Philosophy of the Mind
Short Essay Questions
Question 1
Both Goldman and Dennett agree to the fact that most cognitive scientists rely on introspection for evidence. According to Goldman, cognitive scientists have been seen to rely and trust the quasi-observation of their subjects to disclose most if not all mental facts, to approve and disapprove certain facts and even prove hypotheses (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). Most cognitive scientists have embraced this method of confirming mental facts and thus seem to rely on introspection as an evidence-conferring method. Goldman observes that introspective reports are day in day out put to work in so many fields of research right from psychophysics, meta-cognition, and perception psychology to neuropsychology.
Conversely, Dennett asserts that weaknesses of introspection as a method of collecting scientific data and information about subjects’ minds and brains. He is quick to point out that introspection goes against the publicity thesis that obliges all scientific methods to be public (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). However, he acknowledges the fact that most cognitive scientists use introspection today and rely on it for evidence, confirming facts and testing hypotheses.
Cognitive scientists should not rely on introspection for evidence simply because the facts and data collected from the method cannot be verified and justified using objective methods. Seeing through people’s mind is a practical impossibility which necessitates the researcher to take words and use them to evaluate the mind of the subjects. The lack of reproducibility of data obtained from introspection makes this method less reliable and thus should not be relied upon entirely by cognitive scientists. I find the position that cognitive scientists should not rely entirely on introspection stronger. The truth-yielding reliability of introspection lacks the capacity to be validated through public means and relies more on our ability to use our psycho-sensing skills that requires us to read minds from perceptual input.
Question 2
Nagel’s perspective on qualitative consciousness turns on subjectivity. He argues that consciousness and conscious states are inherently subjective since they can be best understood from limited points of view. His position holds that consciousness cannot be reduced to physics, or be given a scientific explanation since such elucidations demand an objective depiction of facts; one that shifts away from any scrupulous point of view (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007).
Nagel’s theory of consciousness maintains that consciousness supersedes science. By reflecting on his famous question that continues to raise eyebrows of what it is like to be a bat – for the bat, he proves that there is no scientific objective data that is sufficient to provide enable us to discover what it is like for a bat to hunt by echolocation and fly at night. This is because we do not share a common type of viewpoint with the bats no matter how hard we try to learn about the brain of bats, the biochemistry, mechanisms of brain function and even their evolutionary history.
Dennett on the other hand maintains that, there is a clear-cut conventional extension of objective science that substantially covers the ground of human consciousness (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). Dennett holds that discussing subjectivity in human consciousness is uncalled for since science presupposes objectivity in establishing and validating statements. In the Multiple Drafts model of consciousness, he suggests that consciousness is not an experience that occurs in a single point and place in the brain but rather it involves a number of events of content fixing that take place in various places at various times in the brain.
Nagel’s postulation is far much stronger than Dennette’s perspective on human consciousness. Although there has been an increasing belief that human consciousness is a physical phenomena considering the aspect of mental causation and the success of materialistic science in the world today, the bat’s consciousness experience still remains unanswered and unaddressed. Furthermore, Dennett’s argument according Nagel misses the point by simply redefining consciousness as an external possession and brushing away the subjective characteristic completely (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007).
Question 4
Hempel’s dilemma refers to a question that was first asked by philosopher Carl Hempel paying much relevance to naturalism, philosophical physicalism and the philosophy of the mind (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). It refers to the claim or perspective that physicalism is an ill-constructed thesis because it fails to offer an account of the nature and type of physics it makes reference to. Physicalism suggests that the current physics will be useless warranting a change in the future even though it does not expound on the nature of the future physics.
Barbara Montero’s argument on post-physicalism is that our interpretation of what it means by the mind being physical is absolutely ebbed in spite of most studies on the brain showing that consciousness can be physically stimulated (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). This is in light of the many years of trying to find the place of the mind in a world that is greatly physical within the mind-body problem.
Hempel’s dilemma supports Montero’s argument in the sense that the mind-body problem seeks to find the place of mentality in a physical world even though it cannot offer a satisfactory interpretation of what a physical mind and world entail. Montero believes that time has come when we need to acknowledge the difficulty that has engulfed the understanding of what it implies to be physical and adopt a new perspective of the mind-body problem. Instead of seeking to find a place for the mind in a physical world, she suggests that we should seek to find the place of the mind in a fundamentally non-mental world (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). The question that ought to be answered is, is mentality an attribute of the world?
Homework
Read p133-135 and136-150
1) Bertrand Russell means that modern science has failed in proving the existence of the soul or mind as a unit and thus its explanations and tenets are not worth being trusted anymore (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). The reasons for disregarding modern science, which makes readers, know much less than what we thought by scrapping off the fine old simplicities of physics are the same kind of reasons for discrediting matter. Mind and matter are all creations of science that have changing properties.
2) Montero means that physicalism which holds the view that everything is physical is not only false but also trifling. By stating that everything in the world is physical means that everything exists and this according to Montero is an obstacle towards explaining what being physical actually means in milieu of the mind-body problem (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007).
Melnyk’s “How to Keep the Physical in Physicalism”.
1) RR according to Melynk is an abbreviation for Relevant Rivals. Melynk defines a hypothesis’ Relevant Rivals as follows; (RR) Hypothesis H1 is a relevant rival to H2 iff (a) H1 is prudently intended to (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007).
2) Melynk response and argument towards physicalism contains Hempel dilemma. He argues that either proponents of physicalism accept a theory that is unquestionably false, or they work with a theory that has no substance (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). He holds that since a stipulative definition of what physical is has not be put forward, it should be the first step towards building a formidable theory although the definition should not be false, should not be trivial and lastly should have content that can be determined.
Thursday: Read 125-132
Papineau’s argument against mind-body dualism holds that all physical effects are as a result of physical causes, and therefore anything that has the potential of producing physical effects must be physical (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). Conscious events have physical effects and anything with physical effects must have satisfactory and adequate physical causes. In the case of human consciousness, physical effects are not always over determined by physical causes, making conscious events physical.
Tuesday: Read Dennett’s “Who’s on First?”
1) Heterophenomenology as coined by Dennett refers to an overtly third person scientific and systematic approach towards the study of consciousness and other mental observable facts (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). It seeks to apply scientific methodology with anthropological bends to discover how a given subjects views the world while taking into consideration his or her point of view.
2) Dennett says that introspection enables psychological scientists to gather data and information about human since seeing through one’s mind is not possible. Notably, he refutes mental facts that are gathered from introspection as scientific data because they lack verifiability (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007).
Week Four; Thursday
1) Blind sight refers to the case where an individual is clinically blind in a portion of their visual field. Goldman insists that even though individuals with blind sight lack the conscious experience of vision in their field of view but still display signs of having collected information about objects in the unseen area (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). He goes ahead to insist that researchers would not have accepted this diagnosis if it were not for the subjects’ own report which then prompts further research. Through this argument, Goldman maintains his stand that researchers rely on introspective reports from their subjects.
2) Both memory and perception lack nomological inferences just like introspective reports where firm comparison s can be made. Also, since memory and perception cannot be observed directly, it requires that the subject’s behavior be observed so as capture his or her mental events.
Tuesday: Read Goldman, “Science, Publicity and Consciousness”
1) According to Goldman, the publicity requirement or publicity thesis is a requisite that requires all scientific methods be made public (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). This means that all processes of collecting scientific data should be open to all people who might have interest in how it works its reliability and reproducibility.
2) Goldman thinks that we should reject the publicity requirement because all formulations within the requirement grant indistinguishable epistemic credentials on both private and public methods. It is for this reason that Goldman says that instead of rejecting introspection, we should reject the publicity thesis (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007).
Tuesday: Read Nagel, “The Incompleteness of Reality”
Nagel holds that conscious experience occurs and exists in so many different forms of animal life although he is not so certain about the experience existing in lower animals. Nonetheless, the fact that animals or organisms have conscious experiences proves that there is something that may be that particular animal, which he calls the subjective temperament of conscious experience (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). The subjectivity of the experience cannot be analyzed objectively, it is the hardest thing to be explained by physicalists, theories and thus objective accounts of the world will cannot capture everything in the world, not just yet.
Thursday: Read Churchland, “The Hornswoggle Problem”
1) The left-out hypothesis according to Churchland holds that consciousness which is the hard problem would still be a mystery even if human kind could offer explanation and solutions to all easy problems (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007).
2) Churchland’s main argument against Chalmer’s distinction between hard problems and easy problems is that conceptualizing a problem wrongly makes it seem intractable while in real sense it may not be (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). She casts aspersions on Chalmer’s approach of conceptualizing consciousness doubting whether drawing a line between what can be done and what cannot be solved by physical sciences is the best way of addressing the consciousness.
Thursday: Read Chalmers, “The Puzzle of Conscious Experience”
1) The hard problem of consciousness refers to explanations of how and why physical processes within the environment lead to subjective conscious experience. Easy problems of consciousness on the other hand entail accounts on how cognitive and behavioral functions are achieved (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). This includes how the brain merges different attributes, perceptions and autonomous processes to produce consistent responses.
2) Explanatory gap refers to the existing difficulty in offering a substantial explanation by physicialists’ theories of how physical processes and properties gives birth to the way we feel things that we experience (Shapiro & Gertler, 2007). Bridging the explanatory gap is simply equivalent to solving the hard problem of consciousness.
Reference
Shapiro, L. A., & Gertler, B. (2007). Arguing about the Mind. London: Routledge.
