Changes made in Law of Warranties by Insurance Act of 2015 and their Implications for the Policyholder
Introduction
The insurance sector of the UK has for long been controlled by a legislation which was made more than a century ago – the marine insurance legislation of 1906. With the expansion of the insurance sector to include many consumer and non-consumer businesses, there was a need to modify the law for it to be fairer.[1] This is the basis of the inaction of the IA 2015. In their review of the insurance law of the UK, the Law Commissions of England and Scotland found various irregularities in the Marine Insurance Act of 1906; the original MIA of 1906 tended to favor insurers.[2] The IA 2015 proposed reforms to the initial insurance law of the UK including the widening the scope on contracting out of an insurance deal, changes in laws regarding the handling claims that were found to be fraudulent, abolition of ‘basis or contract’ clauses, changes on provisions for breach of warranty which suspend the insurers liability for the period of the breach and few changes in the insurers duty of fair presentation. The IA 2015 also allows the parties to contract out of some terms of the legislation provided they both agree to it for purposes of convenience. This paper is an in-depth view of the changes made in the law of warranties by the act and exactly what these changes imply for the policyholder.
Abolition of Basis of Contract Clauses
Another section of the IA 2015 which does not directly fall under warranties but will greatly influence policyholders I this area is Section 9 of the document. The section abolishes the basis of contract clauses.[3] Before the inaction of the IA 2015, previous legislations provided that the information given in the pre-contractual forms, the basis of contract, could substitute the contract itself in some cases.[4]
The fact that the pre-contractual forms usually ask for a lot of information, some that can seem rather trivial for policyholders, increases the risk of the policyholder erring or giving incorrect information. As per the Marine Insurance Act of 1906, this would mean that the insurer is automatically discharged of any liability.[5] The basis of contract clause thus favored the insurer. As such, in litigation, many insurers tended to capitalize on the information provided in the basis of contract documents to avoid liability.[6] Some of the information that the insurers and the courts relied on to make such calls, despite how frustrating they were to the policyholder, were rather very trivial.
Based on this unfairness of the law to the policyholder, the Law Commission proposed the abolition of these clauses. With this, the IA 2015, therefore, protects the insured from the extreme effects of the incorrect information that they could have given based on contract forms.[7] Rather, the IA 2015 demands that the terms of contract be completed as they are regardless of the significance of the information given in the pre-contractual forms. This is advantageous for policyholders who were mostly the victims of referral to pre-contractual terms. The fact that the parties cannot contract out of this provision also protects the policyholder against any malicious attempt by the insurer to make a contract that does not include this clause as part of the terms of contract.
However, the IA of 2015 allows the insurer to draft provisions that set extra conditions precedent to having the liability of a certain representation as part of an insurance policy.[8] In that case, the extra provision drafted will not be part of pre-contractual agreements but will be under the current contract hence its legality. This can occur when, for instance, the insurer needs to know the truth about a particular representation, also the insurable interest, to be covered in the policy.[9] As the IA 2015 provides, the insurer will have asked for this information from the insured and, therefore, the insured will have to provide this information if they want the particular representation to be covered in the policy. The implications of this provisions are thus not dire to the policyholder as they will only contract into a policy with extra conditions which they are aware of and are part of the current terms of the contract.
The Law Commissions categorically stated that the changes made are not meant to intimidate insurers into excluding conditions so fundamental that their breach will lead to the automatic discharge of liability from their insurance contracts.[10] However, in such a case, the insurer has to clearly spell out the consequences of breach of warranty to the insured before the policy is agreed upon. However, it is not clear whether this means that the parties have to contract out of section 10 or not.
Warranties as Suspensory Conditions
The marine Insurance Act of 1906 provided that any breach of warranty automatically led to the discharge of the insurer from any liabilities.[11] In this case, a breach of warranty refers to falsehood or failure of an affirmative statement or failure to perform an executory stipulation.[12] While signing a contract, the insurer would require the insured to follow some regulations or to avoid certain things or to do some certain things which were mean to mitigate the risk that is covered in the policy from occurring. Failure of the insured to live by these conditions in the period of covered automatically relieved the insurer of all liabilities thereafter.[13] It did not matter whether the associated breach of warranty increased the risk or was at the heart of loss causation or not. . Following Lord Mansfield’s ruling on the case Carter v Boehm in1776, section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act of 1906 spelled out that all insurance contracts were to be based on utmost good faith.[14] The basis of this was the fact that concealing facts could make an insurer to take a significantly higher risk than they would have been willing to take had the facts been laid plainly.[15] Both parties are to observe this requirement of good faith and failure of one party to observe this requirement allows the other party to avoid the insurance contract.[16] The general duty of good faith in an insurance contract demands that both parties disclose necessary material information and should not make any material misrepresentations. In traditional marine insurance, the principle of utmost good faith had everything to do with warranties. In fact, breech of this requirement was equivalent to breech of a warranty according to the MIA 1906. This principle was meant to restrict policyholders from going into situations where they will have breached warranties.
This aspect of the law made it very unfair for policyholders. First, the law did not consider whether the breach of warranty was deliberate of not. The famous analogy of a water vessel insured against destruction and sinking but required only to only sail in waters that were thought to be safe. This meant that the breach of warranty was committed whenever the vessel sailed through waters that were unsafe and the insurer had warned sailing in this waters since they thought that sailing through such waters exposed the vessel to a significant risk of destruction and sinking.[17] On discovery that the vessel sailed through unsafe waters, the insurer did not have any liabilities to carter for regardless of water happened to the vessel while in the unsafe and waters what made the vessel to sail in waters that were thought to be unsafe. As per the MIA 1906, once a breach of warranty had been reported, the insured’s side of the story did not hold any waters.
Secondly, the MIA 1906 did not consider the fact that maybe the breach of warranty could be remedied or cured. Back to the analogy of an insurance policy on a sailing ship, it is possible that the insured ship could sail through waters that were thought to be unsafe and but sail through them safely.[18] In the same way, if an insurer required a building to have a burglarproof alarm before insuring the building against destruction, transient dysfunction of the burglarproof alarm mean that the insurer was discharged of all liabilities of the building. The MIA 1906 did not consider the fact that the ship could safely sail out of presumably unsafe waters or that the burglarproof alarm could be repaired or replaced – these events would be equated to curing the breach of warranty.
Thirdly, the MIA 1906 did not consider the possibility that the breach of warranty did not increase the risk of the losses that could occur either after the breach has been cured or during the period of breach. In the analogy of the sailing ship, MIA 1906 provided that the insurer was discharged from any liabilities if a ship which had sailed through presumably unsafe waters went on to sink in waters that were considered safe.[19] It is clear that the unsafe waters do not have anything to do with the sinking of the ship but just because there was a breach of warranty at one time during the period of cover, then the insurer is exempted of any liabilities. In the second analogy, burglary on the insured house after the burglar-proof alarm had been repaired or destruction of the house of fire or a flood clearly do not have anything to do with prior failure of the burglar-proof alarm. However, since there was a breach of warranty at some point during the period of coverage, the insurer is again exempted from any liabilities.
This evidence of the unfairness of the existing law is what informed the changes in the IA 2015. The IA 2015 provides that the insured should be allowed to cure a breached condition of warranty. In this period, the warranty is suspended until the breach has been cured.[20] After the insurer confirms that the cure has been cured, the insurance policy continues to apply just as it was before. In the case of an insured house with a dysfunctional burglarproof alarm, the insurance policy can be suspended for some time until the insured has restored the function of the alarm. The IA 2015 also provides that any premiums that might have been paid in by the insured during the suspensory period are either returned or pushed forward to cover the period that is remaining.
Effectively, the IA 2015 introduces the fourth exception for the insurer’s immunity to the insured’s breach of warranty – remedy of the breached warranty before loss occurs. Statutes that already existed in the law of the UK provided for three exceptions in the breach of warranty. There were, changes in circumstances that rendered the breach of warranty inapplicable; subsequent laws that render the particular breach of warranty unlawful;[21] and where the insurer themselves waive the breach of warranty.
This amendment protects the policyholder. Breach of warranty is in most instances not in any way deliberate. Moreover, most cases of breach of warranty can be easily cured by the insured. A move to suspend the insurance policy for the period of curing the identified breach will prevent the suffering of policyholders who would have lost any claims if it was found that there was a breach of warranty at one point during the insurance cover. Once concern with the suspension of the policy for the time of curing the breach is that the insurer will not be liable for any losses occurring during this period even if they are unrelated to the breached condition. However, unlike the provisions of MIA 1906 where the insurer was exempted from all liabilities whenever a breach of warranty was shown to have occurred at one point during the cover[22], the IA 2015 provides that the insurer will be liable for any losses which could have occurred before there was a breach of warranty.
The IA 2015 also provides that even though there could be an existing breach of warranty, the insurer is not immune to all liabilities. The insurer will be liable for losses occurring during a period of a breached warranty if the policyholder can prove that the losses occurring are not in any way attributable to the breach of warranty.[23] For instance, if the policyholder was required to have a burglarproof alarm and they do not have one or their alarm is dysfunctional, the insurer will still have to honor a valid claim for a flood. Again, this amendment was meant to protect the policyholder. Most insurers relied on previous breaches in warranty even if the breach was irrelevant to the actual loss to avoid liability. The provisions of IA 2015 ensure that insurers to not have excuses for escaping valid claims.
The insurer, however, will not be liable for losses which occur after a breach of warranty has been remedied but are attributable to something that occurred during the breach of warranty.[24] For instance, a ship that was not to sail to a war zone but does so and is torpedoed while in the war zone but sinks after leaving the war zone. Even though ostensibly, the loss occurred after the breach of warranty had been remedied, the breach of warranty increased the likelihood that the loss would occur hence the discharge in liability of the insurer. The avoid liability, the insurer thus has to show that the breach of warranty increased the risk of the loss occurring.
Moreover, the terms in section 11 of IA 2015, which emphasize on the validity of an insurance claim provided that the insured proves that the breach of warranty did not increase the risk of the loss occurring shall not apply to terms which define the risk as a whole.[25] The example used here is that of a car insured as one that is meant for private purposes suffers a loss while being used for commercial purposes. Since the insurer would have charged higher premiums for a car that is meant for commercial purposes, this is a different risk altogether. The insurer is, therefore, immune to any claims made by the insured despite the fact that the insured could prove beyond doubt that their actions did not increase the risk of the loss that occurred. This part is also a major limitation of this section of IA 2015, there is no clear differentiation between terms which are meant to mitigate losses and terms which define the risk as a whole. A term which is thought to define the risk as a whole might also be able to mitigate losses. This overlap might be more disadvantageous to the policyholder than it is advantageous to them as it could be the only thing that the insurer clutches on to deny a policyholder a valid claim.
The good thing, however, is the fact that section 11 is optional; parties can contract out of section 11. Even though the section offers some protection and advantages to the policyholder, it lacks clarity which could come back to haunt the policyholder.[26] Depending on their type of business, it is important for those seeking to be insured to consider all possibilities before deciding whether to contact out of section 11 of the IA 2015 or not. Section 11 of the IA 2015 bars insurers from on irrelevant policy terms to defeat claims made by policyholders.
Warranties and Remedies to Breach of Warranty
Of the major limitations of the IA 2015 is its failure to clearly define which terms qualify to be designated as warranties. Traditionally, warranties have been defined as conditions in an insurance contract that the policyholder must fulfil so as to ensure that the amount of risk covered is proportional to the insurance policy of the insured. Warranties have been there since the inception of marine insurance. With this, the provisions of the MIA 1906, which provided that warranties were based on the contract that had been signed are upheld.[27] The IA 2015 only redefined the legal implications of a term which had been designated a warranty.[28]
Having stated that the IA 2015 allows for the suspension of an insurance policy until a breached warranty has been remedied, the act goes further to explain what is meant by the remedy of a term.[29] A time warranty is said to be remedied if it was initially breached when the risk to which this warranty is related is perceived to be same as it was originally after an attempt to correct the breach. For any other warranties, a breached warranty is said to have been remedied when the insured ceases to be in breach of warranty.
In regards to this, section 10 of the IA 2015 brings up another controversy. It is not clear when the policyholder ceases to be in breach of warranty where there have been repeated cases of breach of warranty. The Law Commission, in their work, used the example of a car insured as a personal means of transport, which is repeatedly put to commercial use. The framers refer to this as playing the system and that breach of warranty can only be said to have been remedied if the insured stopped using the car for commercial purposes altogether. As such, it implies that if the car was involved in an accident while being used for commercial purposes then the insurer is not liable for the loses; likewise if the car is involved in an accident while being used for personal purposes but the insurer is aware that the car has been used for commercial purposes repeatedly, then the car is in breach warranty and as such the insurer is not liable for any losses[30].
This seems to contradict what the framers meant with section 5 (b) which provides that a previously breached warranty will be said to have been remedied if and when the insured ceases to be in breach of warranty.[31] According to this clause, a car which has been repeatedly used for commercial purposes when it has been insured as one for personal transport is no longer in breach of warranty at a time it is being used for personal purpose even when this occurs between episodes of commercial use. This lack of clarity in the law is more disadvantageous to the policyholder than it is to the insurer. In litigation, the insurer can prove repeated breach of warranty and be discharged of any liabilities even when the insured had an honest plan of stopping the deliberate breaches in policy altogether.
However, even in the face of a breached warranty, a policyholder who can prove that the risk of loss could not have been increased by the breach of warranty in question deserves to be compensated. The case of Synergy Health (UK) Ltd v CGU Insurance Plc and Others of 2010 is a perfect example of this. The fact that the insured had failed to install an intruder alarm as they had promised to install before renewing the insurance policy meant that they had committed a material misrepresentation again but the fact that this material misrepresentation had not induced the insurer to change the insurance policy is what saved the policyholder from the imminent discharge of liability by the insurer. Here, the changes in IA 2015 obviously favor the policyholder and make it tighter for the insurers.[32] Moreover, the IA 2015 provides that it is the role of the insurer to solicit for information they think is important in the establishment of an insurance contract from the insured before establishing the contract. This, therefore, means that it is the role of the insurer to check for possibilities that a warranty will be breached instead of depending on feeble evidence that a warranty was breached somewhere in the course of the contract in order to have them discharged of liability.
Nevertheless, the IA 2015 also appreciates the fact that some breaches of warranty cannot be remedied.[33] For instance, if it was agreed that bottles of wine to be insured were to be kept in a cold cellar but the wines were exposed to harsh weather conditions while in a warehouse during shipment and thus their deterioration, placement of already deteriorated wines in a cold cellar does not remedy the breach in warranty as the wines can never regain their initial form. In that case, the insurer is discharged of any liabilities. The way the act articulates this clause is mean to warn the policyholders of such situations where there is no allowance for a warranty to be breached since such a breach cannot be remedied.
The premium payment warranty
Before the IA 2015 came into play, the premium payment warranty was a very powerful incentive which demanded that the insured pays their premiums on time. Failure to remit one’s premiums on time would mean that one lost their insurance cover totally.[34] However, the IA 2015 provides that provided the policyholder pays in their premiums before a related loss occurs, the insurer is liable for the loss.
Again, this clause is meant to protect the policyholder. Delay in remission of one’s premiums may not be intentional at all. Moreover, delay in remission of premiums when one intends to remit in these premiums as soon as it is possible for them does not in any way increase the risk of a loss occurring. This, therefore, means that it was unfair for the insurer to be discharged from all related liabilities just because the policyholder delayed in remitting their premiums.
However, some insurers feel that the premium payment warranty was of utmost importance and may want to preserve the former effect of this warranty – complete discharge of the insurer from any liabilities in case this warranty was breached.[35] In that case, the insurer has three options to ensure that they maintain the former effects of the warranty. This also applies to any other warranty whose former effects the insurer wishes to maintain.
First, the insurer can draft the warranty of interest as a condition precedent to the existence of the contract.[36] However, because some warranties are not necessarily fulfilled at the very beginning, this would mean that the contract wouldn’t be existent and thus no coverage for the policyholder. As is stipulated in the MIA 1906, the cover can only begin once a contract has been agreed upon and signed.[37] Additionally, this condition would sound harsh and policyholder who needs cover as soon as possible wouldn’t enter such contracts.
Second, redrafting the warranty in terms of a condition that must be fulfilled for the insurer to liable is a better alternative.[38] If premium payment warrant is the warrant in question, then the insurer can make it a condition that the premium must have been paid in by a certain time for the insurer to be liable for any losses suffered. However, such a term would not be different to a warranty hence the violation of section 10 of the IA 2015. As such, this is another example of how the IA 2015 protects the interest of the policyholder – it bars the insurers from introducing new warranties which oppress the policyholder.
The safest option that the insurer has is to contract out of section 10. They might decide to only have the warranty in contention contracted out of section 10 or to have the entire deal contracted out of section 10.[39] However, the former option is far more acceptable for the insured.
Section 11 and its applicability
As earlier alluded to, this section was meant to prevent unfairness. The section prevents the insurer from relying on the insured’s breach of a term to avoid liability even when the breached term has little to do with the actual loss suffered. As such, the section protects policyholders.
This section only applies to risk mitigation terms and not terms that define the risk as a whole. Even though the distinction between the two is not clear, a risk mitigation term can be taken to be one whose compliance with significantly reduce the risk of the insured representation from suffering losses due to certain circumstances.[40] On the other side, terms which define the risk as a whole refer to the terms which are the very basis of insurance. The Law Commissions selected a few conditions which thy designated the terms that define the risk as a whole.
First, terms that describe a geographical zone in which the loss must occur for the insurer to be liable for it were classified as terms which defined liability as a whole.[41] For instance, the traditional war zone warranty now lies under terms which define the liability as a whole and is, therefore, not subject to section 11 of IA 2015. This would mean if a ship that had been insured with a war zone warranty but went on to sail in the war zone and ultimately sank due to reasons other than the war, the insurer would not be liable for the losses suffered. This part of the IA 2015 tends to expose the policyholder and contradicts the whole intention of the act to protect policyholders. Furthermore, classification of a war zone warranty as a term that defines the risk as a whole sounds unfair since this warranty effectively mitigates the risk of the vessel being attacked and should thus be classified as a risk mitigation term. Such classification will only mean that the warranty is suspended for the period that the ship is sailing through the war zone and that the insurer will not be able to escape liability if the vessel sunk in a war zone but due to reasons which the insured can demonstrate were not related to the war situation.
Secondly, terms defining the age, identity, experience or qualifications of the person to operate a vehicle, vessel, chattel or aircraft were classified under terms that define a risk as a whole.[42] In the case of a vehicle, this would mean that the insurer was exempted from liability if the vehicle was involved in an accident while a minor or a person with less experience than that contracted by the insurance contract was behind the wheel. Again, this provision has negative implications for the policyholder. A minor or a less experienced person driving a roadworthy vehicle at the required speed and obeying all other traffic rules of the land does not in any way increase the risk of the vehicle getting involved in a country. Therefore, it is a lame excuse for the insurer to be exempted of liability on the basis that the person driving the vehicle did not have the attributes provided for in the contract. In essence, this clause is not very reasonable and as such, the terms should even be considered as terms as such – they put the insured under undue pressure to fulfill conditions that have little or no influence at all on the risk profile of the represented.
Thirdly, terms, which exclude the use of an aircraft, a vehicle or vessel for commercial purposes are considered terms that define the risk as a whole.[43] As has been earlier alluded to, the insurer will be relieved of any liabilities if the insured locomotive is involved in an accident or any other event preceding a loss of any kind while being used for commercial purposes. This clause as already said does not have extreme implications for the policyholder. Rather, the clause is a timely reminder to the policyholder of the conditions that they need to abide by and the terms of the insurance cover.
As seen, it is possible that terms that are thought to define the risk as a whole or are also terms that mitigate certain risks. However, the applicability of such terms to section 11 of the IA 2015 is heavily dependent on the overall cover that is provided by the policy. A good example to help break down this controversy is a term requiring an oil firm which has been insured against fire to have a fire officer on the ground at all time. If the scope of cover only features fire, then the presence or absence of a fire officer on the ground can as well be a term that describes the risk as a whole.[44] This implies that occurrence of a fire in the absence of this officer exempts the insurer from any liabilities suffered. However, if the scope of the cover includes other likely causes of destruction of the oil company then the requirement a fire officer on the ground is only a term to mitigate risk.[45] This will, therefore, mean that absence of a fire officer on the ground will only lead to temporary suspension of the insurance policy. However, if the oil firm is destroyed by any other cause, for instance, a tsunami during the period of suspension then the insurer will not be able to avoid liability. Destruction of the firm by a fire that started while the fire officer was absent on the premise will be equal to the breach of a warranty where a causal relationship can be established between this breach and the loss that occurred hence the insurer will be exempted from any liability.
It is not certain whether section 11 of the IA 2015 applies to exclusion clauses or not. Even though in their assessment, the Law Commissions are thought to have implied that section 11 includes exclusion clauses, it does not look so in practice since exclusive clauses look like more of terms which define a risk as a whole. Moreover, it is hard to envisage an exclusion clause to which the policyholder might comply with or fail to comply with. For instance, an exclusion clause in the MIA 1906 excludes any losses attributed to the activities of strikers, locked-out workmen or persons taking part in a labor disturbance from cover.[46] This clause merely states what is not covered since there is nothing in the clause for the insured to either comply with or not comply with.[47] As such, this clause cannot fall under section 11 of the IA 2015.
Prior to the inaction of the IA 2015, it was the role of the insurer to prove that the loss suffered by the insured was within the ambit of the exclusion clause. With regards to the example above, the insurer was to show that indeed the loss suffered can be attributed to the activities of strikers or locked-out workmen.[48] However, if the exclusion clauses were confirmed to be under section 11, then the burden of proof would be reversed. It will now be upon the insured to prove that the loss which occurred could not have been prevented or reduced by compliance to the exclusion clause. With regard to the example, compliance with the terms would maybe mean that the insured had the responsibility of ensuring that their workmen were not involved in any industrial actions which could lead to losses.
As such, the inclusion of exclusion clauses to section 11 of the IA 2015, would spell hell to policyholders. Policyholders will be responsible for issues that they need not meddle in and insurers would use this as an opportunity. The indecisiveness of the IA 2015 on this issue thus ranks as one of its major limitations. Section 11 also introduces complexities in the law of causation where there has been a breach of warranty.[49] The arguments that can arise in such a case can favor either side.
Despite the many changes on the section of warranties, there are aspects of warranties that the IA 2015 did not change. The most important aspect that was not changed or modified is the process of claiming for breach of warranty. The need for notification of the defendant, even though seemingly unreasonable was maintained – another area where the IA 2015 failed.
Conclusion
The IA 2015 is definitely a proper improvement to the MIA 1906 which controlled the UK’s insurance industry for a long time. The MIA 1906 had many clauses that were controversial, especially when considered in the face of the expansive insurance industry of the UK. The IA 2015 was enacted in a big to strike out these controversies. As seen in the discussion above, the IA 2015 did well in this regard. The IA 2015 also made the terms of insurance fairer, especially for policyholders. However, not all changes that were made by the IA 2015 favored the policyholders; the few unfavorable changes are epitomized by the terms declaration of terms that define risk as a whole – some of which are terms that mitigate risk. Moreover, there are a few controversies that the IA 2015 does not address and yet some new controversies which the act introduces; the acceptance of exclusion clauses as part of section 11 of the document being one of the new controversies that the document introduces. Therefore, policyholder will feel much safer with the insurance act in place than they felt prior to its inaction. Furthermore, the IA 2015 does not completely bully insurers, it gives them a voice too and most importantly, an option to contract out of some clauses of the document. Effectively, IA 2015 is a much-improved pact for policyholders that does not necessarily spell doom for insurers.
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[1] R. Merkin, & O. Gürses, The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured. (November 01, 2015). The Modern Law Review, 78, 6, 1004.
[2] Christopher Giaschi, ‘WARRANTIES IN MARINE INSURANCE’ [1997] Association of Marine Underwriters 1
[3] Harry Wright, The Insurance Act of 2015 (First edn, international Underwriting Association 2015) 29
[4] D. M. Coombes, Avoiding Claims: A practical guide to limiting liability in the construction. London: Spon Press. (1989). 95
[5] D. M. Coombes, Avoiding Claims: A practical guide to limiting liability in the construction. London: Spon Press. (1989). 95
[6] Sarah Turpin, Frank Thompson, and Sarah Emerson, ‘New UK Insurance Act to come into Force in 2016 ‒ The Biggest Shake Up of Commercial Insurance Law in Over a Century’ [2015] K & L Gates – Legal Insights 2
[7] R. Merkin, & O. Gürses, The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured. (November 01, 2015). The Modern Law Review, 78, 6, 1009
[8] Harry Wright, The Insurance Act of 2015 (First edn, international Underwriting Association 2015) 23
[9] Susan Hodges, Cases and materials on marine insurance law. (2015). Cavendish Books.
[10] R. Merkin, & O. Gürses, The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured. (November 01, 2015). The Modern Law Review, 78, 6, 1004.
[11] O, Gürses, Marine insurance law. (2017). 107
[12] Soyer: Warranties in Marine Insurance. (January 01, 2002). Law Quarterly Review, 118, 647
[13] Daria Evgenievna Romanova,. Marine Insurance Warranties. Development in England, in comparison with other countries. 2015. MS thesis. 18
[14] R. M., Merkin, J, Hjalmarsson, A, In Bugra& Great Britain. Marine insurance legislation. (2014).pre,iu
[15] Marc Huybrechts, Eric Hooydonk, Christian Dieryck, & European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law. (1999). Marine insurance at the turn of the millennium. Antwerpen: Intersentia. 23
[16] R Zimmermann, Good faith in European contract law. (ed) Cambridge [u.a.: Cambridge Univ. Press. (2000).
[17] O, Gürses, Marine insurance law. (2017). 111
[18] O, Gürses, Marine insurance law. (2017). 111
[19] O, Gürses, Marine insurance law. (2017). 112
[20] R. Merkin, & O. Gürses, The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured. (November 01, 2015). The Modern Law Review, 78, 6, 1011
[21] R. M., Merkin, J, Hjalmarsson, A, In Bugra& Great Britain. Marine insurance legislation. (2014).
[22]D. R. Thomas, The modern law of marine insurance: Volume four. (2016). Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Informa Law from Routledge. 24
[23] Harry Wright, The Insurance Act of 2015 (First edn, international Underwriting Association 2015) 25
[24] Harry Wright, The Insurance Act of 2015 (First edn, international Underwriting Association 2015) 25
[25] Harry Wright, The Insurance Act of 2015, 25.
[26] Harry Wright, The Insurance Act of 2015, 25.
[27] Carl Rosio, ‘SIDA 35 Warranties in marine insurance: An unpleasant necessity? [2010] (1/2010) Juridisk Publication 3
[28] Harry Wright, The Insurance Act of 2015 (First edn, international Underwriting Association 2015) 27
[29] Harry Wright, The Insurance Act of 2015 (First edn, international Underwriting Association 2015) 24
[30] Robert Merkin and Jeremy Stuart-Smith. The Law of Motor Insurance. 2004. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Print. 87
[31] Harry Wright, The Insurance Act of 2015 (First edn, international Underwriting Association 2015) 26
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