Is Iran a Rogue State? An analysis of Iran’s Support for Terrorism and Disregard of International Laws

Introduction

Iran has been accused of being a “rogue state” and as the main sponsor of terrorism. As Jones (1998, p.39) argues, while Iran’s security perceptions are not entirely unreasonable, it is important to examine how and why it has attracted these accusations, and critically analyse Iran’s geopolitical intentions and their likely effects on regional security in the Gulf and beyond. As the biggest state in the Arabian Gulf, Iran’s influence in the region has been significant. The country’s influence on policymaking in the international community has also been a major challenge for the GCC given the increase in security issues attributed to countries in the Middle East. The U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (2006, p.173) has reported that Iran has actively taken part in promoting radical terrorist groups. Unfortunately, with no diplomatic ties between Iran and the US, the United States has not established a policy that can counter this threat posed to its national security and the global peace. The radical terrorist groups that are believed to have been sponsored by Iran in the Gulf region include the Shia (Hizbulla, Hothi rebels) and Sunni (al Qeda, ISIS, Hamas). Iran has been accused of using these rebel and terrorist groups to destabilize the region to pave the way for it to extend the 1979 Iranian Revolution and expand its influence Shia fundamentalism (Newman, 2009, p.13; Levitt, 2012, p.1). Most studies have identified Iran’s role in promoting terrorism as a principal international security challenge since it has facilitated missile and nuclear programs to attack other nations in the Gulf region (Nadimi, 2015, p.1; Manni, 2012, p.34).

In understanding Iran’s tag and whether it is indeed a rogue state, it is important to evaluate counter-theories for Iran’s increased military capabilities while explaining why this is merely a drive for expanding its Islamic Revolution agenda, which has been deemed as a security threat to the Gulf and across the globe (Al Tamamy, 2012, p.143; Aarts, P & van Duijne, 2011, p.57). Moreover, it is critical to examine Iran’s geopolitical agenda that acts as a key driver of its actions relating to terrorist attacks in the region (Kraus, 2016, p.35; Kepel, 2006, p.160). Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to determine whether Iran is indeed a rogue state as reiterated by the US, GCC, and international community. In seeking to meet this objective, the paper focuses on if Iran has been supporting terrorism through direct funding, providing terrorists with weapons, and safe refuge to terrorists. The first section starts with an analysis of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which the US has reiterated as the start of Iran’s support for terrorism.

The next section covers Iran’s Constitution and examines whether it disregards international law. Critics have termed Iran’s Constitution as the main force behind its Shiite initiatives in the region. As such, this section identifies key Articles in Iran’s Constitution and how they impact its foreign policy, relate with international law on human right, and determine its leadership structure. Moreover, this section also provides an analysis of Iran’s interpretation of some section of the Holy Quran to extend its geopolitical influence in the region and support its foreign policies. Lastly, this section provides an analysis of why different scholars term Iran’s Constitution as the main force supporting the rogue state doctrine in the country.

The third section then provides the US’ and GCC policy in Iran. The lack of diplomatic ties between the US and Iran after the 1979 Iranian Revolution is indeed a major issue to consider in this section. As such, this paper analyses how the once strong ties between the US and Iran ended in days and how this relationship has played a key role in shaping the rogue state doctrine. Additionally, with the vast influence that Iran has in the region, the GCC, whose existence has been anchored to the depiction of Iran as a rogue state after the Iranian Revolution, remains a critical player in understanding whether Iran is indeed a rogue state. Therefore, this section also analyses the GCC’s policy in Iran diplomatically and the results of various resolutions made by the GCC.

Many scholars examining possible security threats that Iran may pose to countries in the Middle East, with a focus on the GCC, Israel, the US, and globally often delve into Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The fourth section analyses Iran’s nuclear deal and whether its ambitions are pure or if they pose a major security risk. A scholarly approach to the Iran nuclear deal delves more into whether Iran may give nuclear weapons to terrorists or use them to see the destruction of her enemies in the region and beyond.

Further, as the main focus of this study, this paper analyses the rouge state doctrine, relating it with Iran’s activities that have labelled her a rogue state. The section starts with the origin of this doctrine, various definitions of the same, characteristics of rogue states, and finally relates it with Iran. The main focus, however, is whether indeed Iran supports terrorism and acts against the provisions of international law meant to safeguard humanity and fight against terrorism. Nevertheless, despite accusations labelled against Iran, the researcher analyses the threat concerns Iran has used as reasons for its nuclear ambitions and foreign policies and analyses whether they are legit or only a move to support its geopolitical agenda.

Lastly, given the outcome of the discussion, this paper provides a conclusion on whether Iran is a rogue state based on available scholarly literature. The last section provides a summary of the paper and recommendations on the approach the GCC, US, and international community should use in dealing with any possible security threats that Iran may pose.

Methodology

The nature of this dissertation required that the researcher analyse different material from researchers, resolutions from international bodies, Iran’s Constitution, Summit resolutions, and other available publications that seek to establish whether Iran is a rogue state. Therefore, as a critical study that borrows much from descriptive and analytical research, the researcher used secondary sources such as scholarly articles, books, government documents, and intelligence reports, among other published sources about the research subject. The data provided was useful in the thematic analysis of this dissertation. Notably, the researcher focused on a critical review of previous literature; although most sources were recent to reflect the developing story in Iran. While interviews would have also provided critical information and arguments from different people, this information can only be regarded as personal opinion, which may be biased given the sensitivity of the topic. A critical understanding of the Iranian Constitution, especially Article 154 was critical in defining the underlying arguments made in this paper. The researcher also took caution to only include credible academic sources despite many arguments raised in various news channels, blogs, political analysis, and presentations from human rights societies.

1979 Iranian Revolution

In many aspects, the labeling of Iran as a rogue nation in reference to their foreign policies is connected to the period preceding and during the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Rafati, 2017, p.170). Once critical aspect, perhaps different from the need to make Iran an Islamic State and spread the Shii’te ideology, that saw the success of the Iranian Revolution was history of the Anglo-Persian oil agreement and the subsequent Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) (Abrahamian, 2010). Iran has in many times reiterated that she has been a victim of “Western oppression”. Founded in 1908, APOC’s main goal was to use oil reserves in Masjed Soleiman, Iran. However, during its operation, AIOC did not work to benefit Iran and took most of the revenue and used revenue meant to benefit Iran as repayment for debts that shahs owed European creditors (Abrahamian, 2010). The company also failed to train Iranian technicians and chose to employ foreigners. The few Iranians who worked in the company did not receive fair income as compared to foreigners. According to Kinzer (2010), it was only after the 1953 coup d’état that Iran negotiated a new deal giving her an equal share in revenue. The 1979 Iranian Revolution received most of its support from many Iranians who felt that AIOC had exploited and in turn benefited from resources, which would have otherwise benefited the Iranian people (Kinzer, 2011). Therefore, leaders of the revolution exploited the failures of AIOC to their benefit and gain an even stronger support for their revolution agenda.

Boroumand and Boroumand (2002 p.9) argue that the very principles behind modern terrorism, which seems to have its roots in Iran, are strongly intertwined with those of the Iranian or the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The authors try to separate terrorism and the practice of Islamism from the basic principles of Islam as a religion. In discussing the origins of terrorism, they decipher the fact that the original perpetrators of this vice were not theologians and were in fact, rebuked by Islamic religious leaders of the time. They argue that despite the economic crises that are known to be important triggers of geopolitical revolutions, the Iranian Revolution was in part driven by the Ayatollahs’ desire to replace Shah’s authoritarian rule with a Unitarian regime (Wagner, 2010). As such, Boroumand and Boroumand (2002 p.12) conclude that the current Iranian regime, which was founded by Unitarian desires, is likely to propagate Unitarianism.

Inafuku (2010 p.423) also argue that the success of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which was led by a radical religious fundamentalist, promoted the rise of Shia fundamentalism within Iran and widely within other parts of the Middle East. The success of the revolution also transformed religion from a vessel of advocating for reforms and humanity to a fundamentalist association that will resist change and external influence at any opportunity. Inafuku (2010 p.426) also associates this exaggerated fundamentalism to the rogue international policy of Iran and the controversial nuclear project.

Prior to Inafuku’s paper, Byman (2008 p.170) had identified the fact that despite the continued international outcry, Iran started embracing Islamic radicals and fundamentalist groups, which propagated terrorism within its borders and in the neighboring countries after the success of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The basis of this assertion had been earlier elucidated by Boroumand and Boroumand (2002 p.11) who had linked the mastermind of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, with religious fundamentalism that he had learned from other fundamentalists from Iraq and Egypt. The Iranian leaders believed that by supporting Shi’a uprisings in the neighboring countries, they were spreading their influence and limiting the possibility that they would fall (Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 2015, p. 10). Support of the terrorist groups also offered the Iranian leaders extra protection against the West. Moreover, supporting these groups was Iran’s way of destabilizing their neighbors who were threatening to unite against the new Iranian regime.

In his attempt to explain terrorism, Oberschall (2004 p.29) alludes to the same ideas propagated by Byman (2008 p.173). Oberschall (2004 p.27) describes terrorism as an extremist way in which rogue nations respond to the various problems that face their countries. Although the origin of the idea of terrorism dates back to early in the twentieth century, it was until the Iranian revolution of 1979 that the idea was actually propagated (Boroumand and Boroumand, 2002 p.7). The popularity of Islamic fundamentalism and Jihadism was spread rapidly from Iran to other Arabian countries, which had Shi’ite Muslims. Oberschall (2007 p.29) asserts that in modern times, many countries that have supported and funded terrorism have need to protect themselves from the West and their neighbors – terrorism is a good way of destabilizing the perceived enemies of the countries; in this case, just as Iran used it to destabilize their neighbors and reduce influence from Western countries. Moreover, many dissatisfied communities in the Middle East, especially in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iran saw radicalization, as was propagated by Khomeini’s decree to export the revolution, as a good way of expressing themselves.

As presented by various scholars, it is difficult to separate the origin of terrorism from the Iranian Revolution. However, in as much as Boroumand and Boroumand (2002 p.7) argued that it was impossible to separate the various Islamic terrorist groups on the basis of their intentions since they had all arose from the Iranian revolution, Snow and Byrd (2007 p.126) assert that the groups are different and should thus be looked at differently. Moreover, Snow and Byrd tend to overlook the idea that all terrorism stemmed from Iran. Snow and Byrd (2007 p.127) argues that each radical group has a different intention and stemmed up following different circumstances. Therefore, it is unsatisfactory to consider all groups as being linked to the Iranian Revolution.

Nevertheless, at the help of the Iranian Revolution in the 1980s, Iran used and funded the Lebanese Hezbollah to achieve its revolution agenda (Cordesman, 2006, p.1). While the US intelligence did not adequately determine whether Iran directly controlled the group, reports indicated that Iran provided funding, weapons and training to the militia group. Iranian Al Quds force spent a considerable time training the group and further provided UAVs, long-range rockets, and other weapons. Besides, during the Revolution, the IRGC provided the same resources to Palestinian groups that fought against the Israeli and US troops (Codesman, 2006). As such, while Iran has maintained that the Iranian Revolution was only meant to provide a new regime for its citizens, Iran has been keen on achieving the vision of the revolution’s vision as elaborated by Ayatollah Khomeini, “try hard to export our revolution to the world” (Ehteshami, 2002, p.131).

Iran’s Constitution

A major concern within the Middle East is that the Iranian Constitution permits acts of terrorism within the GCC region. Probably, Iran’s constitution has made this provision in response to the Western presence in the Islamic territories (Naji & Jawan, 2011, p.94). Many scholars have projected the ideology of the Islamic community (Umma) as well as unity (Ittihad) as a cornerstone of the nation-state model that divided the Middle-East people and the Islamic legal tradition. Iran has argued that accusations that it sponsors terrorism in the region would have changed if the U.S changed its foreign policy targeting her in 2002 (Ehteshami, 2002b, p.283; Anthony, 2011, p.78; Perthes, 2010, p.98). As a result, arguing that it has a duty to protect itself from any foreign invasion, Iran has intensified its goals of developing a robust nuclear program. However, although Iran’s constitution places emphasis on geopolitical aspects of its borders and the country’s security, which have gained motivation from the economic ties that Iran has with countries like Lebanon and Syria, its geopolitical intentions affects the stability in the region. On the other hand, Iran has continued to argue that its constitution does not support acts of terrorism since it also considers the value of human life and human rights need to be protected within the region. Nevertheless, critics have opposed this argument like in the case of North Korea, a country that uses its constitution to justify its harsh foreign and domestic policies, which contravene international law and policies (Lennon and Eiss, 2004, p.159). Therefore, a dipper understanding of Iran’s constitution helps shed light on whether the tag rogue state suits her.

Chapter Ten

Chapter Ten of the constitution of The Islamic Republic of Iran focuses on its foreign policy, which has been the bedrock of most of its international decisions. Borrowing greatly from the Qur’an, Article 152 reiterates the importance of ensuring that Iran remains a country driven by the desire to help prevent foreign domination and protect the sovereignty of all states in the world (Katouzian and Shahidi, 2008, p.31). Iran, therefore, acknowledges that it seeks to establish mutual peaceful relationships with other countries, defend the rights of Muslims, and non-alignment with domineering powers. Article 153 also defines the various types of any foreign dominations that Iran seeks to prevent including interference with affairs of other countries, the army, culture, and economic and natural resources (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.195). While Article 155 also affirms that Iran will grant amnesty to any persons who seek political asylum, it only submits and subjects to any such amnesty as governed by its constitution and not international law (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.195). Therefore, provided that any political asylum seeker is not considered as a criminal and traitor against Iran, Iran’s constitution allows their protection even if such persons are international criminals or terrorists, which has always sparked mixed reactions (Katouzian and Shahidi, 2008).

Supported by provisions in Article 11, Iran has been in the forefront supporting its duty to ensure cultural, economic, and political unity of all Muslims across the globe (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.167). As such, Iran continues to argue that it has the mandate as provided for in the Qur’an to ensure that all Muslims are united as a ‘single nation’. However this perception remains Iran’s misinterpretation of the Qur’an to expand its Shiite fundamentalism in the region and disregard international law (Kamrava, 2011, p.187). Article 154 of the Iranian Constitution states that:

The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human society, and considered the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of justice to be the right of all people of the world. Accordingly, while scrrupulosly refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the mostaz’ afin against the mostakberin in every corner of the globe. (Katouzian and Shahidi 2007, p.31).

In essence, Iran sees its efforts as a mechanism to help the oppressed fight the tyrants in all corners of the world. Iran has, therefore, always refused to acknowledge that it has been orchestrating invasions in other countries such as recent attack in Syria, killing or American soldiers in Iraq, and continued efforts to sponsor militia groups in Yemen (Katouzian and Shahidi 2007, p.33). President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reiterated Iran’s foreign policy as converting the globe into Islam. While Iran has argued that it has previously ignored its guiding Islamic principles of protecting the citadel of Islam and expediency like in the case of Chechen Islamic movement in the 1990s, acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution 598, and 1982 Islamic uprising in Syria, this undo the fact that Iran is always focused on supporting militia groups that cause uprisings in the Middle East (Katouzian and Shahidi 2007, p.33). Indeed, Iran’s Islamic Revolution has only been strengthened by its constitution and embracing of rogue regulations.

Moreover, the constitution also reiterates the importance of extending the revolution at home and abroad. For instance, the emancipation of the depressed nations is based on the Qur’an verse, “Verily, this Brotherhood of yours is a single Brotherhood, and I am your Lord and Cherisher: therefore, Serve Me (and no other)” (21: 92) (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.162). ” “He releases them from their heavy burdens and from the yokes that are upon them” (7: 157) (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.163).” Therefore, this has been the critical reason for focusing on building sustainable relations with other Islamic movements. However, the Qur’an strongly rebukes killings in the name of Islam and appreciates the importance of respecting views presented by non-Muslims. Therefore, any efforts by Iran to twist the Qur’an to favour its Shi’i revolution is only a selfish agenda to gain support from its citizens.

Human Rights

Like the already analysed provisions in Chapter Ten, other articles in the Iran constitution are based on Islamic interpretation. Therefore, unlike the west and most countries that continue to separate religion from the law, Iran uses religion to interpret and enforce its laws (Meho, 2004, p.83). Article 4 of the Iran constitution provides different guidelines on human rights. Article 4 states that:

All civic, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle governs all the articles of the constitution, and other laws and regulations. The determination of such compatibility is left to the Foqaha of the Guardian Council (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.164).

The U.S. State Department has described Iran’s constitution as ‘abysmal’ and continues to argue that Iran has ensured that its laws only act as an excuse to encourage political assassinations and oppression of its citizens and those in other countries (Meho, 2004, p.83). While Iran has continued to reiterate that its constitution upholds the dignity of man and civil rights as well as prohibits torture, Meho (2004) argues that Iran has been the embodiment of civil rights violation. Article 170 of Iran’s constitution further complicates the matter by limiting what judges can do. “Judges of courts have the duty to refrain from enacting governmental statues and protocols that are opposed to Islamic laws and regulations or are outside the domain of the authority of the executive power (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.194).” In essence, even for citizens who would want to subscribe to other faiths and anyone working in Iran from a different region, their protection mainly depend on whether they conform to Iran’s interpretation of the principles of Islam.

As indicated in Article 20, equality and protection within the law and one’s human rights are only enforceable if they are not detrimental to the principles of Islam (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.170). As such, any court case can only be determined based on principles of Islam, since as previously indicated, Iran’s constitution is only subordinate to Islamic law. Additionally, while Article 14 insists on the respect granted to non-Muslims and appreciation of their faith, it is evident that the Iranian Constitution only subjects such respect to provisions in Article 4 and other sections of its constitution. According to the Qur’an, “Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for (your) faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them. For Allah loveth those who are just” (80: 8)” (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.169). Nevertheless, continuous persecution and oppression of those who fail to subscribe to Islam in Iran is an indicator that Iran only cares about the milestone it makes in its agenda to have the world convert to and uphold the principles of Islam (Tamadonfar, 2016, p.205). Therefore, even though Article 13 recognises Christians, Jewish, and Zoroastrians as the only religious minorities, they can only uphold their faith within the limits of Islamic principles and Iran constitution (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.169). Iran, therefore fails to recognise the independence and rights of other faiths, which further shows its desire to limit the human rights freedom of worship and choice of religion. Further, linking Iran’s constitution to the principles of Islam and making it subordinate to the same only means that any actions by any party that are deemed as against Islam and Iran’s Islamic revolution are punishable by law, which is additionally strengthened in Article 12, which recognises Islam as the official religion (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.169).

Moreover, Iran’s Penal Code borrows directly from the Qur’an. The Penal Code established in 1982 categorises punishments into four groups (Tamadonfar, 2016, p.212):

11. a) Discretionary punishments based on a judge’s decision provided if they are not provided for in Sharia laws. The punishments include lashings, fines, and prison sentences based on Article 11.
12. b) Cash fine compensations are also included as provided for in Article 10 and are normally based on parliamentary legislations.
13. c) Article 9 also provides a retributory punishment, Qesas, which involves condemning a criminal to a crime equal to what he/she committed
14. d) Lastly, most punishments are governed by Hudud, as provided for in Article 8 and determined by Sharia Laws.

While Iran recognises other beliefs and allows for three religions, court decisions are purely based on Sharia laws. Tamadonfar (2016, p.205) posits that this stand has resulted into the Islamization of the law. Iran argues that the Islamic Revolution was meant to develop one state governed by Shari’ah laws and not just a move to have a nation inhabited by Muslims. The Supreme Leader has always reiterated that Iran continues to make decisions governed by the sovereignty of God in every aspect from culture, politics, and economical view, which explains the inclusion of Islamic clerics in its leadership (Tamadonfar, 2016 p.210). As such, Iran has strengthened its criminal codes by relying on Shari’ah rulings an Islamization of the law. Muslim clerics have provided guidelines to help ensure that laws that were in contrary to the Sharia principles were amended and abandoned anti-Islamic laws that were present before the revolution (Tamadonfar, 2016 p.210).

Indeed, the subject of human rights remains critical in many spheres in explaining whether indeed the subject is only a “Western” affair Bielefeldt (2000) gives a great analysis on whether the misconception of differences in “Western” and “Islamic” human rights have any ground. He argues that “There is no such thing as the Western of the Islamic conception of human rights (Bielefeldt, 2000, p.114).” Therefore, concepts and arguments such as “Islamization” of “Occidentalization” of human rights should be used in debates on human rights. Bielefeldt believes that multicultural societies should use Rawls “overlapping consensus” principle in approaching arguments on human rights. As Rawls argues, “Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all. (2005, p.5).” Indeed, despite differences in religious beliefs and having an Islamic majority state, Iran’s approach on human rights only seems to further the idea of “Islamic” human rights, which paints Muslims as against human rights.

Leadership

The relationship between human rights and its inherent interpretation as provided for in Iran’s constitution also affects how leaders from the executive to the legislature and judiciary operate. Unlike countries such as the US that do not require a leader to subscribe to any religion as described in Article 6 of the US Constitution, Article 121 of Iran’s Constitution requires that members of Iran’ parliament to take an oath to protect the sanctity of Islam (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.187). Moreover, while Iran has always argued that it subscribes to the rule of democracy by allowing for presidential elections, candidates are required to “believe in the fundamentals of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official religion of the country (Papan-Matin, 2014. P.185).” As such, this action only discriminates members of other religions and beliefs who may be honest and piety, have a clear past record, demonstrate administrative leadership, be of Iranian nationality, and Iranian origin as provided for in Article 115 of Iran’s constitution. Moreover, Article 121 also requires that the president takes an oath to propagate morality and religion (Islam) (Papan-Matin, 2014. p.185).

While Article 57 allows for the independence of the three arms of government, Iran’s Supreme Leader, wilayat al-‘arm, has the mandate to enforce absolute supervision to all their functions (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.175). Therefore, the powerful supreme leader position only creates a sense of dictatorial leadership clothed in the pretence of democracy through a democratic president and legislature. Additionally, the guiding principles of Article 1 and 2 of Iran’s constitution that define Iran as an Islamic theocracy makes her justify its administrative decision and foreign policy stands. Iran has also since the 1979 Islamic Revolution adopted the position of The Leader appointed by The Experts. Therefore, despite having an elected president, The Leader has the highest authority and makes critical decisions in Iran’s policies. The Leader issues and controls appointments, dismissals, and resignations from the judiciary, mass media president, members of the Guardian Council, army commanders, and coordinates how the three arms of governments operate while resolving any conflicts that may arise (Article 110) (Papan-Matin, 2014, p.185). Moreover, his position also allows him to dismiss a duly elected president and sign his appointment, and even transfer duties from one office to another. Although the Council of Experts has the mandate to dismiss a leader, most of the situations that may warrant his dismissal surround his death or illness that the Council feels affects The Leader’s ability to make informed decisions. Article 5 and 109 are not detailed on the qualifications of the Leader, which leaves his appointment and dismissal entirely on the Council of Experts (Papan-Matin, 2014). Therefore, despite Iran’s right to sovereignty and independence in running its affairs, Iranians have little or no say in deciding who runs their country. The position of the president as described by many critics is only but a ceremonial one. As such, changes in Iran’s foreign policy have never been on the approach of a new regime, but on decisions by the Supreme Leader and his ambitions.

US and GCC Policy in Iran

Iran and its operations have been a major subject of international debates and security meetings, which explains why the US would have explicit policies towards Iran. The Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) countries are also highly interested in Iran’s situation as evidenced by their internal and foreign policies, especially Saudi Arabia (Rezaei and Cohen, 2014, 420). The US’s security strategy and intention to safeguard the global security have been the main reasons for its venture into the Middle East over the years. US policy towards Iran has, however, undergone numerous changes and fostered various kinds of relations between the two countries. Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the US saw Iran as a major partner and as a key gateway into the Middle East (Fitzpatrick, 2017, p. 27). Moreover, the US was an important business partner to Iran and even offered to help Iran set up its first nuclear power plants. However, the change in Iran’s intentions with nuclear energy and refusal to cooperate with international regulations in the lead-up to the revolution forced the US to withdraw its support to the nuclear project in Iran (Fitzpatrick, 2017, p. 27). Moreover, following the regime and constitutional changes after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the US cut ties with Iran and even withdrew its embassy.

The US also castigated other countries like France, Germany, and China to withdraw their support for Iran’s nuclear project. With Iran’s continued failure to disclose its nuclear intentions, the US slapped bilateral sanctions on Iran in a bid to force them into revealing the details of their nuclear deal (Katzman, 2003 p.1; Wright, 2010 p.252). However, in 2002, during the course of the Iraq war, Iran showed intentions of being available for dialogue, attracting the US into lifting the bilateral economic sanctions on Iran (Wright, 2010 p.207). Iran did not, however, respond as positively to this relief as the US hoped, which has been the cause of the cautious association between the two countries. As Katzman (2003, p.1) notes, the US is wary of Iran’s plans to allow the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to acquire missiles and other nuclear weaponry, spearhead the destruction of Israel, and to support terrorism. Therefore, the US’s current foreign policy towards Iran is a cautious one to the potential threat that Iran poses.

As such, the US has tried to cause a change of government system in Iran and to promote democracy (Maloney, 2008 p.34). However, these actions have only seen a more determined Iranian regime, fighting to reduce any possible influence from the west. Moreover, as has been earlier alluded to, the improper response of the Iranian regime to the lifting of business sanctions caused the US to attempt to cause internal resistance to the current regime. Maloney (2008 p.33), however, argues that the US revealed their untrustworthiness around the time of the Iraq war in several ways, which informed Iran’s inappropriate reactions. The US decided to withdraw their military support to Iran at a time they needed it most and decided to halt the Afghan negotiations without a particular reason (Maloney, 2008, p.33).

Nevertheless, considering the effects of the Iran hostage crisis during the 1979 revolution, any failure by the US to support Iran cannot be an excuse for Iran’s failure to uphold global peace and respect to international laws. Iran’s actions during the hostage crisis saw the closure of the American embassy in Tehran after Iran held 42 hostages for 444 days as a measure to force the US to stop interfering with Iran’s domestic affairs (Grzybowski 1981). However, as it would later emerge, these were measures by the regime to rally a cry among its citizens against the West. Iran’s leaders only saw this action as a shortcut to blaming domestic issues on the US. Khomeini and other Iranian leaders leading the revolution united Iranian citizens to see a successful achievement of the objectives of the Iranian Revolution (Takeyh 2007, p.96). Consequently, this action amounted to an act of terrorism and disregard to international law.

In as much as the recent interaction between the US and Iran has markedly improved, this is not all good news to the key members of the GCC. Traditionally, the three main members of GCC were Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (Furtig, 2007 p.29). However, extreme weakening of Iraq by war and economic sanctions and the ever-increasing presence of the US in the region has led to Iraq’s replacement by the US as an influential state in the Gulf region. This is not in any way an achievement for the other countries in the Gulf. Although Iran has always been the biggest economy among them, Iran’s coupling with the military capabilities of the US and tensions between the two countries is likely to pose a real security threat to the other countries in the region (Furtig, 2007 p.33; Kinninmont, 2015 p.8).

Table 1.

Iran’s Imports from GCC Countries (in millions of dollars)

Iran’s unwillingness to cooperate with the security requirements of the United Nations and other GCC states further fuels the tensions in the region (Katzman, 2003 p.1). Although the GCC were adamant to abide by US sanctions against Iran, the Islamic brotherhood has increased economic sanctions against Iran over concerns of its nuclear program. Iran saw the GCC members as its main trade partners after most countries in the west imposed many sanctions, threatening her economic stability. Therefore, as Habibi (2010) notes, the GCC’s approach towards Iran have only intensified the rather tense relationship between the GCC members and Iran. Saudi Arabia has led attacks against Iran through sanctions, which have been mainly based on the latter’s support for terrorism groups and rogue nuclear ambitions (Habibi, 2010, p.2). As such, these policies have seen a cooperation between GCC countries and the US together with other countries that support the UN resolutions to isolate Iran economically. Iran’s insistence on replacing regimes in the GCC and other Muslim majority states with Islamic governments has always been a contentious issue (Habibi, 2010, p.2). As such, the GCC has continued to reduce exports to Iran as evidenced in Table 1 after 2008 (Habibi, 2010, p.4).

Iran Nuclear Deal

In spite of the global criticism against Iran, it does not seem to significantly retreat from its agenda of establishing a nuclear program (Barzegar, 2010, p.155). Iran has not just focused on becoming a nuclear power, but has been increasing its military capabilities by acquiring new weapons, which it has tested in its alleged fight against terrorism. The recent Russia-Iran Mosul invasion saw Iran face numerous allegations of using the Shiite militias to further its aggressive expansion agenda. Thus, there are still concerns as to whether Iran’s nuclear power agenda would continually destabilize the region and increase the risks to global peace (Stracke, 2009, p.5; Hannay and Pickering, 2017, p.155). In its attempt to support terror activities, Iran has utilized the Sunni-Shiite rift, sectarianism, and its applications by the regional powers to increase the magnitude of its geopolitical ambitions (Nasr, 2006, p.58). The other geopolitical goal of Iran has been to liberate Palestine, whose goal was not actively pursued by Shah (Matthiesen, 2014), which has called for intervention from the west with the greatest influence from the United States.

Apart from the link between the 1979 Iranian Revolution and terrorism, Iran’s nuclear deal has increased the propagation of Iran as a rogue state (Inafuku, 2010 p.426). According to Bruno (2010 p.1), Iran’s nuclear program started well before the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and was once greatly supported by the USA, France, and Germany. In fact, the US donated the first uranium Iran used in its initial tests. The development of the nuclear energy program was only meant to supply energy for civilian uses. However, in the run up to the Iranian Revolution, intelligence reports tended to insinuate that Iran’s intention with nuclear energy was changing and she was considering nuclear weapons, especially after a successful launch of nuclear weaponry by India (Bruno, 2010). These actions forced Western countries to withdraw their support for the nuclear program.

Bahgat (2006 p.311) agrees with Bruno’s (2010 p.6) position that despite suspicion and efforts from the West to prevent Iran’s nuclear ambitions from actualizing, Iran has continually denied having a controversial nuclear program. Iran has continually reiterated that their nuclear program is meant for civilian purposes. According to Bahgat (2006 p.318), Iran has continued to argue that her nuclear ambitions are mainly attributed to the perceived security threat of the USA, Pakistan, Israel, and Iraq; Iran’s political and economic situation; and promoting nuclear energy and weapons as a factor of national pride. However, it is Iran’s continued efforts to expand its regional influence through the Shiite fundamentalism, recent military activities in Syria, and link to terrorist groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Yemen that provide a different view (Bahgat, 2006, p.311). Moreover, the recently increased support of Iranian nuclear programs by Russia poses a threat to the International community when one considers the role of nuclear weaponry during the Cold War (Shlutz et al., 2007). Russia, unlike the West, has continued to support Iran in achieving its nuclear ambitions directly and indirectly through its stand in the United Nations.

A popular reason for the international community’s fear with regards to Iran’s unknown nuclear plans and nuclear capability, which have not been fully determined, is a general feeling that the current Iranian regime is irrational and careless (Waltz, 2012 p.4). Waltz (2012 p.40) argues that the Iranian regime is composed of Ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other regime – even if survival means supporting terrorist activities. However, as earlier alluded to, Snow and Byrd (2007 p.34) gives a different approach on why Iran might not allow terrorists to gets their hands on nuclear weaponry if she is successful in its ambitions. This thought seems to fuel Waltz’s (2012 p.4) argument that Iran’s propagation of their nuclear deal is not necessarily a bad thing; he argues that it could enhance stability in a region that has been marred by political instability and numerous military and paramilitary activities. The knowledge that Iran has nuclear weaponry will make the neighboring countries afraid and the western countries to be afraid of provoking Iran, hence, leading to stability. Moreover, Iran’s possession of nuclear power will safeguard them, and they will not need to continue supporting terrorist groups (Snow and Byrd, 2007; Waltz, 2012). However, Snow and Bird (2007) fail to consider Iran’s history and continued support for terrorism since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Iran has always sought to have one global Islamic State governed under Shia fundamentalism, which it has supported through funding terrorism and developing aggressive expansion policies (Bahgat, 2006, p.311). The country’ position in the Arabian Gulf and influence has seen the GCC countries develop policies to deter Iran from threatening regional security.

Shultz et al. (2007) also argue that Iran’s persistence with their nuclear plan cannot be a good thing. They cite the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was meant to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the world after the end of the cold war. They argue that Iran’s persistence with their nuclear plan increases the chance that terrorists will access nuclear weapons, which could be dangerous for international peace. They also believe that the only reason why Iran would conceal details of their nuclear program is her intentions to make nuclear weapons to facilitate its geopolitical influence by supporting terrorist groups, and not as a way of warding off international influence and providing sustainable energy (Shultz et al. 2007).

Earlier, Perkovich (2003 p.2) had identified the need for the international community to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities given the uncertainty surrounding their real intentions. The author then discusses the various strategies that have been used to limit Iran’s nuclear potential and success. The reality is that even though limiting material and expert supply to Iran has been the most successful strategy, there is the ever-emergent issue of China and Russia’s position on the same subject (Perkovich, 2003, p.2). The UN and the US have, however, continually required China and Russia to reduce or totally cut their nuclear support to Iran. Embargos and economic sanctions have also been used to stroll Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Waltz (2012 p.3), however, predicts that this strategy is likely to have little success whilst citing the example of North Korea who continued to pursue their nuclear intentions and successfully launched nuclear weaponry despite heavy economic sanctions. Given Iran’s position in the Gulf and the world and its enormous oil resources, its nuclear success may become a reality if the GCC, the US, and the UN continue to ease on their stand on the issue.

Therefore, as argued by different scholars, it is obvious that Iran’s nuclear intentions are not clear and can only be assumed, which makes it a critical security issue. Additionally, the link between Iran’s nuclear deal and their support to terrorist groups is also a major concern. Therefore, research should establish whether Iran’s nuclear plan is a continuation of their support to terrorism and the likely effects the implementation of a rogue nuclear deal will have on terrorism and stability in the Middle East and global peace. Thirdly, it is still not clear on whether the steps the international community has taken to stop Iran from implementing its nuclear deal will become a success.

Rogue State Doctrine

The rogue state doctrine is a relatively new concept that was developed by the creators of international policy in the US to refer to nations that were unpredictable in their reactions to different security and economic situations; their internal security policies posed a security threat to either their own citizens or those of neighbouring countries and the entire world (Rubin, 1999 p.72; O’Reilly, 2007 p.297; Miles, 2013, p.13). In essence, the term rogue has been associated with countries that oppress their citizens through selfish interests of bad regimes. O’Reilly (2007 p.297) also suggests that the doctrine of rogue state is one whose origin is in the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, the US intelligence focused on the activities that were ongoing in Moscow; however, this had to change after the war since the US faced totally different security threats. The main threat, in this case, being terrorism – this explains why the states that were initially considered rogue were those that were thought to be promoting the activities of terrorists (O’Reilly, 2007, p.297). Similarly, according to Rose (2011, p.3), the term “rogue state” is a controversial word indicating what some international theorists apply to state that they believe they pose a threat to international peace (Rose, 2011, p. 3). Chomsky (2000, p.1) posits that a rogue state has two uses; “a propagandistic use, applied to assorted enemies, and literal use that applies to states that do not regard themselves as bound by international norms.” Although most nations that have been perceived as rogue nations are considered that way because of their form of governments, a regime is not the only determinant of that stance. A nation can only be called rogue after the international community considers their internal policy as aggressive, that is, they are likely to jeopardize international order (Rubin, 1999 p.73).

Rogue states often act against international law and agreements. Caprioli and Trumbore (2003, p.378) argue that a state is classified as rogue if it “establishes a history of international aggression or otherwise troublesome international behaviour.” President Bill Clinton’s administration regarded rouged states as ‘states of concern’ with regards to their view of international relations (Amin, 2015, p.24). Therefore, the US has always categorised states that fail to uphold democracy, peaceful settlement of disputes, and collective security as rogue states. According to Rotberg (2007, p.7), the behaviour of these states should be examined with respect to their external and internal actions. Moreover, Rubin (2005, p.778) also associate rogue states with regime changes or new ideologies, often as a result of a revolution, which has been associated with countries such as Iran and Cuba. Therefore, while different authors hold contrasting views on rogue states, most agree that such nations fail to uphold international laws and do not seem to work towards peace and stability through their oppressive policies.

Moreover, Rubin (1999 p.73) asserts that a rogue nation is one that does not respond to normal diplomacy, which forces the international community to use harsher methods of controlling such states. In this regard, Iran has, in the past and present, failed to adhere to international regulations on the war on terrorism and the use of nuclear weaponry. As Simon (2010, p.271) argues, “The likelihood that a rogue state will acquire nuclear weapons and the likelihood and severity of nearly any plausible conflict scenario depend on the relationships between the rogue state and its regional adversaries.” Iran’s relationship with its neighbours, especially the GCC, and the international community is a revelation that she seeks to develop a new order where respect for human life and peace is not a priority; rather, its focus is to develop its geopolitical agenda and Shiite fundamentalism (O’Brien & Bond, 2004, p. 12). Its nuclear ambitions and reactance by the US, the UN, and GCC to allow it to develop its nuclear capabilities is an indicator that it is perceived as a rogue state. While establishing a standard to define international norms may not be out rightly clear, various treaties and interventions, the UN Charter, and International Court of Justice Decisions provide a framework to define these norms. From 1979, Iran has appeared to be a rogue state since it adversely sponsors terrorism and tries to increase the production of highly destructive nuclear weapons, which have been associated with its aggressive expansion policies and not the protection of its citizens (U.S. Department of Defence, 2009, p. 11). In a broader political context, Iran has a notion that a nation that is stable and whose leadership is subject to a wider scrutiny will behave in its own best interests and not take actions that directly contradicts its interests (Frantz & Collins, 2007, p.2). Therefore, Iran’s nuclear program will only cause a panic in the regional security because of the greater economic, social, and political damage it would cause in the GCC region.

The conversion of most nations into a rogue state is usually down to the personality and inner desires of a single leader with dictatorial traits (Rubin, 1999 p.73). This is true for other nations that were once considered rogue by the US such as China, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Libya, and North Korea (Rubin, 1999 p.73). Henriksen (2001 p.355) asserts that Iran is a nation that holds elections, and thus, can be considered to be democratic, unlike other rogue nations that have a dictatorial form of government. Moreover, Iran has not had a specific dictatorial leader who has propagated the policies that threaten regional security. Iran and most of its sympathisers have argued that like the West, she upholds the spirit of democracy. Therefore, terming her as rogue while the people have the power to decide which regime rules is unfair. On the contrary, Iran has been led by the Ayatollahs system, which has continually propagated the ideas of the Ayatollah who masterminded the 1979 Iranian revolution – Ayatollah Khomeini (Keddie, 2012, p.151). Besides, Iran’s most powerful position is held by The Supreme Leader, which is not a democratic position. The powers vested on The Leader by Iran’s constitution makes the president a ceremonial position. Iran’s Leader, Ali Khamenei, has held the position since 1989, a position he did not get democratically, but has held for 28 years. As the highest ranking religious and political authority, government organizations, state television, judicial system, and armed forces are under him (Keddie, 2012, p.151). Khamenei’s position allows him to make the final decision on everything in the Iran, including the transparency of elections. Therefore, most critics have argued that Iran allows for a dictatorial leadership and further protects it through its constitution, making it worse compared to most dictatorial states (Keddie, 2012, p.151).

O’Reilly (2007 p.299) tries to establish the characteristic features of what the US policymakers refer to as rogue states. The paper concludes that the rogue stereotype is attached to a nation based on their power capabilities and their policies (O’Reilly, 2007 p.299). As such, the rogue stereotype suits Iran, who are among the biggest oil producers among the OPEC and have a stable military that has been used to train and fund terrorist groups. Moreover, the nuclear aspirations of Iran and their known nuclear capabilities make them a threat to international security given their historical relationship with terrorist groups. Furthermore, Iran’s policy of supporting terrorist groups tend to jeopardize stability in the Gulf region and has the potential of causing massive suffering. Based on their capability, Eland and Lee (2001) ranked Iran as only second to North Korea in terms of rogue nations, which had the capability to threaten the security of the US. This high ranking is based on Iran’s refusal to comply with international regulations on the use and development of nuclear weaponry. As had earlier alluded to, since rogue states do not respond to diplomacy adequately, it is up to the international community to use extreme measures through sanctions. Rogue nations often develop policies that promote the increased manufacture and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Hoyt, 2000 p.298). As seen in Jones (1998 p.45), for example, Iran’s internal policies are meant to allow many citizens to be armed and to promote Shi’ite terrorist activities.

Mostashari (2005) also notes that Iran has faced numerous accusations from oppressing its own people, assassinating its dissidents, providing refuge to terrorists and their leadership, involvement in bombings of Jewish centers in Khobar towers, Saudi Arabia, and Buenos Aires, building biological and nuclear weapons capacity, opposing peace processes in the Middle East, links with terrorism groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, among other issues. While Iran maintains that it has always supported the fight against terrorism, its continued fight against the US and other countries keen to fight ISIS and other terrorist groups shows its insincerity. Mostashari (2005, p.3) also argues that the Iran hostage crisis during the 1979 Revolution was probably the first instance it was regarded as a rogue state. Iran started to support radical Shiite Palestinian and Lebanon groups to help it achieve its power objectives after the revolution. Iran views its support for terrorist groups in and outside its borders as a strategy to help her achieve the goals set during the revolution by passing its ideologies. By funding, training, and organizing the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran saw its actions as an opportunity to oversee an anti-Israeli narrative. Iran provided more than $100 million to Hezbollah in the 1980s as calls to rally for the non-existence of Israel intensified (Mostashari, 2005, p.3). These efforts not only intensified the Arab-Iran conflicts, but also went ahead to increase attacks led by Hezbollah against Israel, the US, and countries in the Middle East during the 1980s (Amin, 2015, p.28).

Moreover, Iran has also faced accusations of direct links to terrorist activities. In 1991, Iran killed Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar two years after killing Kurdish opposition leader Abdol Rahman Qasemlu (Byman, 2008, p.171). The killing of leaders who opposed the Iranian Revolution has also intensified as Iranian Quds were accused of killing Iraqi and US armies in Iraq. With unstable states like Afghanistan and Palestine, who have received funding from Iran in their fight against the US and Israel through terrorist groups, any further empowering of Iran through nuclear weapons is a threat to international stability (Amin, 2015).

Table 1: Iran Related Terrorism Attacks

Source: (Katzman, 2017)

Iran has continued to support the Houthi in many areas across the Middle East. For instance, in October 2016, the U.S. show down Houthi-controlled radar installations after Iran supplied the group with anti-ship missiles, which were fired at U.S. and UAE ships. Iran then deployed warships to Yemen in support of Houthis. A report in the Wall Street Journal notes that Iran has supplied Houthis with “tens of thousands of dollars” (Solomon, Nissenbaum, and, Fitch, 2015). In 2016, French, British, and U.S. ships intercepted weapons from Iran that were headed to Houthi’s regions in Yemen (Katzman, 2017). The cases of interceptions of Houthi bound ships from Iran has seen the GCC align with the US to disrupt this flow of weapons. Indeed, the Houthis have been Iran’s proxy in gaining more ground and pushing its Shi’ite ideology in the south-western coast of the Arabian Peninsula.

Moreover, like the support accorded to Hezbollah, reports conducted by the U.S. and UN show that Iran has been funding the Hamas as a proxy in Israel. Formed initially to disrupt the Israel-Palestinian war in the 1990s, the group grew in terms of weaponry and followers following Iran’s aid (Katzman, 2017). Iran has supplied weapons including rockets that Hamas has used to attack Israel in three different attacks since 2008. After the 1991 Gulf War, Iran pledged to train Hamas militia in Sudan, Lebanon, and Iran as well as provide $30 million per year in funding (Rawshandil and Lean, 2011, p.56). Funding from Iran to this terrorist organization has risen to an estimated $300 million yearly in terms of weapons and cash (Katzman, 2017). Indeed, Iran has used Hamas to solidify its regional influence and legitimize its government. This relationship grew further with Iran regarding its relationship as a religious and national duty to see the fall of the Zionist regime in Palestine (Rawshandil and Lean, 2011, p.56).

Iran has argued that it does not support Al-Qaeda (AQ). However, Iran allowed senior operatives of Al-Qaeda to reside in its soil while the US and Saudi Arabia sought their arrest (Katzman, 2017). Katzman (2017) argues that Iran’s purported fight against ISIS and Al Qaeda are merely because Iran sees them as a threat against its Shi’ite ideology since they are predominantly orthodox Sunni Muslim organizations. Most of the aforementioned leaders, (more than 500) came to Iran after the US invasion in Afghanistan (Katzman, 2017). Leaders such as Muhsin al-Fadhli and Adel Radi Saq al-Wahabi al-Harbi saw Al Qaeda’s operation grow even after the US had made efforts to destroy most of AQ’s base. The US Treasury Department has previously sanctioned key AQ operatives linked to Iran including Osama bin Laden’s son, Saad Bin Laden and Ali Saheh Husein who helped AQ members including Osama’s family escape to Iran after 9/11; Muhammad Rab’s al Sayid, who helped AQ’s chief’s family escape to Iran after 9/11, and other key leaders (Mauro, 2006).

In recent times, Iran has also supported Qatar in its outcry against the blockade from other GCC members led by Saudi Arabia. Qatar, like Iran, has been accused of funding and supporting terrorists groups. Qatar has failed to convince other members of the GCC on its resolve to stop funding of jihadist groups by terrorist sympathisers (Dorsey, 2015, 422). For instance, Qatar has failed to stop nationals such as Al Nuaimi listed by the US Treasury as terrorists from funding jihadist groups. Therefore, by seeking to support Iran in its war of words against those who accuse her of supporting terrorism, Iran only seeks to extend its geopolitical agenda.

In as much as the international community’s perception of Iran’s rogue character is thought to be due to the irrational nature of its leaders, Iran’s view is different (Barzegar, 2014 p.30). Iran provides explanations to its extreme international policy – the most important of these being the need to safeguard themselves from the security threat posed by the international community, especially the US. Bahgat (2006 p.319) alludes to this in his attempt to explain why Iran has stuck with their rogue nuclear intentions. Barzegar (2014 p.32) asserts that Iran feels threatened by increased castigation from the west, prompting the need to implement extreme security measures that are aimed at reducing the influence of the West in Iran like promoting terrorist activities and embarking on the controversial nuclear project. As such, Iran feels threatened by the West’s monopoly of power and nuclear arsenals. Moreover, Iran has felt that the US’ push for nuclear disarmament is meant to ensure that Israel has nuclear monopoly in that region (Barzegar, 2014 p.32). In his argument for nuclear weaponry and energy in Iran, Barzegar (2014 p.33) identifies terrorism as a major security threat to Iran. However, Barzegar’s argument fails to realize that Iran has in the past supported terrorist groups including Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah, and continues to do so through direct funding, providing security for terrorists, and weapons to these groups meant to destabilize the Middle East (Byman, 2008). All these attempts are geared towards ensuring that Iran remains a force to reckon with in the Middle East. As such, terrorism is not a threat to Iran, but a means to help meet its aggressive expansion objective, which started after the 1979 revolution.

Earlier, Jones (1998 p.43) had reiterated that Iran’s security policies, which are local and global security risks, are not as irrational as the international community may perceive them, but are rather informed by security threats to Iran as perceived by Iran’s regime. Jones (1998 p.44) goes ahead to outline the key security threats perceived within Iran. As of 1998, Iran were wary of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein’s administration and the possibility of another Iran-Iraq war erupting. Although the Iraq military had been severely weakened by past wars and were facing economic problems following international sanctions, Saddam had the potential of becoming a big threat to Iran immediately the sanctions would be lifted; therefore, Iran had to prepare for that possibility. Jones (1998 p.44) also identifies the remote possibility of the conflict between Iran and the United Arab Emirates on the ownership of two islands. The biggest problem, in this case, would be the immediate involvement by the US. Thirdly, Iran perceives the possibility of a direct attack by the US or Israel over their refusal to cooperate with international regulations on nuclear weaponry (Jones, 1998, p.45). As such, Iran’s government launches arm and security policies that are meant to ensure that their country is safeguarded from the above-mentioned threats.

Chubin (2006 p.23) attempts to explain the rationale behind Iran’s controversial security policies with particular interest in their nuclear agenda. Chubin (2006 p.13) first gives the Iran’s perspective, which is based on Iran’s argument that the security policies of the country are not irrational, but are informed by various threats. The main factor that Chubin (2006 p.121) identifies is the regional politics in the Middle East. Iran faces a threat of possible attacks from Iraq and other neighboring countries around the Arabian Gulf. As such, Chubin argues that Iran pursuance of nuclear weaponry could be the only way to ensuring stability in the region.

Vakil (2006 p.57) also emphasizes on the importance of Iran’s perception of security threats from the West in the development of their rather controversial security policies. Iran’s intention is to secure its people, which is explicitly recorded in its constitution, – it is for this reason that Iran would seek support from China and Russia to complete their nuclear program (Vakil, 2006 p.61). This is also the only explanation as to why Iran would brave international sanctions that could come as a result of their persistence in implementing their nuclear deal. As Jones (1998 p.44) suggests, Iran generally mistrusts the international community following the events of the Iran-Iraq war. Therefore, Iran maintains that it is out to seek for autonomy and total security.

Additionally, Le Billon and El Khatib (2003 p.109) suggest that although terrorism poses a significant security threat to Iran, the war against terror by the West is perceived in Iran as an indirect attack on them. In other words, Iran perceives the war on terror as US’s way of accessing the interior of Iran and controlling the oil mining industry. This further increases Iran’s worry that they can be attacked by the US, Israel, or other Western countries in the name of a war against terror. Therefore, Iran has to develop policies that safeguard their oil even if the policies do not sound rational before the international community.

Nevertheless, a look into Iran’s interest in the Middle East provides a different perspective altogether. While both sides suffered and lost significantly in terms of life and resources during the Iran-Iraq wars, Iran has seen Iraq as a strategic location to achieve the objectives of the Iranian Revolution. Iraq’s religious position with the second largest population of the Shi’i, that is approximately 65% of Iraqis, makes it ideal to develop Iran’s Shi’i revolutionary agenda (Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 2015, p.3). Moreover, as home for Najaf and Karbala, two critical Shi’i sites, where Ali ibn Abi Talib and Imam Hussein are buried, Iraq is a critical religious site for Shi’i Muslims. As such, in 2015, Iran invested more than 13.5 million US dollars in Iraq to foster the construction of shrines (Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 2015, p.3). Therefore, Iraq does not pose a real security threat to Iran; the latter only seeks to interfere in Iraq’s affairs and convert it into a ground for achieving its Shi’i agenda.

Similarly, Iran has always considered Israel as an enemy of Islam and the Middle East. Israel has, therefore, been viewed as a country with remarkable strategic capabilities, a US agent in the region, key influence of the US policy in Iran, and a nemesis of its own right (Rezaei and Cohen, 2014, p.2). Prior to the Iranian Revolution, Iran was the only country that had close ties with Israel in the Middle East. Iran maintained a mutual relationship with Israel and even provided Israel with oil during the 1956 Suez Crisis and rejected the destruction of Israel, recognizing it as an independent and sovereign state as other Islamic countries demanded for its destruction (Rezaei and Cohen, 2014, p.2). However, after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini cut diplomatic ties with Israel, questioning its existence and legitimacy. Iran has since then adopted a pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel stance. Iran continues to support Palestinian forces against Israel through weapons and financial aid. Like his predecessor, Ali Khamenei has also spearheaded the destruction of Israel. Israel’s military activities have only been regarded as decisions to protect itself from the hard stance from most Middle East countries (Rezaei and Cohen, 2014, p.2). Therefore, empowering Iran with nuclear capabilities is a threat to Israel and its allies and any country that Iran may deem as an enemy.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Iran’s position in the Middle East and image as a rogue state poses a major security challenge in the region. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution that sought to develop one Islamic State, Iran has embarked on a series of events aimed at jeopardizing security in the Middle East and global peace. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has led Iran into enacting a series of foreign policies aimed at destabilising its neighbours and extending its wrong interpretation of the Qur’an and achieving its geopolitical agenda and foreign policies as evidenced in its geopolitical intentions. Apart from being a sympathiser of terrorism, Iran has funded terrorism groups in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and other areas in the Middle East and even saw direct attacks on US forces and those who oppose the regime. Strengthened by its constitution, Iran has reiterated on its hostile foreign policies and disregard for international law. With a ‘ceremonial president’, Iran’s Supreme Leader makes decisions on war and all policies in Iran as it seeks to grow its Shi’i religious narrative. Nonetheless, despite sanctions from the US, UN, and GCC members, Iran is still adamant in its resolve to build a nuclear program, which has been termed as a means to achieve its geopolitical intentions. Iran’s nuclear deal poses a security threat to the whole world and not just Israel and Middle East countries. If Iran builds a sustainable nuclear facility and gives its nuclear weapons to terrorists or directly use them as it has done with other weapons, this would result into a new, unending war. Iran’s recent use of chemical weapons in Mosul is a reflection of what its regime would do if it acquired nuclear weapons. Therefore, although Iran is a sovereign and independent state, it has little regards to human life, sovereignty of other countries, and respect for international law and covenants.

Based on the mentioned security issues that Iran’s geopolitical agenda has caused in the region, the GCC countries and the international community must embark on efforts to counter Iran and the terrorist-radical groups it sponsors. There is a need for better efforts in fighting terrorism in the GCC and the Middle East, which would extend to a global fight against terrorism (Katzman, 2017, p. 58). Such efforts could be through sanctioning reliefs to prevent Iran from the illegal acquisition of technology and resources required in achieving its nuclear and missile programs (Habibi, 2010, p.2). The GCC countries should improve the capabilities of the Peninsula Shield, intelligence sharing, as well as unifying their foreign policy in order to deter the security threats that are imposed by the Iranian regime. Saudi Arabia has shown its resolve to fight terrorism through its sanctions on Iran, and recently Qatar. While Qatar is currently a critical member of the GCC, it has faced a hostile relationship with other GCC members for sponsoring terrorism. There is a need for other GCC members to treat Qatar the same way they do to Iran as an example on their resolve to achieve the goals of the fight against terrorism. The 2017 Riyadh Summit provided a critical opportunity to solidify cooperation between the GCC and the US, which were not well-grounded in the past. However, as King Salman reiterated, the fight against terror is an opportunity for countries in the Middle East to reiterate that Islam is a peaceful religion, contrary to perceptions that Iran has always shown the world. The US$350 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia is an opportunity to intensify efforts to end terror groups in the region.

Besides, sanctions against Iran from international community through the Security Council in order to amend and change their constitution and laws so it would comply with the international law and norms. (Sanger & Schmitt, 2012, p.1; Khaitous, 2009, p.20). Iran’s radical undertone requires a blockade from the GCC, UN, countries in the Security Council, its main trade partner (South Korea), and other countries that have a resolve to fight terror groups. Thirdly, there should be increasing efforts of fighting the terrorist rebels and militants in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, as well as establishing political remedies to every nation (Modell & Asher, 2012, p. 10). As a result, this attempt would not only see an end to terror groups and radicalizzation, but also stabilize the entire region. In turn, these efforts would enhance the region’s economic growth and political stability. Fourth, the GCC region has to continually enforce and issue laws deterring terrorist groups in the area (Lebovic, 2007, p. 11). Such efforts would include adopting the foreign policies such as the U.S foreign policy to protect the internal affairs of the GCC states.

Moreover, for any to achieve any sustainability, there is a need for continuing the efforts to fight the terrorist militants and rebels in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, and finding political solutions to each of these countries in order to end the conflict and stabilize them. This will result in stabilizing the whole region and reduce the likelihood of new terror group seeking to pass Iran’s agenda. Iran has always utilized new terrorist groups and used them as proxies in its geopolitical agenda. Given that international sanctions threatening Iran’s economy have not been entirely effective in preventing Iran from funding terrorism and giving a new stand on its nuclear ambitions, it is now time to also collectively deal with terrorism and support the international community in such endeavours.

Lastly, the initiative of King Abdulla – Saudi Arabia, which was presented in the 32nd Riyadh Summit in 2011 about moving from the cooperation phase to the union phase is also a critical factor that GCC members should consider. A union against Iran and its support for terror groups provides an opportunity to act in unison against Iran as was evidenced in efforts by the European Union. Oman and Qatar will no longer maintain a normal relationship with Iran and probably take a new perspective similar to Saudi Arabia’s. Nevertheless, such a move solely depends on whether individual sheikdoms are ready to shelve their individual ambitions and agree on a unified stance on Iran.

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