Introduction
The constitutional guidelines for Britain provide that the primary mission of IC be to reduce uncertainties and provide warnings on potential threats to national security of the country, its interests and safety for its citizens around the globe. Decision makers – from the Capital in London to local jurisdictions and battlefields – crave insights and information from the IC to make critical decisions. Whereas spying has been described as the second oldest profession in the world, human intelligence has continued to undergo life-changing metamorphosis. While the underlying human espionage remains constant, there exist miscellanea of contributing factors, which over time have had an impact on the parameters and tenets of spying.
The hurdles to the future success of the intelligence community (including subnational and national threat and Global War on terror) as reported include, but not limited to technological changes, changing cultural expectations, legal barriers (restrictions to hire new IC employees and ways to deal with “unsavory characters”), interagency cooperation, the changing IC demographics, the perpetual pendulum of focusing on SIGINT and HUMINT, and failure to imagine potential future threats. This write-up thereof will plunge into exploring these topics that have played a significant role in shaping the role of clandestine officers – specifically HUMINT officers – with a major exemplification of the British and American IC in understanding the challenges and issues facing HUMINT.
Aspectual Definition of HUMINT
The skills encapsulated within HUMINT are wide – from vices such as deceit and manipulation to traditional diplomatic dialogue. Within the core of the field is the ability to recruit individuals and make them capable of conducting espionage, or “spy.” The ancillary set of skills for such include liaison exploitation, surveillance, counterintelligence, the utilization of “covers” – either the more probably unofficial or commercial – and false flag operations (Glees 2004; Hitz 2005). Additionally, HUMINT can complement at the same time be bolstered by other “INTs.” Predominating this are Geographical Spatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), and the Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) (Sano 2015).
Exemplifying the CIA, and distinctively, the NCS, which is the U.S.’ national HUMINT manager, partakes in projects that entail the working together with other law enforcement entities as well as other intelligence organizations both at homeland and international levels (Sano 2015). By statute, the CIA is also assigned with the undertaking of Covert Actions (CA) (activities carried out by governments to affect the state of economic, military or political conditions in foreign countries). CA operations are the mandated to HUMINT operatives (Sano 2015, pp. 78).
Assessing The Challenges and Issues Facing the IC and HUMINT
Major events, such as the surprise attack carried out by Al Qaeda on the US on September 11, 2011 have come under the microscope of the media, scholar, the British people and their government; and such have been demanded that they adapt to change to the rising post-Cold War threats to the national security. The poor fellows within the British IC could not predict the threats posed by subnational groups evolving from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The IC could never be the same. A series of reports after the incident recommended that governments take proactive measures, change policies and align themselves with the changing face of threats on a global scale.
Within the American and British forefront setting of 9/11, books, assessment, commissions, recommendations and reports rose, giving birth to such a cottage industry of publicized security experts wanting to have their perspectives given considerations during this transformation period within the IC. A handful pro argued the need for change within the IC fabric, as many of the weakness contributed to the failure of intelligence apparatus to uncover plots (for example prior to 9/11, many elements of the attack were known). Recommendations as to organizational changes, better interagency cooperation, transformation of counterintelligence in conjunction to cultural and educational changes all are areas ought to be fixed for a better performing IC.
The Changing Demographics Within HUMINT
Some of the deficiencies, experienced within the IC have had their foundation with the changing population of IC operatives. The bulk of operatives recruited to serve in today’s American IC, be it the CIA or the NCS, or in any other of the sixteen organizations comprising the U.S.’ IC have joined post – 9/11. Despite the IC being plagued by attendant controversies over the years before, and more so after the traumatic happenings of 11th September 2011, today’s IC membership remains patriotic and highly motivated professionals (Andrew 2012; George and Bruce 2008). One significant difference between such is their “expectancy of careers.” Officers in the Clandestine Service, for example, have joined the service with job expectations of serving over 20 years. Such was a reflection of the prevailing state of things at the time – and not only among members of the IC – of the “cradle grave “syndrome, where employees expected that they would spend their entire careers in one organization (Sano 2015).
Contrarily, employees in today’s world have grown to expect a career life spanned by job positions in multiple organizations and companies (Herman 2002). Some perhaps have developed this view that a stint within the IC is more so than not a means of advancement to something greater, whereas the view of others is perhaps as the final climactic stage of career progression; although provided with the set restriction on admission ages into the IC, such is less probable. These shifting views present a challenging to the HUMINT, and thereof the broader management of the IC a challenge on decisive means to put into proper use of talents – for the unspecified period they are stipulated to perform their duties (Sano 2015).
Technological challenges within the Intelligence Community make it difficult for HUMIT superiors and inferiors to strike a balance and confront future issues. In a critical analysis of the situation, managing such a more technically astute and younger workforce sometimes presents challenges in various forms and shapes – not the least of which are the more dramatic generational differences pertinent to learning. According to Richards (2010), today’s workforce has a significant upper hand against its predecessors on how it processes information. The different kinds of experiences such a labor force is put through when they grow up result in different brain structures with either positive or negative impact on the functioning of the HUMINT. In light to this, the labor force in today’s world have a much faster perpetual input of information than generations before (Andrew 2012).
Whereas the comprehension of information is not linear with the reception of information, it brings forth an issue to instructors as well as managers within the IC. Educational programs within the HUMINT world are to a great measure “anecdotally based,” with an incorporation of legal scenarios in instructions, or “tribal memories” to underline important points (Lowenthal 2009; Sano 2015). Whereas such technique has on more than one occasion proved useful, young practitioners of espionage, on the other hand, have found it unfamiliar, even ineffective.
Glees, Davies, and Morrison (2006) posit that today’s’ clandestine officers who grew on a regular diet of technology are more adept with multitasking and better connected than previous generations. In a critical outlook, adjusting to such significant divides has more often proved a hurdle, as most instructors have a view on education based on the same teaching guidelines as when they were instructed – via bit-by-bit logics, traditional lectures and “tell-test” instructions. Present time’s clandestine operators have more often proved to experience better mental states and physical well-being when taught with procedures they are adept with such as televisions, video cameras, the internet and mobile phones, and all associated accouterments brought forth with technological advancements (Jeffrey 2010; Shulsky and Schmitt 2002).
What does this hold? Such has an impact on the way today’s officers learn together with their expectations (Richards 2010). Jeffrey (2010) elaborates that today’s’ espionage, clandestine or whatever line of intelligence an officer is in demands that they have access to information at any time, any place and on whatever instrument available. An attempt at inculcating the appropriate balance of security versus expenditure, not mentioning the tolerant nature within a labor force that is increasingly becoming impatient – a difficult undertaking, but despite anything to the contrary, a crucial facet of any clandestine activity (Aldrich 2010; Herman 2002).
In essence, the phenomenon “digital divide” within the IC distinguishes the present time generations’ operators from preceding generations, with the former acquiring the tag “digital natives” and latter gaining a relegation to the status of “digital immigrants” (Sano 2015; Smith 2007). Such is not a mere semantic segregation – today’s graduates spend more time in front of computer screens or televisions than attending lectures and reading books. As such, the thinking patterns used by these “digital natives” are different from those of the “digital immigrants.” Richards (2010) explains that they learn, inter-alia, through random access (hypertexts), networking, and have a preference of scenarios in video games to regimental lecture classes and all mannerisms of social media over monotonous and more often than not obsolete texts.
The digital divide also stretches into the operations carried out by the HUMINT regarding both the engagement of officers and their targets (Glees 2004). For the sake of this text, the discussion is thereof restricted to traditional espionage – that is making a spot, conducting an assessment, developing and eventually recruiting a human target(s) – then both the target and those targeting it (the HUMINT operations officer) often have variances. Avenues used to approach such a topic can sometimes prove challenging. If the target and those targeting it are of digital natives, then the actual access and eventual development of such a human target are symbiotic. However, if the target is a digital immigrant, differences arising from such are more often problematic.
Technologically Savvy Operatives, Laxity in Security
Sano (2015) explains that clandestine officers in today’s world grew up in a world donned by digital expediency, if not dependency, and whereas formally educated in the nuances of carrying out traditional espionages, they increasingly rely on the contribution of technology in the fulfilment of the need and furtherance of their tradecrafts. Critically, such is a positive step forward in aligning tasks with a changing world as technology has shortened timelines and increased efficiency (Phythian and Gill 2013). With better progression and development in speed and effectiveness presented by technology also comes vulnerabilities that are not so often accurately assessed or readily foreseen (Aldrich 2010; Turner 2005).
According to Andrew (2012), the digital age has eased our day-by-day lives, albeit for our predecessors in the field and thereof “digital immigrants” are perhaps finding it frustrating and confusing at times. An equally true statement is that these technological efficiencies bring with them additional risks and responsibilities for the tradecraft of espionage. Conduction of assessment of potential adversaries or targets and the craft of approaches using technical means – whether through social blogs, emails, or through the more detailed esoteric mechanisms such as avatars – might be expeditious, but nevertheless highly insecure. Communication using these methods furthermore complicates matters of security for the same reason.
Whilst the longstanding (and precisely the concepts of “digital immigrants”) modus operandi of “chances of encounter”, clandestine meetings in a rolling car or designated safe houses and crypt telephone codes for conversations may as well seem antique, have proven reliable from a security perspective, but with an inevitable shortcoming of time consuming (Turner 2005; Kahn 1996). Such is not to discount the advantages of technology in actions intended at preserving contact with the agent, but only when used “moderately.” Too often than not espionage programs over-relying on the “ease” of utilizing technological means for communication are more vulnerable to hostile counterintelligence activities (Aldrich 2010). Although the IC in today’s world has to deal with threats to the British national security, comparatively to the Cold War days, the enemy has gone beyond our borders to become more organic (such as the AL Qaeda). The communication, acting and thinking patterns of the enemy have changed drastically post-Cold War, requiring that the IC transform to better defend the homeland.
Apart from the issues of security plaguing technological over-dependence, Phythian and Gill (2013) explain that cultural changes pectinate to HUMINT and other intelligence activities have taken place over the years. In the immediate years gone-by, for example, communication with intelligence headquarters was at a snail’s speed as compared to present near-instantaneous speeds nor did it offer bountiful alternatives. Todd, Bloch, and Fitzgerald (2009) note that previous time lags in the response got from Headquarters has diminished from days to hours and minutes. Whereas of HUMINT activities has become timely and more efficient, such has led to the transfer of substantial decision-making responsibilities from administrative centers, vice the field (Aldrich and Hopkins 2013). Provided the dearth of experience garnered by many operatives in the field – a secondary outcome of the 1990s “peace dividend,”– and whilst not averse of risks, such has advanced the penchant for deferring decisions in regard to operations to managerial staff who are regarded to be more experienced (Jeffrey 2010; Herman 2002).
The Issue of Changing Cultural Expectations
During the Cold War, Andrew (2012) elaborates that intelligence targets had without doubt clear definitions – the Soviet Union being the chief if not the exclusive target. In the neo world’s post 9/11 totality of surrounding conditions, targets in the environment have become more diverse and elusive. Non-state terrorist groups and thereof targets present unprecedented and unique demands (George & Bruce 2008). Officers in today’s world charged with foreseeing operations are faced with a bountiful of the same moral, and ethical quagmires as were generations of operators before them were when carrying out tasks on more classical targets. The raging political controversies on whether the actions of countries such as Britain and the US deeds over the continuing global terrorism are further complicating the prevalent situation (Johnson 2009). According to Olson (2006), whether combating terrorism on a moral or legal basis was then and is now justified calls for reasoning and querying whether such endeavors warranty their continuation in any form.
Espionage admittedly has been plagued by a myriad of quandaries on whether it is right or wrong based on standard behavior and character; and hitherto to the years behind, the HUMINT undertakings and activities have frequently been rationalized regarding the ‘the end justifying the means’ phrase (Olson 2006; Johnson 2009). In most instances, such effectively contained, if not disrupted the aggressive Russian KGB intelligence (SVR) and the GRU (Andrew and Gordievsky 1990). Whereas one could make the same case for terrorist targets, the fundamental differences between these targets (exemplifying Al-Qaeda and KGB, or other affiliated groups) is that the former had a religious footing whereas the latter had a political basis (Berkowitz 2002; Shulsky and Schmitt 2002; Phythian and Gill 2013). On a positive note, officers in today’s operations are less likely to adopt the “end justifying the means” approach and mentality than their predecessors.
Conclusion
The hurdles to the future success of the intelligence community include, but not limited to technological changes, changing cultural expectations, legal barriers, interagency cooperation, the changing IC demographics, and the perpetual pendulum of focusing on SIGINT and HUMINT and the failure to imagine potential future threats. My critical point, thereof, is that the he IC will continue to metamorphose under as many influences of domestic political climates as by developments beyond British and American borders. Although the IC in today’s world has to deal with threats to the British national security, comparatively to the Cold War days, the enemy has gone beyond our borders to become more organic (such as the AL Qaeda). The poor souls tasked with ensuring homeland security have to strike a balance between the highlighted issues to effectively confront future issues.
Differences in cultural expectation and experience notably will continue to exacerbate the relationships between these poor fellows, but importantly in the short term as the “digital immigrants” gradually pave the way for the “digital natives.” Whereas reliance on technology to make HUMINT collection more commendable and efficient, adhering to core principals will guarantee that human operations will become as secure as possible. With workforces averagely expected to remain for seven years, any prevalent limitations to their advancement will bring deleterious effects on their work morale as well as retention. Officers in today’s IC have continued to remain both exceptionally resilient and adaptive. Although they may stay for shorter time spans than generations before them, their dedication to missions and thereof accomplishments are of equal measures and will serve the IC well in the years ahead.
Bibliography
Aldrich, RJ and Hopkins, MF 2013, Intelligence Defense and Diplomacy: British Policy in the post-war world. Ilford, Frank Cass.
Aldrich, RJ 2010, GCHQ: the uncensored story of Britain’s most secret intelligence agency, London, Harper Collins.
Andrew, C 2012, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of M15, London, Alfred A Knopf. Vintage.
Andrew, CM and Gordievsky, O 1990, KGB: The inside story of its foreign operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, London, HarperCollins Publishers.
Berkowitz, B 2002, ‘Intelligence and the War on Terrorism,’ Orbis, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 289-300.
Davies, P (2004): M16 and the Machinery of Spying: Structure and Process in Britain’s Secret Intelligence, Ilford, Frank Cass.
George, RZ and Bruce, JB 2008, Analyzing intelligence: origins, obstacles, and innovations, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University. http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=547760
Glees, A, 2004, The Stasi files: East Germany’s secret operations against Britain, London, Free Press.
Glees, A, Davies, PH and Morrison, JN 2006, The open side of secrecy: Britain’s Intelligence and Security Committee. London, Social Affairs Unit.
Herman, M 2002, Intelligence power in peace and war, Cambridge, Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Hitz, FP 2005, ‘The myths and current reality of espionage,’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 730-733.
Hulnick, AS 2006, ‘What’s wrong with the Intelligence Cycle,’ Intelligence and National Security, vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 959-979.
Jeffrey, K 2010, M16: the history of the secret intelligence service 1909-1949, London, Bloomsbury.
Johnson, L 2013, National Security Intelligence, Cambridge, UK: John Wiley and Sons.
Johnson, LK ed., 2009, Handbook of Intelligence Studies, Abingdon, Routledge.
Kahn, D 1996, The Codebreakers: the comprehensive history of secret communication from ancient times to the internets, London, Simon, and Schuster.
Lowenthal, M 2009, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4th edition. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.
Olson, JM 2006, Fair play: the moral dilemmas of spying, London, Potomac Books Inc.
Phythian, M and Gill, P 2013, Intelligence in an insecure world, [Place of publication not identified], Polity Press. http://rbdigital.oneclickdigital.com
Richards, J 2010, The art and science of Intelligence Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Sano, J 2015, ‘Guide to the study of intelligence: the changing shape of HUMINT,’ AFIO’s Intelligencer Journal, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 77-80.
Shulsky, AN and Schmitt, GJ 2002, Silent Warfare: Understanding the world of intelligence, Washington, D.C., Brassy’s Inc.
Smith, M. (2007), Station X: The Codebreakers of Bletchley Park, London, Pan Books.
Todd, P., Bloch, J. and Fitzgerald, P. 2009, Spies, Lies and the War on Terror, London, Zed Books.
Turner, M. A. 2005, Why secret intelligence fails, Dulles, Potomac Books, Inc.
