has deployed the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) troops to counter the effect of Iran and suppress the unrest caused by these protesting groups in Bahrain (Kahan, 2016. P. 33). Consequentially, both Iran and GCC condemned each other’s action, which has continually deteriorated the relationship between Iran and the GCC states.
Conversely, Iran has an unsolved dispute with Kuwait over the offshore gas field called al-Durra by Kuwaitis and Arash by Iran. Each of these nations is claiming this field; thus acting as a source of conflict between these two nations (Al Shayji, 2014). However, Iran has attempted to resolve this conflict by calling for joint development. Nevertheless, the Iran-Kuwait relation deteriorated after the Islamic Revolution (Charountaki, 2016, p. 206). The UAE and Iran have unresolved dispute concerning three islands Greater Tunb, Abu Musa, and Smaller Tunb in the Persian Gulf. Initially, Iran occupied these islands before the British withdrawal in the Gulf and the attainment of independent of the UAE in 1971 (Gause, 2015). Later on, the UAE started claiming the islands; thus acting as a source of dispute between these two nations that is yet to be resolved.
The continuous regional unrest between Iran and the GCC countries has stimulated possible negotiations to bridge the differences between these regions. The GCC has supported the Iranian right to operate nuclear under a peaceful program. However, the GCC has opposed the production of nuclear weapons by Iran, which has continually heightened the rivalry between these regions (Gause, 2015). As illustrated, Iran has both negative and positive impact on individual GCC nations. This has caused a difference in the perception of each nation towards Iran’s activities. For instance, the Saudi is more oppressive of Iranian activities while Oman is an ally of Iran. Moreover, the GCC states have created an alliance with the Northeastern Africa such as Ethiopia and Egypt meant to weaken Iran’s power and, in turn, strengthen theirs (Stratfor, 2016). This has allowed the GCC states to strike economic and security deals with these nations that are important in improving their unity against Iran;s security threat.
3.2 The Effect Iran on the Stability, Integration, and Security of the GCC States
Iran’s cultural relations with the GCC has been a source of contention between these two parties. The rift between the Shiite and Sunni has been the prime source of conflict between these regions. As argued by Suwaidi (1996, p. 41), the revolution of Iran in 1979 started causing fear to the GCC states following the declaration that these regimes were not compatible with the Islam as they acted as the American Imperialism. The threat posed by Iran together with the revolution of the Shiite population intensified the instability of the Gulf State (Suwaidi, 1996, p. 92). Consequentially, the GCC supported the Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 and later attempted to peaceful resolve the situation after the war turned against the Iraq (Kahan, 2016, p. 31; Taremi, 2005, p. 28). Nevertheless, the end of this war did not bridge the gap between Iran and the Gulf States; instead, it widened this gap (Khalilzad, 1995, p. 96). For instance, the Saudi Arabia started enforcing stricter control rules over the Iranian pilgrims during the Hajj season while oppressing their Shiite population (Patterson, 2015, p. 4).
The nuclear deal has created a division among the GCC states (Shabaneh, 2015). Despite having a common role in countering the threat by Iran, these nations have different perspectives on the nuclear deal that have affected their unity and; thus their stability (Khalilzad, 1995, p. 99). For instance, the Saudi and Bahrain’s leaders have regarded Iran as a predatory state that is aiming to use the nuclear program to cause chaos throughout the Middle East region. However, states such as Emirate of Dubai, Oman, and Qatar have praised the attempts of Iran in the deal and claim the deal should be handled in a diplomatic way (Shabaneh, 2015). This perspective reveals that Iran should be integrated into the development initiatives of the GCC states. The difference in the perception of each of these nations put a clear distinction between the interests and perception of each of the Gulf state (Kahan, 2016, p. 37). This has not only affected the stability of these states in the fight against Iran in pursuing the nuclear deal, but has also influenced the integration of their effort in the fight against Iran.
Gawdat and Barracks (2007, p. 5) claim that since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has grown to be the beneficiary of this war. Since then, Iran’s influence in the region has intensified, which has resulted in the security instability of the GCC states (Colombo, 2012). Iraq used to possess the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that has ballistic and unconventional capabilities that were later posed by Iran (Gawdat & Barracks, 2007, p. 5). The integration of these weapons with the ongoing negotiations on the nuclear deal has frightened the GCC states with the fear that Iran will increase its influence in the region as well as intimidate its neighbors and challenge the U.S. involvement in the region. This presents the growing potential of Iran power in the region, which challenges the strength and security of the GCC states.
However, Iran has numerous positive attributes to the integration, security and stability of the GCC states. First, Iran has positively contributed to the formation of the constructive forces such as post-Khomeini leadership that has acted fairly to the new independent Islamic countries in Central Asia (Al Shayji, 2014). Iran has facilitated the formation of a positive relationship with the Islamic states instead of building a pro-Iranian column in these nations (Ottaway, 2009, p. 16). Further, Al Shayji (2014) notes that some GCC states view the nuclear deal of Iran as a potential capability of reinforcing the security of the Gulf region against other external threats. This perspective allows the GCC states to also reinforce their security mechanisms from the idea that they will also develop their nuclear once Iran has signed the deal with the United States (Ulrichsen, 2009; Ottaway, 2009, p. 33).
Conversely, Anthony (1993, p. 109) notes that Tehran assisted in freeing the pro-Iranian groups held hostage in Lebanon. Such assistance revealed that some Iranians are less malice against the GCC states and their Western partners such as France and U.S. Such attempts have promoted the integration of the GCC and Iran attempts in fighting their common enemies (Kashgari, 2011, p. 1; Momani, 2008, p. 234). These among other attempts indicate that Iran has a desire to promote GCC in the fight of their enemies as well as maintaining peace and security in the Gulf region.
Iran has been involved in a variety of activities that wholly affect the stability and security of the GCC states. For instance, Ulrichsen (2009) argues that Tehran rhetorically supported the rebels that had seized Mecca in 1979 while Iran also attempted a coup in Bahrain in 1981. The GCC states cannot also forget the invective threats from Tehran towards all of its states in 1980 (Ulrichsen, 2015, p. 54; Kahan, 2016, p. 35). These threats have constituted to the instability in the region, and the GCC states cannot trust them. Therefore, the GCC member states perceive Iran as a major threat to the peaceful coexistence to the Gulf region. Moreover, Iran has continued to support the destabilizing groups across the world such as Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Gaza, and Lebanon (Ulrichsen, 2009; Zanders, 1995). In addition, Iran has continued to train its militants as a way of upsetting the political status quo of the region as well as its occupation of the three UAE islands. With such a record, Iran continues to have a substantial role in influencing the stability and security of the GCC states.
4.0 Chapter 4
4.1 The Iranian Foreign Policy and its Position from Various Issues Related to the GCC
The Foreign policy of any state represents a crucial component in ensuring stability and a good relationship between nations. Currently, foreign policy has a significant role in the management of the interstate relationship from the way states have grown to be more complex. In addition, the increase in a number of international players such as non-state actors, multilateral organizations, and individual stats has complicated the policy making process (Ostovar, 2016; Sadeghinia, 2011, p. 112). Besides, Ostovar (2016) illustrates that the explosion of globalization has facilitated the way nations relate to each other, which has as well contributed to the foreign policies of different states. Therefore, foreign policy plays a substantial role in managing the growing interstate relationship across the globe.
Since the establishment of Iran from the revolution in 1979, the country has faced several challenges. The foreign policy of Iran after the revolution has been based on several objectives and ideals that are embedded in its constitution (Katzman, 2016; Sadeghinia, 2011, p. 88). The major objectives guiding the foreign policy include the national security, preservation of its independence, and attainment of long-term sustainable development (Osiewicz, 2014; Davies, 2008, p. 212). Moreover, as argued by Katzman (2016), Iran wishes to improve its regional and global stature in the face of the world as well as promote its ideals such as expanding its bilateral and multilateral relations and enhance the Islamic democracy. Rakel (2007, p. 160) argues that the aim of promoting these ideals is meant to enhance its relations with its neighbouring Islamic states, which is essential in reducing the tension between these states and facilitate the management of the disagreements that arise between these states (Al-Shboul et al., 2013; Rakel, 2007, p. 162). Thus, the foreign policy of Iran plays a substantial role in fostering peaceful and secure relations at regional and international level by facilitating positive engagement between different states that is important in understanding dialogues as well as cultural interactions.
The foreign policy of Iran has influenced the way it relates to the GCC states. The differentiating factors influencing the way Iran uses its foreign policy depends on some unique features of this country. First, Guzansky (2015a, p. 66) asserts that Iran is the only non-Arab state in the Persian Gulf; hence, it needs to relate well with the neighbouring Arab countries. Secondly, all states in the region belong to the GCC apart from Iran. Iran is perceived as a guardian of Shia doctrine while also protecting the Shiite outside Iran such as in Bahrain (Mcinnis, 2015; Patterson, 2015, p. 5). Therefore, these outstanding differences of Iran and its neighbouring nations calls for special ways of relating to these nations and facilitate peaceful correlation. The post revolutionist foreign policy of Iran plays a key role in determining the relationship between Iran and the GCC.
Iran’s foreign policy can be attributed to various overlapping and contradicting motivators. Zarif (2014) argued that the tension between these motivations has resulted in decisions by Iran on its national policies where it weighs the imperatives of their religious ideologies and their revolutionary against the demands of its national interest (Osiewicz, 2014; Hunter, 2001, p. 62; Hunter, 2016, p. 16). Threat perception is one of these motivations where Iran perceives the presence of the U.S. in the region as being hostile and controlling the policies made by Iran and their neighbours. Based this perception, the Iranians feel that the United States has empowered the Sunni Arab regimes that are against Iran (Ehteshami & Zweiri, 2011, p. 62).
Another key motivator of Iran’s foreign policy is ideology. The leaders of revolution overthrew a secular that had suppressed Islam and its clergy (Osiewicz, 2014). It is through this policy that Iran has increased its support for the Shiite and Sunni movements. These groups have a significant threat to the interests of the GCC nations such as Bahrain that is opposed by the Shiite majority group in its country (Kashgari, 2011, p. 1; Hunter, 2016, p. 16). The GCC has offered its troop in Bahrain to prevent the Shiite rebels from threatening Bahrain as well as making it clear to Iran that Bahrain is in the Arab’s sphere and not its districts as they claim (Mcinnis, 2015; Oktav, 2011). Iran not only supports Sunni and Shiite groups, but also other non-Islamist groups as a way of showing its support to the promotion of the Palestinians (Rosemarie, 2009, p. 13).
National interest is another motivation factor for the foreign policy of Iran. Iran leaders stress over their historic independence and well-developed civilization in Iran. Therefore, these leaders call for the recognition of Iran as a superpower in the Gulf region. These leaders contrast Iran’s power with that of the GCC, which is the prime source of their unison (Schnars & Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.), 2010, p. 65). The national interests in becoming the dominant country in the Gulf region has facilitated the formation of the GCC states that are aware of the intentions of Iran in increasing its leverage in the region and dominating most of its activities.
Factional interests and competition also represent a major factor that determines the foreign policy of Iran (Malek, 2013). The urge of competing with other countries in the region in the urge of remaining the powerful nation has made Iran remain as a threat to most of the GCC states (Ramazani & Kechichian, 1988, p. 77). Maleek (2013) argues that threat is attributed the fact that the GCC states cannot tell the intentions of the moves made by Iran such as the implementation of the nuclear and missile systems. As such, Iran continues to be a threat to the progress of the GCC States from its foreign policies motivated by factors as mentioned above.
Importantly, Iran’s foreign policy focuses on the near East region, allowing Iran to employ most of its foreign and defence policy in this region. According to Bin Uzayr (2014), this translates that most of the foreign policy of Iran focuses on the GCC states, as they are the member states of the Persian Gulf that control most of these foreign policies (Guzansky, 2015b; Guzansky & Palgrave Connect, 2014, p. 16). The presence of U.S. in the region before the fall of Saddam Hussein was meant to protect the GCC states against the threat of Iraq, but since the fall of Saddam in 2003, the Iraqi threat became weak. Bin Uzayr (2014) and Lesch (1996, p. 8) note that the U.S. has maintained its presence in the region in the attempt of containing Iran’s threat against the GCC states. However, Iran has made various foreign policies meant to influence each of the GCC states despite the American attempt to contain the situation.
The UAE has had a conflict with Iran based on the three islands in the Persian Gulf (Fürtig, 2007, p. 631). However, the territorial and political differences between these two nations have not affected their economic relations. Fürtig (2007, p. 636) showed that Iran’s foreign policy of encouraging trade relations with its neighbors has enabled them to extensively trade with the UAE and maintain strong commercial ties. Consequentially, there is a high number of Iranians in the UAE owning big businesses to facilitate this relation (Boughanmi, 2008, p. 44). Qatar, on the other hand, has maintained a high-level contact with Iran, as there are no regional or territorial disputes between Qatar and Iran (Dargin, 2007, p, 136; Crystal, 2014, p. 391). Kashgari (2011, p. 1) comments that this is an effective way that Iran uses its foreign policy to maintain a close and productive relationship with some of the GCC states as a way of relieving security tension in the region (Kostiner, 2010). Similarly, Oman has maintained a consistent engagement with Iran despite the existence of the unfavourable foreign policy. Saeed (2014) argues that this relationship is because the Omani officials perceive Iran’s foreign policies as moderate that facilitate good relations instead of engaging in military action against it (Schake, 2007; Saeed, 2014). Consequentially, Oman and Iran have collaborated in building the Oman port in Duqm that is supposed to promote trading and transport outlet for Iranians in Oman (Goldenberg & Dalton, 2015, p. 59; Kostiner, 2009, p. 43). Besides, the conductive relations between Oman and Iran have made Oman play the mediator role in the conflict between Iran and other GCC states (Saeed, 2014).
Nevertheless, Iran’s foreign policy has not facilitated good relations with some of the GCC states. For instance, Bahrain has remained oppressive of Iran’s involvement in the Gulf region (Wright, 2016, p. 62). This is because Iran has supported the Shiite community in the Persian region that has tried to overthrow Bahrain (Ehteshami & Zweiri, 2011; Polk, 2011, p. 77). Besides, Iran has funded, trained, and provided weapons to the Shia militants in Bahrain in the name of maintaining good relations with regional groups (Ehteshami & Zweiri, 2011, p. 65). Certainly, these practices of Iran with these groups in Bahrain have distorted a good relationship between Bahrain and Iran. Therefore, Bahrain has withdrawn its Ambassador from Iran due to the extensive involvement of Iran in the non-government plots in Bahrain. Moreover, the continued support of the Shiite community in Iran has intensified the sectarian tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Gause III, 2014, p. 16). The two nations seek to establish the regional hegemony; thus, the foreign policies or practices implemented by Iran widen its gap with Saudi Arabia (Dreger & Rahmani, 2016, p. 39). This gap according to Kamrava (2012, p. 99) expanded in January 2016 after Saudi Arabia disconnected its diplomatic relations with Iran after the destruction and violent attacks against its embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, Iran (Katzman, 2016). Subsequent attacks by Iran broke the diplomatic relations with Saudi and Bahrain leading to their withdrawal of their ambassadors from Iran.
It is apparent that Iran’s foreign policy has both positive and negative impact on its relationship with the Gulf States especially the GCC. Some of the policies facilitate a good relationship that promotes trading relationships while others have resulted in the poor relationship due to the urge of supporting the Sunni and Shiite community in the region. Furthermore, the GCC states have perceived Iran’s foreign policy as a motivating factor promoting its plans to become the hegemony country in the Persian region, which is against the will of the GCC states.
4.2 The Nature of the Relationship between Iran and the Different GCC Members
From the above-discussed areas from the impact of Iran on the security, stability, and integration of the GCC states to the impact of its foreign policy to the relation with the GCC states, it is evident that the nature of the relationship between Iran and the GCC states is similar in some extent and varies in others. The central purpose of the formation of the GCC states is to curb the growing security threat posed by Iran. However, as Saeed (2014) highlights, this prime objective has not broken the good relationship between Iran and some of the individual countries such as Oman whereas the unity of these states has intensified the gap between the individual countries such as Saudi Arabia.
First, Iran has maintained a fruitful and friendly relationship with Oman despite the formation of the GCC states. Oman and Iran have maintained close commercial ties as well as security connections outside the GCC consensus (Saeed, 2014). These ties have enabled Oman to be the only GCC country that allowed the Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, to visit Oman in 2014 (Saeed, 2014). Moreover, the Oman president Sultan Qaboos has as well visited Iran to assess the relationship between the U.S. and Iran in the nuclear plan negotiations (Al Shayji, 2014; Jamal, 2014). Besides, the cordial relation between Iran and Oman has facilitated the growth of trade between these two nations. Omani has also played the mediator role in resolving the conflict between Iran and other GCC states (Gause, 2015).
Kuwait also maintains a conducive, yet a cautionary, relationship with Iran due to their geographic proximity. In this case, Kuwait has tried to appease Iran in several ways as a way of enhancing their relationship. For instance, Kuwait first hosted Iran’s president in 2006 and declared its support on the ambition of Iran to exploit its nuclear capabilities by preventing any attack based on Kuwait and directed to Iran due to its interest in nuclear energy (Al Shayji, 2014; Gause, 2015). Rather, Kuwait urged that Iran should be allowed to use its nuclear energy for civilian purposes (Gause, 2014). The Kuwait Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad made the first visit to Tehran since Islamic Revolution. The purpose of this visit was to mediate between the Saudi and Iran and reduce the tension between Kuwait and Iran and; thus facilitate the gas export to Emirate from Iran (Gause, 2015; Karasik, 2016). The cautious nature of Kuwait in relating with Iran was revealed during the sanction regime against Iran when it expelled the Iranian diplomats from its ground.
Additionally, Qatar has maintained a close relationship with Iran evident from the various instances that the Iranian and Qatari leaders have visited each other. The close relationship between these two countries is motivated by the animosity between Saudi and Qatari (Al-Maamary, Kazem, & Chaichan, 2016, p. 1980). The tension and dispute between Qatar and Saudi are caused by the influence that Saudi has on the gas fields in Qatar that are adjacent to Iran’s territorial waters (Peterson, 2012; Dargin, 2007, p. 136). Therefore, Qatar supports Iran as a way of balancing the influence of Saudi Arabia in its region. Nonetheless, Iran perceives its good relation with Qatar as a bond to reach the rest of the GCC states and improve its relationship (Dargin, 2007, p. 136). Moreover, Qatar perceives the security arrangements planned by the GCC against Iran as hollow. The poor relationship between Saudi and Qatar has also reduced the participation of the Qatar in approving the security frameworks made against Iran (Peterson, 2012). Consequently, Qatar has avoided criticising Iran in public; instead, it has attempted to improve its relation with Iran through the improved security agreements and reciprocal visits. Thus, it is the wish of the Qatar to smoothen their relationship with Iran and reduce tension between the two countries.
The geographic proximity and the commercial ties with Iran have influenced the UAE relationship with the war-torn country. However, the relationship between these two nations is not smooth due to the increased conflict concerning the three islands in the Persian Gulf (Jamal, 2014). Likewise, the UAE also supports the diplomatic approach used by Iran as a way of containing their conflict (Looney, 2003). Additionally, the UAE understands that it does not have sufficient power to fight with Iran; thus, it separates the issue of the three islands from their commercial relationship with Iran, which is the greatest trade partner of the UAE.
Unlike Qatar and Kuwait, Bahrain has had an unfriendly relationship with Iran because of the constant Iranian claim of dominion over Bahrain. Therefore, there is increased pressure between the two countries, particularly after Tehran started supporting the Shiite community in Bahrain, which opposes the Sunnis in the attempt of causing a subversion (Nuruzzaman, 2013, p. 364; Karasik, 2016). In this case, Iran acts as a primary threat to Bahrain, which has deteriorated their relationship. Wright (2016, p. 64) claimed that this has forced Bahrain to strengthen their alliance network with the Western nations in the pursuit of curbing the threat of Iran (Nuruzzaman, 2013; Mabon, 2012, p. 84). Therefore, Bahrain has become one of the key supporters of the GCC union, since the cooperation of this union is important in controlling the influence of Iran.
Finally, there is a growing and threatening rivalry relationship between Saudi and Iran. According to Iranian leaders, Saudi Arabia seeks supremacy in the Gulf region by denying the Shiite and Iran any power in the region (Downs, 2013, p. 219). On the other hand, Saudi views Iran as a regional threat with its continuous support on the Shiite Muslim (Nuruzzaman, 2013, p. 372). This perception has made Saudi to oppose the nuclear plan deal between Iran and the U.S., as it would be a way of empowering Iran. Saudi has as well claimed that it will develop its nuclear system if the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal is signed (Jamal, 2014; Downs, 2013). Saudi has consequently broken its diplomatic relation with Iran due to this rivalry and unfriendly relationship (Bin Uzayr, 2014). Saudi withdrew its ambassador in Iran due to vandalism of its embassy in Tehran. These activities have heightened the gap between these two states. Consequently, Saudi Arabia has pressed for cooperation among the GCC States as a way of reducing the growing influence of Iran in the Gulf region.
5.0 Conclusion
The GCC states united to curb the growing security threat of Iran in the Gulf region. The ongoing negotiations between Iran and the United States over the nuclear program have stimulated different views for the GCC states. The GCC states fear that Iran will dominate the region once the deal has been signed. Consequentially, Saudi as expressed its willingness to produce nuclear weapons if Iran is granted the chance. However, the study has revealed that Iran has both positive and negative impact on individual GCC states. These impacts are influenced by the perception that each member state has towards the Iranian foreign policy. Besides, the study has affirmed that the Iranian foreign policies have influenced the quality of the relationship between Iran and the GCC states. For instance, Oman and Kuwait have maintained a cordial relationship with Iran that has promoted the trade between the two countries. However, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are always at rival with Iran especially its support for the Shiite community that once attempted to overtake Bahrain. The quality and nature of the relationship between individual GCC states have affected their dedication in the union in the fight against the threat caused by Iran. Therefore, the attempts made to solve the conflict between Iran and the GCC states should first focus on resolving the relationship between Iran and the member states, as this is the key to the conflict between the GCC states and Iran.
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