The Flawed Emergency Response to the 1992 Los Angeles Riots
Despite there being a seemingly well-organized emergency response structure in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) hierarchy and evidence of tensions in the city that could lead to a major riot, the unsuspecting LAPD was still not prepared enough to control that biggest civil unrest in American history that ensued soon after the jury had announced their verdict on the fate of four LAPD officers who brutally assaulted a black man in an attempt to arrest him in late 1991. This major failure of the LAPD, a seemingly strong police department in America at the time, was majorly due to poor and insensitive leadership, hence, the reason I chose it as my case study. The current course is concerned with leadership in criminal justice and this case scenario is a perfect case of how the lack of proper leadership can have detrimental effects on the performance of a unit in criminal justice. I will, therefore, conduct my research on the final project based on this particular case study. This paper is a response to the initial prompt. This paper discusses the research gathering process and analyzes the case study scenario and the failures in leadership that underlie it.
Research Plan
I plan to conduct this research by searching into the various literature on the same issue. The major areas of literature whose search will aid in the process of conducting the research will include the communal aspects of the situation and the impact of community policing on the chosen scenario. In searching for the literature to use in the study, the Shapiro library and ebscohost database will be essential in helping get credible sources. These libraries provide a wide range of study sources, hence, its importance in this research.
Flaws in LAPD’s Emergency Response
The first and biggest flaw that led to the inability of the LAPD to deal with the emerging mass actions was their unsuspecting approach. In a bid to stay cool and attempt not to stir any further tensions, the LAPD made it impossible for them to deal with a real emergency (Rosegrant, 2000). Gates, the then LAPD chief felt that police training and extra patrols would further breech the faith that existed between the officers and the public and as a result escalate the situation. Conversely, Bradley, LA’s first African-American mayor who was the sitting mayor at the time and an important member of the emergency response system, was also unsuspecting and silently seemed to support Gates’ low profile approach (Rosegrant, 2000). If at all Bradley’s actions were in a bid to amend for the recent constraints in his relationship with Gates, then it would be a marker of his poor leadership. Both leaders, however, were unsuspecting and expected a ruling which would be favorable to the public. As such, maintaining an unsuspecting view is in itself dangerous in criminal law and its poor leadership for leaders to inactivate all important systems just because they are not suspicious of anything. Good leaders in criminal justice should have a high index of suspicion.
Moreover, from the crisis and its start, it is clear that some officers in leadership positions had disregard to their juniors and would not listen to any proposals put forward by a junior. This is exemplified by the attempts of a new officer in charge of Metro district who had a high index of suspicion and planned to train a few officers on riot control and to have the armored anti-riot engines on standby before the verdict was released (Rosegrant, 2000). In fact, one of the reasons as to why the verdict was delayed was to allow for the police departments to get ready to handle any emerging unrests. The officer’s attempts were frustrated as his training program and equipment could not be approved and availed. Furthermore, the senior officer who was consulted for the move to have anti-riot engines on stand-by quickly dismissed the issue citing that it would spike anxiety (Rosegrant, 2000). This was a mark of poor leadership, the senior officer imposed his own feelings on the situation before listening to the colleague in an attempt to understand the whole situation. Several other officers have also been documented to have felt the need to have emergency structures organized prior but their pleas had been quelled by their unsuspecting bosses.
Finally, the importance of fact over opinion in matters of criminal justice is well exemplified in this case study. It is evident that prioritizing one’s opinion at the expense of fact can be detrimental in criminal justice. The people in leadership positions in the LAPD at the time of crises were of the opinion that the verdict to be released by the jury would be favorable to the public and that no upheavals would result. However, fact had it differently. Considering the composition of the jury and the process of selection of the jurors, it was evident that the ruling would favor the officers. Furthermore, it seems faulty for a leader in criminal justice to publicly express their opinion like Gates and Bradley did before considering fact.
Reference
Rosegrant, S. (2000). The Flawed Emergency Response to the 1992 Los Angeles Riots. Cambridge: John F. Kennedy School of Government.
