Introduction
Although arguably the best intelligence at the time, the US intelligence failed on 9/11 (Trafton, 1994 p.1; Herman, 2002 p.224l; Johnson, 2009). Inaccuracy of the intelligence information gathered was key to this failure as it would be to any other intelligence mission (Betts 1978, p.63). The success of the 9/11 terrorist attack in America, which was spearheaded by an organization of Islamic extremists under the leadership of Osama bin Laden based in Afghanistan, succeeded mainly because of internal failures in America’s intelligence and response systems rather that the enemy’s wit. Among these internal failures were:
- Low preparedness
- Miscommunication and assumptions
- Lack of keenness
Why the Intelligence Operation Failed
Reports show that the CIA and by extension the White House were aware of an impending attack on US soil organized by Al Qaeda. A series of Al Qaeda-sponsored attacks targeting US citizens prior to the 9/11 attacks served as a warning sign to the impending massive attack. This warning attacks included the bombing of US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and an attack on the US navy vessel USS Cole (Dahl, 2013 p.23). Moreover, it has been reported that President Bill Clinton was informed of plans by Al Qaeda to attack the US whilst using commercial aircrafts as weapons of mass destruction. The CIA also informed the White House of the presence of a group of terrorists planning to attack the US within US borders in May 2001. Despite the availability of this crucial information, the intelligence operation still failed.
Therefore, it is obvious that the CIA and the White House underestimated the threat posed by Osama and his crew (Borch, 2003 p.851). Before the 9/11 attacks, American agencies thought that it was impossible for any terrorists to gain access to the US and in turn plan and orchestrate terrorist related activities. For this reason, the intelligence agencies saw it as impossible for Al Qaeda to harm the USA with missiles launched from Afghanistan. The fault of underestimating possible attacks was even more with the White House; it is documented that the FBI briefed her of the discovery of patterns consistent with a possible hijack-type terrorist attack, but Condoleezza Rice was unimpressed (Windrem, 2012 para 5; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004 para 3). Moreover, despite the CIA’s reiteration of the possible dramatic consequences of the anticipated attack, President Clinton still saw the terror threats as a disinformation campaign by Osama. As such, these assumptions underlie the failure of the intelligence agencies and the White House to act appropriately to stop the attacks.
Additionally, internal failures within the CIA itself precipitated their failure (Goodman, 2003 p.63). The CIA, for instance, had identified an Al Qaeda operative by the name al-Mihdhar as potential security threat 18 months before the attack, but they neither put him on the US watch list nor denied him an American visa; by the time they moved to do this, al-Mihdhar was already taking flying lessons in California (Zegart, 2005 p.79). The CIA were just not sharp in their actions. Furthermore, the increasing rivalry between the CIA and the FBI tended to disrupt the effectiveness of the American intelligence system (Zegart, 2007 p.27). The two groups could not work together to connect the external and the internal security threats that had been thought to exist.
Challenges Faced by the US Intelligence
The main challenge that was faced by US intelligence agencies before the 9/11 attack was the emerging nature of terrorism (Dahl, 2013 p.39). Even though there had been a few terrorist attacks targeting US citizens in the past, none of those attacks had happened on American soil. With the sophisticated security system that seemed to have sealed all possible leakages, it was hard to envisage a terrorist attack on American soil. As the 9/11 commission reported, the intelligence agencies simply lacked imagination. However, lacking imagination was not purely their fault. Rather, this lack of imagination was more of an effect of the fast changing nature of security threats. In the late 1980s when the Cold War was at its peak, the Soviet Union posed the greatest security threat to the USA and, thus, formed the focus of CIA operations (Lahneman, 2011 p.16). The collapse of the Soviet Union left the CIA confused. Meanwhile, the threat posed by terrorism was fast becoming significant (Lahneman, 2011 p.16). As such, it was difficult for the CIA to deal with a challenge they had never dealt with and could not even envisage its occurrence.
Secondly, miscommunication between intelligence agencies and the White House posed a major challenge in the implementation of plans to alleviate the 9/11 attacks; Richards (2010 p.34) asserts that poor communication is central to the failure of many intelligence operations. As earlier alluded to, both the CIA and the FBI had challenges in convincing those in White House of the seriousness of the looming attacks. Without presidential approval, the plans hatched by intelligence teams could not be implemented. Both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had indifference and did not take the security reports with the seriousness they deserved. Marrin (2011 p. 187) seems to blame the two presidents when he blames the attack on policy and not an intelligence failure, something which Bossie (2004) agrees with.
Point of Inevitability of Intelligence Failure
The failure of the US intelligence to track and prevent the 9/11 attack was imminent as soon as the plans for the attack were made. Basically, the CIA were poorly prepared for this type of attacks (Theoharis, 2006 p.34). The failure of the CIA to track al-Mihdhar being a key factor in the precipitation of the ultimate failure. However, the situation turned from bad to worse when a number of Al Qaeda operatives gained access to the USA and even started taking flying lessons there. At this point, an Arabian was arrested for attempting to enroll for a flying program that was unsuitable for non-citizens but again the intelligence agencies did not interrogate him sufficiently (Lansford, 2012 p.24). The failure of White House to act with the required agency when reports of an imminent attack surfaced was also a huge contributory factor towards making the intelligence failure inevitable.
The situation got unsalvageable once the Al Qaeda operatives breached the security protocol at various airports and found their way into the four ill-fated planes. At this point, the intelligence teams did not have the particulars of the plan and could not do much to prevent the mass destruction that was imminent (Moore, 2004). Once the operatives were on board, the attack would definitely progress as planned. Failed attempts by passengers to try and prevent the commercial aircraft they were in from getting to the White House are an evidence of this. The plane ended crushing and killing some of the passengers who were on board (Lansford, 2012 p.27).
The Intelligence Failure was not Inevitable
Based on the arguments presented above, it was possible for the intelligence departments in the USA to prevent the 9/11 attack. There are several steps that they would have taken to prevent the progress of Al Qaeda’s plan. First, it was prudent for the American agencies to think of striking first as Shultz and Vogt (2002 p.413) suggest. This is to mean that the initiative of trying to subdue Al Qaeda and capture Osama should have been incepted as soon as the Arabian began peddling threats of attacking American soil (Posner, 2009 p.17). However, this was never done since both the Clinton and Bush administrations were reluctant to initiate military action in the Middle East probably for political reasons; politicization interferes with the success of intelligence missions (Phythian and Gill 2013 p.121; Pillar, 2011 p.141).
Secondly, the CIA should have been more precise and cautious in their dealings. After confirming the whereabouts of al-Mihdhar and his membership to Al Qaeda, the CIA should have made an effort to track or to arrest the Arabian. Moreover, since the Arabian operative was known to have multiple entry US visas, it was prudent for the CIA to block him from entering the USA in good time (Ahmed, 2005 p.9). However, their delay allowed al-Mihdhar to enter the USA untracked and even to enroll for flying lessons while using his real name.
Thirdly, cooperation between the CIA and the FBI would have helped to prevent the attack. As Betts (2007 p.593) suggests, Communication issues between the two facets could have facilitated the ultimate intelligence failure. If only the CIA and the FBI would exchange the pieces of intelligence that they had, it would easily be worked out that members of Al Qaeda were already within the limits of American borders and were planning an attack using commercial aircrafts as weapons. Moreover, combined efforts of the two agencies to alert White House of the looming attacks would have yielded better results.
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