Can Securitized Development overcome the crisis of liberal peace?
Introduction
The concept of liberal peace was mainly fueled by powerful Western countries, especially after the cold war, to encourage international peace. The principles of liberal peace are easy to understand – a liberal nation, which is democratic and follows the rule of law, is more likely to be peaceful than an illiberal state (Cooper, 2007). Looking at it theoretically, it makes absolute sense. However, in practice, this concept has been a dream in most cases with liberal peace-building interventions failing terribly, which constitutes the crisis of liberal peace. Securitized development, the coupling of peace and security projects with economic development projects is one of the principal ways in which liberal peace has been encouraged. However, can securitized-development overcome the crisis of liberal peace? Indeed, instead of spearheading the development of liberal peace, securitized-development as evidenced in different cases, such as Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq, has only contributed to the crisis of liberal peace and has only been an initiative to foster the agenda of superpowers such as the U.S and the UK.
The first section of this paper provides definitions of key terms used in the paper. Secondly, the paper discusses how securitized development has led to the widening of the crisis of liberal peace and how it has been abused by western countries as an avenue to conduct operations deemed as combating terrorism. The paper also provides a realist point of view to the discussion using arguments by Samuel Huntington. Further, key ethical, political, and social implications of securitized development are also discussed. Nevertheless, the paper reveals a few areas where securitized development has been embraced by the locals and has succeeded in building liberal peace. Finally, the paper concludes by showing that the benefits of securitized development in some countries do not outweigh its negative effects.
Definition of Terms
Lemay-Herbert defines liberal peace as “the idea the idea that certain kinds of society will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than ‘illiberal’ states (Lemay-Herbert, 2013, p.242). Lemay-Herbert also defines peace-building as the process of managing instability between states and building peace within them on the basis of democracy and market economics (Lemay-Herbert, 2013). Fisher and Anderson (2015) present securitized development as the process of linking peace operations to long-term developments. McSweeney (1996) explains securitization based on arguments from the Copenhagen School, which view it as a speech act, which focuses on whether a social issue, such as poverty and migration, can be coined into a threat rather than whether the threat is real or not. Laffey and Nadarajah (2012, p.417) define liberalism as a specific form of governmental practice and reason that was produced by the intersection of European and non-European worlds and encompasses both liberal and illiberal practices. Lastly, the crisis of liberal peace is the perception that attempts made to bring free markets and democracy to the Global South have not worked, despite the millions of dollars and intervention from numerous countries.
The Role of Securitized Development in the Crisis of Liberal Peace
There are several ways in which securitized development has been shown to contribute to the crisis of liberal peace. First, although most Western countries continue to downplay the crisis of liberal peace, its effects on countries like Sri Lanka are still visible today. As Rampton and Nadarajah (2016) note, liberal peace was considered a slow but effective way of propagating peace in Sri Lanka. However, the country faced numerous cases of communal violence, majoritarian exclusion, ethnic antagonism, widespread right abuses, mass displacements, and protracted armed conflicts. All these issues are indicators of the gravity of the crisis of liberal peace in the country.
Secondly, in as much as liberal peace is supposed to be based on the very traditions of a people, securitized development is mostly fueled by foreigners who know little about the history of the locals. Peace is welcome in each country and anything that promises harmony is longed-for, which drove the high acceptability of the UN, Commonwealth, and other Western missions aimed at long-term peace in Sri Lanka. However, the low productivity of these projects contributed to the rise of insurgents (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016). Westerners who were fueling securitized development did not try to understand the basis of the insurgency. This explains the failure of the international peace negotiations, which were led initially by India and later by Norway. Instead, western countries saw the insurgency as activities of a few communists who threatened the liberty of a free nation. Therefore, they lured Sri Lanka towards capitalism by providing them with aids and grants to make her the biggest beneficiary of per capita aid at the time (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016). With this aid, Sri Lanka waged an armed war against the insurgents; the Tamils. The inception of an armed war is in itself a proof of the failure of the peace-keeping missions in the country. As such, the case of Sri Lanka reveals that the Westerners were not interested in bringing economic development that would promote security in the country, the very ideals of securitized development, but were more interested in ensuring that she remained a capitalist state, which waged their cold war in bed with the west (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016). This can be depicted by the West’s relentless praise of the Sri Lankan president for his good international relation strategies despite the crumbling economy and peace within his country.
Moreover, in some cases, parties that come to foster liberal peace through securitized development have been seen as catalysts of war rather than peace. The AMDP project, which was majorly funded by the UN and the IMF, is a perfect example (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016). Although the foreigners thought that the project was bringing together people of two different ethnicities – the Sinhala and the Tamils – to work and coexist peacefully by participating in a similar development project that was meant to benefit the poor, the conflict between the two tribes only intensified (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016). The project saw the displacement of many Tamil-speakers with their land handed to armed Sinhala settlers. Therefore, securitized development increased ethnic polarization, emergence of the Tamil insurgence, and a majoritarian nationalist order. Additionally, the West’s misunderstanding of the local factors leading to the Tamil insurgency was epitomized by their reference to this insurgency as terrorism and extremism (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016).
Furthermore, the securitized development that was meant to promote regional peace by making the unsatisfied individuals happy was seen as unfair in many respects. In Sri Lanka, the postcolonial government embarked on the colonial government’s strategy of demographic redistribution that saw many other communities settled into areas that were earlier predominated by the Tamil community (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016). The Tamil militia led a revolution to object decisions by the new regime, which was only but a reflection of the colonial government (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016). These basic demographic instabilities eluded the financiers of Sri Lanka who saw the Tamil insurgents as a budding group of troublesome communists in a capitalist nation who deserved to be silenced. Indeed, securitized development may foster more hostility in cases where development projects are not fairly distributed among parties in a conflict.
Additionally, securitized development often leads to the militarization of peace-seeking missions. While liberal peace is meant to provide a long-term solution to ending conflict, which is highly acceptable among the differing parties, the militarization of the peace-seeking process is the complete opposite as it looks to suppress those who are unsatisfied with the existing solutions (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016). Strategies that look to suppress certain groups almost always attract revolts, which was what happened in Sri Lanka. Similarly, Beckwith (2012) argues that in Afghanistan, militarized aid has only developed a hostile relationship with residents, which has limited its ability to foster peace and sustainability. Non-military organizations have not had a platform to encourage peace without encouraging Western foreign policies. Moreover, after the U.S. military left Iraq in 2011, the UN and humanitarian organizations still receive the perception of invaders rather than bodies that work to encourage peace and development (Beckwith, 2012). Indeed, those who fuel securitized development are the problem; ideally, securitized development should be advanced by the local governments and not by foreigners who know little about the day-to-day livelihoods of the local people and what seemingly subtle policy changes mean to the locals.
Nevertheless, an in-depth view into securitization of development reveals that the practice is a form of modern day slavery and neocolonialism that targets the third world countries. Securitized development is mainly driven by first world countries who take advantage of the poverty and lack of peace situations in developing countries to advance their foreign policies (Fischerand Anderson, 2015). The slavery and neocolonialism in this practice becomes more evident when one realizes that the third world countries in question have their own needs but cannot advance them since they do not have the funds to; rather, they have to agree to the acts of the foreigners since the latter provide the necessary resources. For example, western countries advanced their own agenda in Siri Lanka while ignoring the most pertinent needs of the citizens including the inadequacy of rice, the staple food in the country (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016). Moreover, the foreigners took advantage of the war to advance their own pro-capitalist activities in the name of peace-building. Further, the westerner’s resolution to militarize the peace-seeking mission was reminiscent of the colonialist’s use of force and brutality to subdue individuals and nations, which has also been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, the UN has been alleged to encourage corruption in some countries such as Iraq (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006). Such allegations only fuel atrocities and encourage the growth of terrorism. As such, securitized development is not a genuine peace-seeking mission, but a strategy by developed nations to subdue third-world countries and advance their own policies.
In support of the aforementioned claims, Mac Ginty (2011) compares the effects of liberal peace-building in various countries including Iraq and Bosnia. Countries in which liberal peace-building was accompanied with vigorous securitized development did not achieve as much when compared to those where securitized development was not a major practice. This partially explains the greater success of the peace missions in Bosnia compared to what happened in Iraq. As Lemay-Herbert (2013) explains, the problem with strategies of liberal peace is their contradictory nature; securitized development, for instance, eventually antagonizes and interferes with the liberal peace that it was meant to bring. Arguably, Nadarajah and Rampton (2015) seem to relate the failures of liberal peace-building to combining peace missions and economic development. The authors argue that most peace-keeping missions are illegitimatized when they are uncompromisingly attached to a rigid democratic market state model. This uncompromising attachment is not driven by the desire to achieve peace, but rather, by private intentions of international organizations that drive the peace mission.
Duffield (2014) critiques securitization of development as a mechanism for achieving liberal peace arguing that it introduces a new form of imperialism. Countries that seem to encourage liberalism only entice those in war through funding and aid. However, they end up using this power wrongly as they instill their order and agenda in these foreign countries even though it might be deleterious to the local community and even to the advances already achieved in the peace mission. Duffield (2014) further suggests that attachment of economic development to peace missions is equal to the radicalization of economic development that has led to the unfair distribution of natural resources and obvious oppression of some communities, which has resulted into inevitable revolts being the. In turn, feelings of dissatisfaction and revolts characterize a radicalized and polarized society. As such, security development deletes the gains of liberal peace by polarizing the local communities, hence, waging more war than it prevents.
In addition, Khan and Nyborg (2013) expose other negative impacts of linking economic development and peace. For instance, the distribution of foreign aid in North-Western Pakistan is mainly dependent on the state of peace. Instead of taking supplies to those who needed them more due to natural calamities or poverty, most of the resources helped fund the military (Khan and Nyborg 2013). As Pahlman (2014) argues, a significant portion of funding towards aid has gone to different defense departments. For example, in 2002, the U.S Department of Defense was given 21% of the funds meant for securitized development (Pahlman, 2014). Pahlman (2014) notes that despite receiving the largest share of international aid from the U.S., Iraq and Afghanistan are yet to enjoy any peace. As such, securitization of development has negative impacts on the balance of development projects and distribution of resources in a country and is, thus, a policy that leads to no good.
Similarly, using Sudan as the case study, Ayers (2010) argues that it is misplaced to term the country’s turmoil as a civil war. Rather, Sudan’s war was purely political and stemmed from remote injustices and unfairness in the distribution of resources. One dimension of the Sudanese situation relates mainly to the political economy of the situation considering the fact that she is a capitalist nation (Ayers, 2010). Therefore, it is easy to understand why international interventions only brought false hope to the people and seemed to take peace away later. International interventions meant that Sudanese citizens could now fight for something else apart from oil, funding. As such, Ayers (2010) confirms that securitization of development almost invariably worsens the peace situation where it is attempted.
Securitized Development and Realism
The principles of liberal peace clash with those of realism. However, there are some aspects of realism that significantly marry with aspects of securitized development and liberal peace. Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory effectively redefines realism. The theory defines realism on the basis of a future paradigm shift, unlike the conventional international relations proposition that proposes that there is a tendency for conflict to arise between states, hence, the need for each country to acquire economic and military power enough to guarantee them security over others (Donnelly, 2000). The conventional view of realism also argues that each state has an inner desire to subdue their neighbors to ensure that the latter do not attain political, economic, and military power enough to threaten the former’s security (Donnelly, 2000). Contrarily, Huntington’s theory argues that this propensity to engage in conflict will exist among civilizations and not states (Huntington, 1993). Among the civilizations that Huntington cites are the Muslim, the Western, the Japanese, and the Chinese. Lastly, Huntington’s theory is based chiefly on his opinion that the Western countries will be facing a different kind of security threat in future; the Muslim civilization (Huntington, 1993).
Linking realism to the securitization of development, one of the first things one sees is the USA’s counter-insurgency policy. Although this policy is tailored towards identifying terrorists and subduing them, the war has only been seen as a fight against a state and not terrorist organizations (Kienscherf, 2011). In essence, it can be said that the capitalist west feels threatened by Islamic extremism and is on the verge of destroying pure Islamic states. The recent news of the USA using a GBU-43 Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) in Afghanistan is a perfect example (Ackerman and Rasmussen, 2017). Such acts can only interpreted as invasions in a sovereign country.
Moreover, securitized development has only been depicted as an avenue for the West to subdue countries engulfed in war, especially those in the Middle-East. As such, as Boghani (2015) argues, Western countries use the peace situation in Islamic states to gain access to push their foreign policy agenda and the fight against terror. Once the powerful military personnel of these Western countries, specifically the U.S, are within the Islamic countries, for instance, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Libya, they use development agendas to advance Washington’s own plan of curbing terrorism (Boghani, 2015). In turn, the development agendas are used to keep the locals silent and lure them into revealing those suspected to belong to terrorist groups. This is well epitomized by the events that followed the U.S peace mission in Iraq – the eventual capture of Saddam Hussein and later Osama bin Laden – two individuals who were profiled as the chief sponsors and minds behind the operations of Al Qaeda terrorist network. The situation in Libya was no different as the U.S peace operation in the country led to eventual capture and death of the then-Libyan president Colonel Muammar Gaddafi (Boghani, 2015). Therefore, the U.S and other western countries have used their military influence in most countries termed as terrorism hubs to pass their own agenda in the name of working for sustainable peace.
While some security development may be beneficial, the negative impacts of the policy exceed any of its perceived benefits. The dire situation and the worsening of the Libyan economy after the death of Gaddafi and the unending local conflicts in Iran and now Syria are evidence of the negative impacts of security development (Boghani, 2015). Therefore, countries such as Syria and Afghanistan should not be subjected to liberal peace as a hope of ending the long conflict that has engulfed them.
Ethical, Political, and Social Implications of Securitized Development and Liberal Peace
Arguably, liberal peace and securitized development have ethical implications. The debate of liberal peace is in itself an ethical debate. The first way of looking at it in this perspective is using the utilitarian approach. “A utilitarian approach justifies the use of violence as long as, ultimately, the sum of happiness increases” (Baum, 2008, p.441). As such, to achieve liberal peace, there are individuals or regions which have to be sacrificed for the satisfaction of all. This is seen perfectly in the discussion above where liberal peace-building and its ally, securitization of development, led to regional imbalances in the distribution of resources, and in places like Sri Lanka, led to vehement revolts from communities who felt that they were on the losing side of the divide (Nadarajah and Rampton 2015). Further, it is unethical to deny individuals or communities whatever they deserve for the joy of other people. Therefore, liberalism is unethical as it leads to peace-making at the expense of the comfort of some communities.
Moreover, although Kant’s perception of liberal peace is to use economic development to foster international peace, this is often not the case as one side gets economically disadvantaged. The Tamil revolts in Sri Lanka, which had to be thwarted forcefully by the U.S, are a perfect example (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016). Ideally, a liberalist thinking would support the rationale of the revolts fully as it was obvious that the regime was unfair to the Tamil-speaking individuals by taking their natural resources and handing them to their nemesis. However, the unethical and contradictory nature of liberal peace became glaringly evident as the U.S led efforts to suppress Tamil insurgents in the name of terrorism. Similarly, in Uganda, the West supported the movement by Yoweri Museveni to oust a regime that was seen to spearhead conflict. However, as Tangri and Mwenda (2010) highlights, President Museveni has continued to discourage democracy through intimidation amidst reports of rigging elections. The country was also elected to seat in the Security Council in 2008, reaffirming the West’s support of the regime.
An absolutist view, which is based on the Mosaic Law, also reveals the unethical nature of liberal peace. The absolutist view sees some acts as unfair regardless of why they were committed (Fischer, 2000). For instance, the Mosaic Law demonizes murder, theft, and adultery regardless of the rationale behind such practices – some rationales might be legally acceptable on the basis of the laws of the land. In this sense, practices such as suppression of insurgent groups by treating them as terrorists is wrong and unethical. Moreover, forceful grabbing of land from the Tamil to hand them to the Sinhala is like robbery (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2016), which is unfair and unethical according to Mosaic Law. In essence, in the absolutist school of thought, liberalism is unethical. As an Aristotelian would put it, a city that looks to sacrifice innocent civilians to ensure its existence actually ceases to exist; justice is a mark of humanity and humanity is, thus, inexistent where injustice becomes a norm.
Immanuel Kant predicted peace among liberal states but had a slightly different view – in his sense, he meant that the end could not justify the means (Fischer, 2000). While proposing this, Kant had in mind that liberalism gave every human being the right to do all that they wanted to do provided it did not interfere with the liberty of others. However, liberal peace does not respect this; for it to be achieved, some individuals have to be on the losing end. Furthermore, Zambakari (2016) opines that the interaction between liberalism and democracy tends to undermine liberal peace. As a result of democracy, even unfair practices are considered fair and right just by the virtue that they are supported by the majority. In essence, democracy has contributed to the unethical nature of liberalism.
Additionally, the acceptability of liberal peace in third world countries is mainly driven by the material gains that are fostered into these countries by the international proprietors of liberal peace (Fischer, 2000). As such, many see hope and are open to the trial of democracy and liberal peace majorly for the development and financial assistance that follows such acceptance. This is in itself an evidence of greed, which is unethical. Ideally, the economic development that characterizes securitized development, which is a mainstay of liberal peace, was meant to be a facet of interaction to enhance peace between communities and not the very reason why states would accept liberal peace missions.
Socio-politically, as seen earlier, liberal peace and its strategies have greatly influenced the livelihoods and the living standards of many people. However, this influence varies greatly. While some have benefitted from the practice, others have suffered as a result of the same. Politically, the picture is no different. However, the economic development that comes with liberal peace has been used as a political bait in the third world (Pahlman, 2014). Instead of politicians influencing economic development, they have taken advantage of the peace situation in their states to advance themselves politically and misappropriate public resources.
Role of Security Development in Enhancing Liberal Peace
Despite the arguments above that show the downside of securitized development and how it causes the whole quest for liberal peace to become unethical, the idea was developed and it is still being practiced for a good reason. Security development has successfully fostered liberal peace in many places in the world (Dodge, 2013). First, linking economic development and security has successfully enabled nations to kill two birds that are not easily caught with a single stone – achieving peace and security and at the same time promoting economic development. Apart from solving the very problems of poverty and unemployment, which are the chief causes of lawlessness, hence, the lack of peace in many developing countries, by fostering economic development, these projects embarked on as some are also meant to improve interaction between conflicting individuals and communities (Duffield, 2014). Moreover, the projects undertaken are usually meant to be those that can solve an identifiable problem common between the two or more interlocking sides. The linkage of development projects to peace missions also helps to encourage individuals to participate in these projects (Duffield, 2014). Dodge (2013) also proves the successes of securitized development by highlighting the advances that have been made in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Susan Willet appreciates the fact that security is necessary for peace (Willett, 2006). The importance of personal and community security cannot be undermined as a necessity for peace. Individuals and communities who feel secure are more likely to coexist peacefully (Willett, 2006). Willett underscores the fact that a feeling of political and environmental security is also key to ensuring that societies, such as the Tamil and Sinhala in Sri Lanka, to coexist. Willet (2006) further argues that poverty and hunger are among the chief causes of human conflict. This is the very essence of securitized development. As such, giving the interlocking groups whatever they need can help to make them peaceful. In fact, the framers’ idea of liberal peace was to have free and satisfied individuals who had the liberty to act as they could – the result was to be individuals who have little or nothing to complain about and, thus, nil propensity of engaging in a war. Thus, securitization of development is important if liberal peace has to be achieved. Moreover, securitized development can help to accelerate the gains achieved by liberal peace hence helping to solve the crisis of liberal peace.
Fischer and Anderson (2015) show the importance of authoritarianism and securitization of development to the peace mission and general economic development of Africa. Their paper antagonizes the popular view that securitization of development is propagated by foreigners who do not understand the problems of the locals, which is deleterious and purely unwelcome locally (Fischer and Anderson, 2015). The paper shows how various third world countries, especially in Africa, have not only embraced but also actively encouraged the securitization of development. In fact, there are African countries who have benefited from security development so much that they have inculcated the same into their military structure. Case reviews from Chad, Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia reveal that the practice of securitization of development has been cultivated by the regimes in those countries and are not there by accident (Fischer and Anderson, 2015). The bulk of Fischer and Anderson’s work delineates the very strategies employed by this African countries to foster peace by way of securitizing development projects. First, the state governments in these countries have been known to play the proxy in peace agenda. Secondly, liberal peace has been achieved by the simultaneous socialization of development policies and privatization of security. Thus, despite different criticism, security development has been instrumental in fostering liberal peace in some cases.
As such, liberal peace has done the unique thing of allowing people with different ideological views to coexist peacefully with each other. Fischer (2000) argues that despite their similar ideological injunction, which is based on faith in a one all-loving and all-merciful God, the provider of all peace, wars still existed between Christians and Muslims for example. Liberal peace has been a revelation in this regard as it has been credited for creating peace between interlocking religious facets.
Conclusion
In essence, securitized development is an ill-fated strategy that cannot resolve the current crisis of liberal peace, but can only help to deepen the disaster. As different scholars reveal, securitized development has led to the widening of the crisis of liberal peace. The world’s superpowers, such as the U.S, use securitized development to push their agenda, which is mostly damaging to the locals, in foreign countries. The practices underlying securitized development as a key strategy in the achievement of liberal peace are flawed, contradictory, and most importantly, unethical. Nevertheless, in some states, such as Chad, securitized development has been embraced by the locals and has succeeded in maintaining liberal peace. However, these pros of securitized development are numerically inferior to the cons of the same, hence, the view that securitized development cannot overcome the crisis of liberal peace.
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