Appeals Map (Ohio v. Clark 2015)
| Event | Date |
| Original ruling | Dec 22nd 2011 |
| Appeal arguments | March 2nd 2015 |
| Final ruling | June 18th 2015 |
| Facts and Changes | Outcome |
| Darius Clark is charged with multiple counts relating to abuse of two children belonging to his girlfriend. In the trial process, the procession introduces the testimony from one of the children’s preschool teacher as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Clark argues that the testimony incriminating him should be excluded based on the sixth amendment (Supreme Court of the United States, 2014a). | The Judge denies Clarks motion to exclude the testimony and finds him guilty of all but one of the accused charges. Clark is sentenced to 28 years in prison.
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| The state appellate court revises the ruling on Clark based on the confrontation clause. The provision of this clause per Crawford v. Washington is that it prohibits the introduction of testimonial statements by parties that are not directly testifying (Supreme Court of the United States, 2014a). The exception here is that if the witness is not available, then the testimony being presented should have been cross-examined by the defense before. Also, according Michigan V. Bryant, a statement qualifies to be a testimonial if the primary purpose of the statement was to established an out of court alternative of the testimony | These arguments primarily invalidate the testimony used by the procession as evidence of Clark’s guilt. According to these assertions, the statement obtained by the teacher were not made with the primary purpose of investigating the crime. Rather, it was an effort to remove the child from immediate danger. |
| The second stage of repeal arguments is that in addition to the fact that the statement was not acquired in the context of investigation, the child did not know that their statements would be used to convict Clark. In addition, the child never explicitly hinted that his statements to be used by the police. Lastly, as the child was only 3 years old at the time, his age presented a problem in validating his possible intentions (Supreme Court of the United States, 2014b). | The child’s age further invalidate the credibility of the testimony.
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| The third stage of arguments reveals that Clark’s original motion was not persuasive. The mandatory reporting obligations that require teachers, social workers and medical professionals to report suspected cases of abuse does not necessarily transform teachers into law enforcement agents (Supreme Court of the United States, 2014a). Additionally, the defense team was inaccurate in the proper test for certifying a statement as a testimonial. It is not how the jury would view the remark as previously suggested. Rather, the true test is based on the Bryant case where the primary purpose of obtaining the testimony is put into account. | Since the teacher is not an agent of the law, the kid’s statement cannot qualify as a testimonial in the way the defense team had viewed it. Thus, the introduction of the statement in court does not violate the confrontation clause. |
| Alito J delivered the revised opinion of the Court in which seven other judges agreed (Supreme Court of the United States, 2014a). Justice Scalia and Ginsburg J of Ohio joined in the judgement. They agreed that the teacher did not have a primary purpose in her inquisition. In addition, they assert that the child’s age makes him less likely to even have an abstract concept of the impact of his oath. Similarly, Thomas J concurred with the ruling adding that the mandatory reporters are not law enforcement agents and that the child’s age limit any implication to the confrontation clause. | The previous judgement was reversed as the judges did not find sufficient indicia of solemnity in the testimony |
References
Supreme Court of the United States. (2014a). Ohio V. Clark: Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Ohio. October term. Retrieved from https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-1352_ed9l.pdf
Supreme Court of the United States. (2014b). 13-1352 Ohio V. Clark. Retrieved from https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/13-01352qp.pdf
