Nuclear Strategy
Introduction
Nuclear strategy is one of the fastest growing branches of military strategy that has seen a lot of developments, advancements and inventions since the strategic shock of September 11th 2001.[1] Nuclear strategy according to Powell involves the adoption, development and advancement of principles and strategies essential in the creation and employment of nuclear weapons.[2] Nuclear weapons in this case are tailored to be used both in battlefields and also strategically as a bargaining tool. Nuclear strategy as a branch of military strategy is unique from other branches owing to its ability to cause mass destruction and thus making its use in pursuing military conquest in conventional sense utterly impossible. Many scholars have observed that important focus and effort in nuclear strategy has been directed towards ensuring that other countries do not develop and deploy nuclear weapons; an important aspect of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).[3] Hymans asserts that earlier predictions of rampant proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world after the Second World War have not come to pass with the international security literature uncovering numerous reasons for the nonproliferation global norm that has proven prior predictions null and void.[4] Various nuclear theorists and scholars have contributed immensely to nuclear strategy literature over the years with Bernard Brodie being one of the most quoted, studied and referenced nuclear theorist (Ayson & Leah 2015, p. 75). As the pioneer of the deterrence theory of nuclear strategy and warfare, Brodie’s thoughts and perspectives are considered to have greatly influenced the American nuclear strategy right from the culmination of World War II to the end of the Cold War.
This paper seeks to widely explore Bernard Brodie’s nuclear theory that continues to spark debates among nuclear theory scholars around the world. Over and beyond that, it goes ahead to compare and contrast Brodie’s nuclear theory ideas with other nuclear theorists that include Herman Khan, Henry Kissinger, and Thomas Schelling.
Bernard Brodie’s Nuclear Theory – The Nuclear Deterrence Theory
In the 1950s and the first phase of 1960s, many strategies and scholars were full of anticipations following the advent of a technological state of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) in which USA and the Soviet union had the capacity to launch a second catastrophic nuclear attack after withstanding a first devastating nuclear attack.[5] Bernard Brodie’s evolution as a scholar and nuclear theorist alongside his contributions, responses and insights to the many inventions that have characterized military technology have earned him a place in the field of military strategy and more specifically, nuclear strategy. He is widely known for nuclear deterrence and many other influential works on military and warfare that include The Absolute Weapon of 1946 and Strategy in the Missile Age that was done in 1959. His shift from naval power theory to nuclear strategy laid the foundation for nuclear deterrence strategy hence the deterrence theory.
Brodie in his 1946 book wrote that the usefulness or rather the power in nuclear weapons do not lie their deployment but in threatening to deploy them (Hymans 2015, p. 389).Because of its ability to cause massive destruction, Brodie’s view held that nuclear warfare could no longer sustain the traditional sense of warfare where military victory was the center stage. Later in 1958, Brodie laid down the framework for nuclear deterrence theory. Brodie observed that preventing nuclear attacks by staging retaliatory strikes would only serve to escalate nuclear war to total war. He theorized that deterrence through having the capacity to survive an attack and staging a second strike would give forth a more peaceful and stable outcome for both conflicting sides and the world as a whole. In his postulation that inhibits first strike as a strategy, Brodie a war fighting theorist emphasized the need to have a well-structured and alert civil defense.[6] This includes having strong and hardened land based missile locations which are critical in ensuring stronger and more destructive second strikes.[7]
In his theory, Brodie not only stressed on the need to have a second strike that is more destructive that the first one, but also advocated for a second strike with an equal capability to the first strike in order to cause stasis crucial in deterrence. Furthermore, Brodie stressed the need to have the second strike directed to military structure and infrastructure of the adversary and not necessarily cities or towns as a strategy to limit and possibly eliminate escalation from the Soviets and adversaries by extension. From these ideas that have since been thought to have revolutionized the American Military strategy, he has been considered a war fighting theorist. Brodie’s idea of a secure and escalated second strike was inspired by the fact that both states lacked mechanisms to protect themselves physically and hence a second strike would be impossible to defend against.[8]
Nonetheless, a close analysis of Brodie’s deterrence theory of nuclear strategy reveals that a valid problem to do with credibility lies at its center. Powell argues that a state is more likely to back down its intentions to enact a first nuclear attack on its adversary or even exert coercive pressure to further its interests if its target has credible and established capability to stage a second nuclear strike. However, the question that challenges the deterrence theory is, how can a state then impose sanctions on another state that if imposed, would ultimately lead to its own destruction? The reality in international politics is that one state is likely to impose sanctions and even exert coercive pressure on another state to further its interests notwithstanding the fact that both states have equal second-strike capabilities.[9] Equal capabilities never cancel each other because of the credibility of one’s second strike capabilities and the capacity of each state to effectively absorb a devastating first strike. More often than not, states will exert pressure on each other and even threaten by taking steps that heighten the risks and probability that things will spin out of control in a bid to weigh the credibility of their adversaries to actually mount a serious nuclear strike while at the same time withstanding the first strike.
Comparative Analysis with Other Nuclear Theorists
Thomas Schelling’s Theory of nuclear strategy
Thomas Schelling in his numerous works about military and nuclear strategy undoubtedly shaped the understanding of a nuclear proliferating world. In his 1966 work on nuclear strategy, Schelling redefined the meaning of military strategy and victory and introduced a new perspective into nuclear strategy.[10] He held that military strategy in a nuclear proliferating world is not just a science of military of victory but it refers to an art of being coercive, intimidating and the ability to deter other players from attacks.[11] Schelling added more flesh to the already laid out deterrence theory by insisting that the capability to cause harm to another or other states can be used by one state as a motivating factor to influence, lead and make other states avoid getting into conflicts with it. In his postulation, Schelling denotes that to deter or to coerce another state so that it does not engage its nuclear weapons, violence and the use of force must be anticipated by the state being coerced so that by all costs, it can be avoided through accommodation.[12] It its simplest interpretation, Schelling’s theory of deterrence can be seen as proponent of the use of bargaining power to influence decisions and hurt.
Schelling’s theory differs from Brodie’s theory in the sense that Brodie emphasized the need to have a strong second nuclear strike in order to deter adversaries while Schelling seems to weigh down his emphasis on both strike with the first one more emphasized. By stressing that a state with the capacity to harm others is likely to deter them, Schelling creates the impression that nuclear weapons by a state ought to be well endowed to bring down its adversary with a single first strike.[13] Brodie on the other hand insists that the capacity to absorb and adversary’s first strike and then launch a stronger second strike is the best strategy to deter other nuclear powers. Even though both theorists focused on psychological warfare as a means of deterrence, Schelling went overboard to not only look at winning warfare, but also securing the interests of a state through coercion and hurting adversaries.[14]
Schelling’s theory on nuclear deterrence effectively closes the gaps that Brodie could not fill in his theory about why a state with equal or almost equal second strike capabilities to another one will still exert coercive pressure on it and push through its interest. Schelling observed that since no state has the ability to physically protect itself from nuclear attacks, any crisis poses a risk of escalating to catastrophic levels and mutually destroying both states implicated in the crisis. “It is the essence of a crisis that the participants are not fully in control of events.”[15] The risk a crisis escalating to nuclear war makes states to credibly threaten other states over launching its nuclear installations but still leave room for deliberations. Schelling affirmed that what a state is willing to risk and run in nuclear crisis depends on what is at stake in the disagreement. If the stakes are high, a state will be willing to run much more risks, a phenomenon Powell calls brinkmanship.[16] During crises, states exert pressure on each other as they pursue individual goals through taking steps and acting in ways that raise the possibility of events spinning out of control.
Herman Kahn’s Theory of Nuclear strategy
Herman Khan came into limelight as a military strategist while employed at RAND cooperation due to his ability to analyze the repercussions of nuclear war and his ability to recommend different ways of surviving nuclear war. Kahn came up with the theory of the escalation ladder after criticizing the traditional retaliatory ‘New look” theory by the United States military against the Soviet Union in 1950s during the cold war.[17] Khan in his theory argued for the deterrence nuclear theory by insisting that the only way to deter Soviet Union from staging an attack on American troops was to make the believe that no matter how destructive their nuclear attack can be, America had the capability of staging a more devastating second nuclear strike. He named it the escalation theory because it stressed on the need to have a strong second nuclear strike against an adversary.[18]
In his postulations, Kahn is remembered for insisting on the need to be willing to accept the consequences and aftermath of a nuclear exchange before proclaiming capability to attack an adversary. In his theory, he refers to dire consequences of a nuclear exchange as the unthinkable and says that if Americans were unwilling to accept the repercussions of a nuclear warfare no matter how horrifying they could be, then they had more moral authority to proclaim their willingness and intentions to stage nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union.[19] Nonetheless his postulation that nuclear war just like any other was winnable drew a lot of critics that claimed his theory was agitating for nuclear war.
The Escalation Ladder theory by Khan and Brodie’s deterrence nuclear strategy share a base which makes them almost similar. Both theorists stressed on the need to have a stronger and well equipped nuclear bass within a state that would ensure a strong and overly destructive second strike after suffering the first nuclear strike. Having a more destructive second nuclear attack against an adversaries will not only deter them from striking first and causing nuclear warfare, but it also gives a state bargaining power to further its foreign interests and influence international politics.[20] Both theorists in the long run advocate for resolution of political conflicts through accommodation since all players stand to suffer in case of nuclear crisis and warfare. To a large extend, both Khan and Brodie believed in the balance of power as the only war a nuclear crisis can be avoided in an archaic world characterized by states with competing and clashing interest.[21]
In spite of the many similarities that the two theorist share, there are notable differences that define each of the postulations on nuclear strategy. Many scholars have observed that the escalation theory put forward by Herman Khan put emphasizes psychological war more than the actual state of affairs. In his theory Kahn argues that the willingness to proclaim nuclear war on an adversary should be thought about and the consequences evaluated before taking going ahead.[22] Also, he argued that for deterrence to succeed, states must be convinced that other states have strong and sustainable second strike capabilities. According to Carlson, this makes the theory more psychological because states might boost of nuclear weapons and missiles plants that are non existence just to create a feeling security and push its interest at the international political platform.[23] On the contrary, Brodie is more concerned with having the actual capacity to deploy a more destructive second nuclear strike than just having other states convinced that the capability actually exists. As an initial proponent of escalating responses who later abandoned the idea to lay the foundation for nuclear deterrence, Brodie came to hold that America should use nuclear weapons against any sort of hostility. It has been observed that the construction of protected missile silos across the United States was due to the adoption of his beliefs and theory.
Henry Kissinger’s Theory on Nuclear strategy
Henry Kissinger went down the books of history in America for being one of the most successful Secretaries of State who negotiated numerous peace deals that saw international security upheld.[24] Under the administration of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, the Diplomat who also multiplied as an Advisor to the American National Security played a high-flying role in American foreign policy between 1969 and 1977.[25][26] It was during this time that Kissinger helped ease tension between USA and the Soviet Union and also led bilateral talks between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
After so many years of being a proponent of nuclear and an expert cold war strategy maker, Kissinger reversed his initial stand about having nations empowered with nuclear as a way of ensuring international security.[27] Kissinger’s theory on nuclear strategy holds that far from ensuring a safer and peaceful world free from war, nuclear weapons pose an extreme risk to humanity in the modern world. Kissinger insisted that his initial stand was informed and inspired by the then fewer number of states that had nuclear capabilities. However, with the ever growing number of states with the necessary technology and nuclear capability, the world becomes a hotbed of nuclear warfare with most states vigorously pursuing their interests and coercively pressurizing others.[28] He maintains that the high number of unstable nuclear players in the current world can easily lead to confrontations and nuclear warfare that are massively destructive. Kissinger’s theory holds that nuclear proliferation being witnessed today lack crucial protection safeguards that were developed and used by pioneers such as America and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the emergence and development of nuclear weapons by pariah states such as North Korea and Iran heightens the risk of such nuclear weapons being stolen by terrorists and insurgent groups.[29]
The outstanding similarity between Kissinger’s and Brodie’s schools of thought is that both theorists advocate for accommodative conflict resolution in light of nuclear proliferation and advancement. Brodie theorizes that states will tend to solve transnational conflicts peacefully if both of them possess equal nuclear destructive capabilities. Being equal creates a level platform where states can engage depending on the states and interests being pursued while avoiding a possible nuclear crisis or total nuclear war.[30] Kissinger on the other hand believes that the world will be safer and more peaceful if the current nuclear proliferation is contained so that the technology does not end up in the wrong hands.
Kissinger differs sharply with Brodie’s nuclear deterrence theory which advocates for the strengthening of states’ second strike nuclear capabilities. Kissinger holds that nuclear deterrence has lost touch with the evolving world as its applicability is slowly being outlived. Regional nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism that characterize the current world render nuclear deterrence less persuasive. In his theory, Kissinger seeks to call for global input in addressing the problem and risk that come with a nuclear proliferating planet rather than great powers strengthening their nuclear capabilities.[31] Brodie is on the other hand believed in having strong nuclear players with the capacity to absorb the first strike from its adversary and still mount a formidable second strike. The capacity to deter other state emanates from the conviction that a state is able to survive and still deploy its nuclear weapons (Kent 2015, p. 63). It is however worth noting that Kissinger does not oppose nuclear technological advancement and development, but rather, his pessimism about nuclear proliferation comes from the reality that most states lack security safeguards necessary for nuclear development, terrorism and competing interests that are likely to spark conflict and war thereafter.[32]
Bernard Brodie as the greatest proponent of nuclear deterrence who advocated for having strong, well endowed, protected and stand by military base and nuclear weapons can be seen as war fighting theorists who believed in deterring other states through perceived nuclear threats (Kent 2015, p. 63).[33] In his works, the war fighting theorist maintains that in nuclear warfare, having the capacity to contain an adversary’s nuclear attack is half the job. Mounting a much more devastating nuclear attack against the attacker directed at the right target in the right magnitude is the ultimate strategy of winning a nuclear warfare.[34][35] He believes that nuclear weapons are not only meant for attacking and destroying perceived enemies but also as bargaining tools that can be used to further s states’ interests. Unlike Kissinger who believes in containing nuclear proliferation, Brodie holds that a safer and tranquil world will be guaranteed if all players are armed with nuclear weapons and the only way to resolve disputes is through peaceful deliberations and accommodation.
Conclusion
Nuclear strategy as a sub branch of military strategy continues to attract scholars, scientists and theorists because of its dynamism, rapid proliferation and daily technological advancements. Indeed, Bernard Brodie’s ideas that gave forth nuclear deterrence clearly indicate that he was a war fighting theorists who believed in the power of a second nuclear strike. Thomas Schelling and Herman Khan on the other hand served to propel nuclear deterrence to much higher levels through their colossal contributions notwithstanding the dimensions they took. With Henry Kissinger seeking to have nuclear proliferation put under scrutiny, the reality that nuclear proliferation and advancement is global thalidomide waiting to consume the world becomes apparent. As long as states continue to exist, nuclear strategy will continue being a field of interest since what keeps the world together is peaceful association of nations.
Bibliography
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[1] Ayson, R. and Leah, C.M., 2015. Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age. Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(1-2), p.75.
[2] Powell, R., 2003. Nuclear deterrence theory, nuclear proliferation, and national missile defense. International Security, 27(4), p.86.
[3] Hymans, J., 2015. Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. Political Science Quarterly, 130(2), p.388.
[4] Hymans, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, p.389.
[5] Powell, Nuclear deterrence theory, nuclear proliferation, and national missile defense, p.87.
[6] Wagner, R.H., 1991. Nuclear deterrence, counterforce strategies, and the incentive to strike first. American Political Science Review, 85(03), p.732.
[7] Kent, C., 2015. Evolutionary Game Models of Optimal Nuclear Weapons Strategies. Undergraduate Research Journal, p.63.
[8] Powell, Nuclear deterrence theory, nuclear proliferation, and national missile defense, p.87.
[9] Brodie, B., 1978. The development of nuclear strategy. International Security, 2(4), p.69.
[10] Schelling, T.C., 2008. Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword, (Yale University Press), p.93.
[11] Powell, Nuclear deterrence theory, nuclear proliferation, and national missile defense, p.92.
[12] Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword, p.98.
[13] Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword, p.93.
[14] Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword, p.93.
[15] Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword, p.97.
[16] Powell, Nuclear deterrence theory, nuclear proliferation, and national missile defense.
[17] Carlson, L.J., 1995. A theory of escalation and international conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39(3), p.519.
[18] Carlson, A theory of escalation and international conflict, p.521.
[19] Kahn, H., 2011. On thermonuclear war, (Transaction publishers), p.34.
[20] Carlson, A theory of escalation and international conflict, p.519
[21] Kahn, On thermonuclear war, 9.34
[22] Carlson, A theory of escalation and international conflict, p.526.
[23] Carlson, A theory of escalation and international conflict, p.521.
[24] Powell, Nuclear deterrence theory, nuclear proliferation, and national missile defense, p.91.
[25] Kissinger, H., 2014. Henry Kissinger on the Assembly of a New World Order. Wall Street Journal, 29, p.2
[26] Shultz, G.P., Perry, W.J., Kissinger, H.A. and Nunn, S., 2008. Toward a nuclear-free world. Wall Street Journal, 15, p.2008.
[27] Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, Toward a nuclear-free world, p.2008.
[28] ibid
[29] Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, Toward a nuclear-free world, p.2008.
[30] Powell, Nuclear deterrence theory, nuclear proliferation, and national missile defense, p.87.
[31] Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, Toward a nuclear-free world, p.2008.
[32] Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, Toward a nuclear-free world, p.2008.
[33] Kent, Evolutionary Game Models of Optimal Nuclear Weapons Strategies, p.63.
[34] Ayson and Leah, Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age, p.75.
[35] Lantis, J.S., 2009. Strategic culture and tailored deterrence: Bridging the gap between theory and practice. Contemporary Security Policy, 30(3), p.470.
